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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters that fall under the broad banner of applied
microeconomics, with a particular focus on the study of conflict and its social cost.
The importance of social security systems, providing a safety net for individu-
als to cope with shocks is well understood in developed countries. Less developed
countries struggle with implementing social security schemes, due to a lack of state
capacity, which often render these schemes less effective than designed. However, so-
cial insurance schemes may have far greater benefits in societies, where there is latent
conflict. In the first chapter of this thesis, I study the Indian employment guarantee
act and its effect on rural labour markets, mitigating adverse shocks by providing
safe outside options. I show that this scheme has a significant effect on the dynamics
of intra-state conflict: it moderates the cyclical nature of conflict triggered by adverse
shocks and thus, helps to contribute to substantially lower levels of overall violence.
The importance of technologies to smooth adverse shocks, in particular, shocks due
to bad weather, will become increasingly important due to climate change.
The second chapter analyses a dimension along which conflict is costly. We esti-
mate the impact of Somali piracy on the costs of trade. In spite of general agreement
that establishing the rule of law is central to properly functioning economies, little
is known about the cost of law and order breakdowns. We study shipping routes
whose shortest path exposes them to the risk of piracy and find that the increase in
attacks in 2008 lead to an 8 to 12 percent increase in shipping costs. We estimate the
welfare loss due to piracy based on these estimates and arrive at a fairly conservative
estimate: generating around 120 USD million of revenue for Somali pirates led to a
welfare loss in excess of 630 USD million, highlighting that the welfare losses from
trade disruptions are substantial and piracy capture only a small share relative to the
loss in welfare.
The third chapter is reflecting my earlier research interest in the economics of
micro finance. The chapter provides a theoretical model contrasting individual li-
ability lending with and without groups to joint liability lending. This research is
motivated by an apparent shift away from joint liability lending, while still retaining
the group structure. We show under what conditions individual liability can deliver
welfare improvements over joint liability, conditions that depend on the joint income
distribution and social capital. We then show that lower transaction costs that me-
chanically favour group lending may also encourage the creation of social capital.
In the last section, we draw on estimated parameters to simulate the model and to
3
quantify our welfare conclusions.
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Preface
This thesis consists of three chapters that fall under the broad banner of applied
microeconomics, with a particular focus on the study of conflict and its social cost.
Conflict is socially very costly but remains a prevalent feature in the 21st century.
The first chapter studies the relationship between social insurance and the impact of
local Monsoon weather shocks on conflict in India. Considering the vast literature
that has studied the relationship between weather shocks and human conflict (see
Hsiang et al. (2013)), the concern is that climate change could induce more human
conflict. Hence, it becomes increasingly important to understand whether and how
social insurance schemes could moderate the weather and conflict relationship by
providing insurance. A central economic mechanism that drives conflict is the op-
portunity cost channel. A productivity shock puts downward pressure on workers’
outside options, which renders joining or supporting insurgency movements incen-
tive compatible. Insurgents draw from this increased support base and are able to
affect more violence. The core of this argument implies that any intervention that
smoothes away negative shocks should contribute to weaken the link between eco-
nomic shocks and conflict, through its stabilising effect on workers outside options.
The first chapter is a contribution that tries to tackle the question on whether public
interventions can achieve this end.
The testing ground for this study is India. India has suffered from many low-
intensity intra-state conflicts throughout its history; while these are endemic, they
are still not too intense for the state to not function altogether. This allows me to
study how a workfare scheme, introduced under the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Act (NREGA) in 2006, could moderate the relationship between income
and conflict.
The chapter focuses not on the levels of violence, but rather on the elasticity of
violence with respect to income and how this relationship changes after the introduc-
tion of the workfare program. Before the introduction of NREGA, agricultural pro-
duction, wages and violence in India were strongly rainfall dependent to the present
day. This is a surprising finding, since the dependence of Monsoon rainfall should
have been weakened through decades worth of investment in physical infrastructure
such as damns, irrigation canals, or railroads and roads. Nevertheless, the elasticity
between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural GDP estimated in this paper is actually
higher than the one presented in the existing literature derived from historical data.
A one percent increase in Monsoon rain, increases agricultural GDP per capita by
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0.36%. This relationship between rainfall and agricultural incomes appears to be the
driving force behind the strong reduced form relationship between Monsoon rain
and conflict in India before the introduction of NREGA.
Following the introduction of NREGA, I highlight in the second step that NREGA
appears to have completely removed the relationship between Monsoon rain and con-
flict. A similar pattern emerges when studying agricultural wages. The introduction
of NREGA insulates agricultural wages from shocks, while agricultural output is still
very much dependent on Monsoon rainfall. This suggests two things: first, NREGA
serves as an effective tool to stabilise agricultural wages and thus incomes; however,
it is not able to affect the underlying agricultural production function, at least in the
time-period under study.
In the third step, I explore the underlying mechanisms that explain the reduced
form findings. I show that NREGA does function as a stabiliser with take-up - both
on the extensive, and the intensive margin strongly responding to contemporaneous
and lagged rainfall. An 1% lower Monsoon rainfall realisation, increases NREGA
participation by 0.2%. I show that NREGA expenditures offset around 1/3 of the
income losses that can be attributed to Monsoon shocks.
My findings do not imply that India has become a more peaceful place since the
results only suggest that a particular driver of conflict has lost its bite. Nevertheless,
despite identification concerns, I provide some tentative evidence that suggests that
overall levels of violence, following the introduction of NREGA, have gone down. I
highlight that at least 1/3 of this decrease is driven by NREGA shutting down the
opportunity cost channel, highlighting the importance of this mechanism driving
conflict.
The second chapter analyses a dimension along which conflict is costly. We es-
timate the impact of Somali piracy on the costs of trade. For centuries, piracy has
posed a threat to ocean-going trade. In essence, it is organized private predation
which thrives in locations in which law and order is weak, either because particu-
lar states provide a safe haven or due to poor international cooperation. And it has
repercussions for worldwide trade. However, despite the long-standing importance
of piracy, little is known about its economic costs. The issue has been brought into
sharp relief by the upsurge of piracy in the Gulf of Aden which poses a threat to
one of the world’s busiest shipping routes. Frequently attributed to the collapse of
effective authority in Somalia, it has provoked an international response.
We match data on piracy attacks in the maritime area around Somalia to data on
around 24,000 shipping contracts by constructing the closest navigable sea distance
between each origin and destination port for which a ship has been chartered. This
allows us to exploit the monthly time-series variation in the frequency of piracy
attacks in the main areas affected by Somali piracy to estimate the impact of piracy
on shipping costs. We then use these estimates to calibrate a model of the welfare
cost of Somali piracy.
Our regression results show that shipping costs for dry bulk goods rose by be-
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tween 8 and 12 percent when pirate activity increased in Somalia. We also show that
these larger shifts mask significant variation across months. Charter rates fluctuate
by 18 percent between the most and least dangerous months. This seasonal pattern
in shipping prices is absent prior to the upsurge in pirate activity in the region dur-
ing 2008. Accounting for this seasonal variation highlights that the average shipping
costs through the Somali area did not increase during the months in which weather
conditions inhibit pirates from operating.
The extra shipping costs that we uncover are mostly due to higher insurance costs
and the increased security measures that are needed to repel pirate attacks. These
constitute a welfare cost to the extent that labor and resources are allocated from
productive tasks towards protection. Our model compares the extraction of resources
through pirate attacks to a tax on shipping which finances an equivalent transfer. This
allows us to calculate the welfare loss caused by piracy. Our central estimate suggests
that the resource costs incurred in transferring around 120 million USD annually to
Somali pirates is well in excess of 630 million USD.
The third chapter reflects the early part of my academic journey, in which I fo-
cused on studying micro finance. The chapter contrasts individual liability lending
with and without groups to joint liability lending. The motivation for this research is
the apparent and documented shift away from lending methods that use explicit joint
liability in giving out loans. We show under what conditions individual liability can
deliver welfare improvements over joint liability, conditions that depend on the joint
income distribution and social capital. We then show that lower transaction costs that
mechanically favour group lending may also encourage the creation of social capital.
Finally, we simulate the model to quantify our welfare conclusions.
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Chapter 1
Can Workfare Programs Moderate
Violence? Evidence from India
Can public interventions persistently reduce conflict? This question is more impor-
tant than ever. The last decades have seen dramatic episodes of social unrest, some of
which turned violent leading to civil war and state failure. This has affected the lives
of millions of people.1 Between 1946 - 2005 it is estimated that civil wars claimed 10.1
million lives and currently, more than one third of developing countries are affected
by internal conflict. In an effort to contain spreading conflicts, billions of dollars are
spent on military interventions. This often takes the form of providing arms and
training for different fighting groups. The open question is whether such money
could have been spent to prevent conflict in the first place. The academic literature
can help guide policy making as it has has put a lot of emphasis on identifying drivers
of conflict. Two interlinked empirical regularities stand out. Low incomes provide a
breeding ground for civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Hegre and Samba-
nis, 2006) and adverse shocks to incomes induce new conflicts to break out or lead to
an intensification of existing ones (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Dube and Vargas, 2013;
Besley and Persson, 2008; Miguel et al., 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This robust
empirical relationship provides a blue print for a policy: social insurance. Any public
intervention that helps households smooth income following adverse shocks has the
potential to break the link between income shocks and conflict.
The scope for public interventions to protect households from income risks is
huge in developing countries. The 35 poorest countries with real GDP per capita
less than USD 1000 have experienced 2.8 times more volatile growth in consumption
per capita compared to the 35 richest countries.2 The recent World Development Re-
port 2014 arrives at similar figures suggesting that household consumption risk in
1A large literature in economics has tried to assess the true social and economic cost of conflict
and the many channels through which it operates, such as by deterring human capital investment
(Blattman and Annan, 2010; Leon, 2009; Akresh and Walque, 2008), affecting time preferences (Voors
et al., 2012), affecting capital investments (Singh, 2013), diverting foreign direct investment (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2008) or increasing trade costs (Besley et al., 2014).
2Computed as simple average using the World Bank Development Indicators studying growth in
consumption per capita between 1995-2011.
15
developing countries is of several orders of magnitude larger compared to developed
countries. Yet, the share of public resources devoted to social insurance in develop-
ing countries is dismal. Data from the International Labor Organisation for the same
set of countries suggests that the share of GDP devoted to social protection for the
poorest countries with real GDP per capita less than USD 1000 lies at 4.4 % compared
to an average of 20.5 % for the set of richest countries.3 At the same time countries
with volatile consumption per capita experience a lot more social unrest and crime.
Homicide rates in the poorest countries with most volatile consumption growth are
six times larger compared to developed countries.4 Since income risks are so pro-
nounced in developing countries, an effective social insurance could have profound
effects on the dynamics of conflict: it could break the link between income shocks
and conflict. This chapter shows that social insurance can achieve just that.
The challenge for researchers is to find a context in which the interplay between
social insurance and conflict can be studied. This is not easy to come by. First, it is
difficult to find a developing country context in which an effective social insurance
has been introduced. This is not aided by the fact that developing countries spend
little public resources on social protection despite the pronounced consumption risk.
Even if a country spends significant resources on social protection it is not clear
whether this truly reflects social insurance: providing a state-contingent pay out to
individuals that are adversely affected by shocks. Given a set of policies that devel-
oping countries classify as social protection, this needs to be refined to only include
policies that have the potential to function as insurance. Last but not least, if such a
policy has been identified in a country, it is important to bear in mind that delivery
of social insurance may be particularly difficult in countries that already experience
conflict. India checks all three boxes providing a unique testing ground to study the
relationship between social insurance and conflict. First, the country has suffered
from many low-intensity intra-state conflicts throughout its history. These conflicts
are endemic but have a relatively low intensity so that the state still functions on
many dimensions. Secondly, India has put forth many development schemes. Most
recently from 2006 onwards, India has introduced a public employment program
through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This programme
has the potential to function as social insurance by providing public employment on
local infrastructure projects at minimum wages when households demand it. Third,
NREGA is large and due to its scale may have an impact on the dynamics of conflict.
It is the biggest public employment scheme in mankind’s history, currently reaching
up to 47.9 million rural households annually, generating 210 million person-days of
employment. On a typical day, 7.7 million workers are expected to show up to work
on one of nearly 294 thousand work sites.5
This chapter makes three contributions. First, the chapter highlights that income
3Computed as simple average of using data on Total public social expenditure as a percentage of
GDP collected by the International Labor Organization for the most recent year available for each
country. If one only looks at non-pension spending, the shares are 3 % and 13.7% respectively.
4Computed using data from the most recent United Nations Homicide Statistics.
5See http://nrega.nic.in/netnrega/mpr_ht/nregampr.aspx, accessed on 14.06.2014.
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variation is an important driver of conflict in India. The chapter then studies the
relationship between insurgency conflict and social insurance in India. The focus is
not on levels of conflict but rather on the relationship linking adverse shocks to in-
comes with conflict and how this relationship changes once NREGA has been intro-
duced. This is a natural extension to the vast literature studying the effect of income
shocks on conflict and crime. The chapter highlights that public employment deliv-
ers effective insurance as it is designed to induce self-targeting. This helps overcome
problems of adverse selection inherent to transfer schemes. The NREGA employ-
ment requires households to exert effort by working on public infrastructure projects
at minimum wages. This ensures that households with ample economic opportuni-
ties have no incentive to work under NREGA even when they could credibly signal
that they have been adversely affected by a shock. The self-selection of households
ensures that NREGA resources are sent to households that are most vulnerable and
have no access to a better paying job opportunity (see Besley and Coate, 1992; Nichols
and Zeckhauser, 1982). The requirement for infrastructure construction through the
public employment can further reduce moral hazard problems, since the public em-
ployment should produce relatively easily verifiable output. The chapter also studies
the potential indirect insurance benefits that public employment can deliver: first,
agricultural labor markets could become more resilient to adverse shocks and sec-
ond, agricultural production could become more resilient against local productivity
shocks.
The chapter has three main findings. First, I show that before the introduction
of NREGA there is a strong relationship between local Monsoon shocks, proxys of
agricultural income and conflict. This complements and reinforces the findings of
the existing literature on conflict in India. I then show that since the introduction of
NREGA the relationship between Monsoon shocks and agricultural wages has sta-
tistically disappeared. Local Monsoon shocks cease to have an effect on agricultural
wages, while they continue to strongly predict agricultural output. This suggests
that agricultural productivity and agricultural wages have decoupled since NREGA
was introduced. More importantly, I show that the relationship linking Monsoon
rainfall shocks and conflict has disappeared. Studying violent crimes and rioting
suggests similar results. The introduction of NREGA induced an inward rotation of
the relationship linking Monsoon shocks and conflict or crime. The finding is ro-
bust to an array of checks and is most pronounced when studying conflict events
where the target of violence are civilians. This suggests that NREGA helps bring
civilians out of the line of fire. The third findings highlight that NREGA provides
insurance. I show that public employment under NREGA is utilized as a tool help-
ing households to smooth consumption following adverse shocks. Participation in
the program strongly responds to adverse Monsoon shocks along the extensive and
intensive margin. In addition I provide a simple quantification exercise suggesting
that 30% of the district level income losses due to an adverse Monsoon shock are
offset by direct NREGA expenditure flowing into a district. This does not capture the
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indirect benefits gained by households from stabilized agricultural wages.
This chapter also makes some advances methodologically. This is the first chapter
to use a novel conflict dataset that covers the whole of South Asia and has been
constructed using scalable Natural Language Processing Tools (presented in Fet-
zer, 2013). The semi-automated coding procedure makes the process of coding data
highly transparent and can be used to complement human coding of conflict data.
This highlights the possibility to use semi-automated machine-learning routines for
data cleaning and preparation in a field of economics research, where data availabil-
ity and coding routines have been identified as an important constraint (Blattman
and Miguel, 2010).
This chapter contributes to the nascent literature that evaluates the extent to which
public interventions can affect the dynamics of conflict. Moderating the relationship
between conflict and productivity shocks requires insulating personal incomes from
these shocks. Technologies that can break the link between productivity shocks and
incomes can be classified into three categories: (1) physical infrastructure, (2) new
production technologies or (3) politically created institutions. Most of the empirical
literature has focused on evaluating whether these technologies increase levels of in-
come, rather than moderating income volatility.6 Only recently, some studies have
emerged that take the results form these chapters to study whether they help break
the link between productivity and conflict. In the first category falls Sarsons (2011)’s
paper, which builds on work by Duflo and Pande (2007) suggesting that the construc-
tion of dams moderated wage volatility, but appear not to have moderated Hindu-
Muslim riots. This is not too surprising as physical infrastructure, while increasing
levels of income, may not prove to be effective in providing insurance. Hornbeck
and Keskin (2014) finds that farmers adjust their production technologies to take
advantage of irrigation, which leads to higher production levels but not necessarily
lower volatility. The insurance that is provided by access to irrigation may induce
households to take more risks ex-ante in the crop choice. In the second category falls
the work by Jia (2014), who studies the moderating effect of the drought resistant
sweet potato as a new technology on the incidence of riots in historical China. She
finds that the sweet potato persistently reduced the impact of droughts on rioting.
Production technologies that help households cope with shocks may not be available
in certain contexts. This chapter is the first to fall into the third category, evaluating
whether a politically created institution such as India’s National Rural Employment
Guarantee achieves the goal to insulate personal incomes from negative shocks and
through that, remove the income dependence of conflict.
This chapter also relates to the wider literature on the economics of conflict and
labor markets. Shapiro et al. (2011) study how levels of unemployment affect levels
6Duflo and Pande (2007) evaluate the construction of dams and its impact on agricultural production
in India. Aggarwal (2014) evaluates the impact of road construction, while Donaldson (2010) studies
the impact of railroad construction in colonial India. Burgess and Donaldson (2010) build on that work
to study how trade integration may have cushioned the effect of adverse productivity shocks on famine
mortality. Another vast literature tries to understand and design effective rainfall or weather insurance
schemes (see e.g. Lilleor and Giné (2005) or Cole et al. (2008)).
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of insurgency violence in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Philippines, finding no support
for an opportunity cost channel at work. Iyengar et al. (2011) on the other hand,
highlight that increased construction spending seems to cause lower levels of labour
intensive violence. Annan and Blattman (2014) present results from a randomised
control trial in Liberia, indicating that interventions providing training and capital
can greatly increase the opportunity cost of becoming a mercenary and thus, con-
tribute to weaken the relationship between shocks and conflict.7 A smaller literature
studies conflict in India, in particular studying the Maoist movement and the driving
forces behind this conflict (Gomes, 2012). Vanden Eynde (2011) and Gawande et al.
(2012) established that the Naxalite conflict varies systematically with incomes or
proxies thereof, suggesting an opportunity cost channel at work. This chapter builds
on to their work studying conflict and crime across the whole of India and how the
NREGA workfare scheme weakened the link between income shocks and conflict.
The chapter also relates to recent research efforts that seek to estimate level effects
of the introduction of NREGA on conflict levels in India. This chapter does not
focus on the level effect of NREGA for two reasons. First, there are identification
concerns as the roll-out of NREGA was clearly targeted towards poor and vulnerable
districts: districts that experienced conflict received NREGA earlier, making districts
that received NREGA later a poor counterfactual. It is conceptually not clear why
one should expect to see an effect of NREGA on conflict levels, bearing in mind that
NREGA provides social insurance. This chapter highlights that NREGA functions
as social insurance following adverse shocks. The insurance effect of NREGA on
conflict levels should manifest itself through the interaction with adverse shocks.
The effect of NREGA on conflict levels should manifest itself indirectly over time.
With this in mind, I estimate level effects in the appendix and find similar results to
Dasgupta et al. (2014). They use a difference-in-difference estimator to estimate the
level effect of NREGA. The identifying variation this relies on is coming from the
sequential roll out of NREGA, coming solely from two years of data. Khanna and
Zimmermann (2013) address the endogeneity of the roll out directly and use a fuzzy
regression discontinuity design. They reverse engineer the NREGA roll out algorithm
to identify districts that were near the cutoff of being assigned into an earlier or later
phase. Districts close to the cutoff serve as counterfactual. Their results indicate
that the introduction of NREGA lead to an increase in levels of conflict in the short
run. The concern with this research design is that it lives off very few observations
of districts on either side of the cutoff that experience conflict variation. However,
some districts included may have never experienced any conflict event throughout
the whole sample period and thus, may not be a good counterfactual.
The chapter is organised as follows. The second section provides some back-
ground on the context of conflict in India and the NREGA workfare program. Section
3 presents the data used, discussing the novel conflict dataset created for this chap-
ter. Section 4 presents the empirical strategy used in this chapter. Section 5 discusses
7This contrasts with Blattman et al. (2014), who find that a Ugandan employment program, despite
large income gains, is not correlated with lower levels of aggression or protests.
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the main results and provides robustness checks. In Section 6 I show that NREGA
functions as insurance and quantify to what extent it offsets risks. The last section
concludes.
1.1 Context: Conflict and Insurance in India
India is affected by multiple insurgency movements. The most prolific insurgencies
are the Maoist insurgency that stretches across East India and into several districts in
India’s Northeast (also known as the 7 Sister States). In the North East, various in-
surgency movements strive for political independence from the Indian government.
Most prolific are the movements in the states of Manipur and Assam. It is difficult to
separate these conflicts from one another due to the geographic proximity and exist-
ing interlinkages. The Maoist groups have documented ties with insurgencies in the
North East, in particular with the Manipur based People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and the Assam based United Liberation Front (ULFA).8 This makes insurgency a re-
gional phenomena covering most of East India and the North East. A particular focus
of the academic literature has been the Maoist conflict.9 The movement started out as
a peasant revolt against extortive labor relationships with landlords in West Bengal.
In May 1968 the “All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries”
(AICCCR) was formed. This organization became the root for the armed struggle of
multiple organizations, including the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-M). The
CPI-M, in its present state, is the result of mergers of various groups beginning in the
late 1990s and the early 2000s. CPI-M as an organization consists of a political wing
and an armed wing and is considered a terrorist organization. It is estimated that
the military wing the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army consists of at least 10,000
combatants.10 Originating in West Bengal, the movement has spread to less devel-
oped areas of rural southern and eastern India. The Naxalites are especially prolific
in states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh; but they
are also present in some states in the North East, in particular in Assam, Arunachal
Pradesh and Tripura. In 2006, around 1/3 of India’s roughly 600 districts were con-
sidered under the influence of left-wing extremism or subject to violence, forming a
“red corridor” that stretches across India (see Figure 1.1).11 The aim of the Maoists
is to overthrow the existing government and establish a communist state. The Union
government under Manmohan Singh has announced that Naxalism poses India’s
largest internal security threat.12
The Maoist movement is most prolific in India’s rural districts. Districts affected
8See Lok Shaba Unstarred Questions 3138 (13.12.2011) and No 1964 (17.12.2013). Ramana (2007) and
http://goo.gl/bB8wLp, accessed 20.01.2013.
9See Gawande et al. (2012); Gomes (2012); Hoelscher et al. (2012); Vanden Eynde (2011); Khanna and
Zimmermann (2013); Morrison (2012); Morgan and Reiter (2013).
10Henceforth, I will refer to the CPI-M and its military wing as the Naxalites, the Naxalite movement
or the Naxals.
11I will work with district definitions as per the 2001 census.
12See http://www.economist.com/node/15579946, accessed 25.02.2011.
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by left-wing extremism are marked by underdevelopment: districts under left wing
extremist influence are characterized by lower rates of urbanization, higher degrees
of illiteracy and limited access to infrastructure (such as paved roads, electricity, pri-
mary education or health care facilities, see Table 1.11.) The Naxalites are also very
prolific in the jungle districts of Chhattisgarh, Bihar and Jharkhand, where they con-
trol swaths of land and are said to draw support from the high share of tribal people
living there.
The economic livelihood in left-wing extremist affected districts is dominated by
subsistence farming, sharecropping or wage employment in the agricultural sector.
The states of Jarkhand and Chhattisgarh host most of India’s coal and bauxite re-
serves which attracts a lot of investment for resource exploitation. The Naxalties are
said to extort taxes from mining companies and intimidate firms. In forested areas
the main source of income is the production of forest produce such as the collection
of tendu leaves, which are used to produce cigarettes. According to data from the
National Sample Survey 2001, 64.9% of households directly rely on agriculture as
primary means of income in India. In states with significant Naxalite presence, this
share is significantly higher; for example, up to 90% of Chhattisgarh’s population is
employed in agriculture. For the tribal population, Gawande et al. (2012) highlight
the relative importance of income from forest produce. Any shock to local incomes
has dramatic consequences to the rural livelihoods. This results in very poor devel-
opmental indicators with tribal households displaying significantly higher levels of
food insecurity. Nearly 71.6% of tribal households being food deficit for 2-3 months
in a year and 79% of tribal children being anemic (Radhakrishna and Ray, 2006).
The Naxalites are highly organized. Across regions, the political wing has a Cen-
tral Committee that makes key strategic decisions, while Regional- and State Bu-
reaus are responsible for organization of coordinated activities, such as strikes. Local
Squad Area Committees have a high degree of autonomy on individual operations.
The military wing is called the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA) and has
similar structure. At the village level a civilian militia operates. They act as infor-
mants and provide direct support and shelter for armed squads. New recruits are
typically sent for training into training camps. There they receive a basic military
training, lasting between 6-12 months, which equips them with the necessary knowl-
edge of guerilla warfare, including handling of rifles and minor explosives (such as
hand grenades, land-mines and improvised explosive devices), before joining an ac-
tive fighting squad in their home district. The Naxalites have ties with insurgency
movements in the North East. They cooperate in the procurement of arms and the
training of new recruits.13
The governments response to the various insurgency movements is hindered by
the federal structure of the Indian Union. Law and order rests in the domain of state
governments. The Maoist insurgency is flexible across borders. The Operation Green
Hunt, that took off in early 2010 was the first integrated response against Naxalism
13See Lok Shaba Unstarred Questions 3138 (13.12.2011) and No 1964 (17.12.2013).
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by the central government conjoint with the states. Estimates suggest that around
100,000 Central Reserve Police Force personnel operate along the side of State Police
Forces, mainly in Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa.14 The deployment of
paramilitary is the latest military response of the Indian state. However, some de-
velopment policies were also put forward to tackle chronic underdevelopment. One
policy is the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) which in December 2010 released a block
grant of INR 25 crore (roughly USD 4 million) as additional funding for infrastruc-
ture development. The scheme was first conceptualized to provide additional funds
to 35 districts that were severely affected by left wing extremism, but was later ex-
panded and now covers around 80 backward districts. Projects funded through the
IAP are decided upon by district-level committees with limited involvement of local
stakeholders.
Naxalite’s do want to be seen as the advocates of local interests to gain legiti-
macy and through that, foster their popular support and recruit active fighters. A
lot of these grievances are brought into relief by economic shocks. Some examples
of issues aggravated by economic shocks are relationships with moneylenders who
forcefully demand repayment, grievances surrounding sharecropping arrangement,
which leave farmers with little of the produce, or low wages being paid. In these
environments Naxalites are said to step in and protect the interests.15 This could
involve launching of “famine raids” (Dash, 2006), calls for bandhs (strikes) to push
for higher wages (Ranjan and Prasad, 2012) or targeted violence against civilians that
may turn to becoming police informers (Vanden Eynde, 2011).
It is in environments of deprivation and hunger when they are able to actively
recruit new fighters from the local population without having to rely on coercive
means. The anecdotal accounts on recruiting of insurgents are concentrated around
the Maoist insurgency. Verma (2011) argues that environments of deprivation are
ideal for “Maoists to step in, by paying a handsome amount of around Rs. 3000 to
the young and promising parents that their kid will have food and money.” There
are accounts suggesting that Naxalites use the extortion revenues and money from
Narcotics trade to pay monthly stipends of around Rs 1,500 (see Ramana, 2007). This
figure is significant compared to average agricultural wages ranging between Rs 50
- 70 per day in India’s poorest districts (see Table 1.1). Higher levels of recruitment
will ultimately lead to more violence, once the new recruits have been trained and
sent back to their home districts.
While these are distinct mechanisms, they have in common that they are brought
into relief by adverse shocks. This generates the widely observed correlation be-
tween contemporaneous violence and lagged Monsoon season rainfall that has been
14Some states have responded by setting up local militias recruited as Special Police Officers (SPOs).
In Chhattisgarh, the state government has commissioned and armed local militia known as “Salwa
Juddum” (peace hunt), which is said to operate with complete impunity and lead to an escalation of
violence.
15See discussion in Pandita (2011) relating to money lenders, Deshpande and Shah (2010) for a discus-
sion about the relationship between droughts and farmer suicides in relation to money lending, Prasad
(1987) for a discussion of tenancy arrangements and conflict in Bihar.
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observed in the data. This chapter studies how the relationship between local Mon-
soon shocks and conflict (or general violent crimes) changes with the introduction of
the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act.
The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was
passed in 2005 and establishes a “right to work” by providing a legal entitlement to
100 days of (minimum) wage employment per household and financial year to rural
households. The Ministry of Rural Development considers the program to be “the
largest and most ambitious social security and public works program in the world”
(Ministry of Rural Development, 2012). The goal of NREGA is to develop a strong
social safety net for vulnerable groups by providing employment sources when other
employment alternatives are scarce (Ministry of Rural Development, 2008). It is also
envisioned as a “growth engine for sustainable development of an agricultural econ-
omy, through the process of providing employment on works that address causes
of chronic poverty such as drought, deforestation and soil erosion. The Act seeks
to strengthen the natural resources base of rural livelihood and create durable assets
which have potential to generate additional employment in the years to come in rural
areas.”16
The employment scheme that is defined under the act was rolled out in three
phases between 2006 and 2008 and covers nowadays all Indian districts.17 In the first
phase, 200 districts received the program from the first quarter of 2006 onwards. In
2007, 130 further districts were added, while, in early 2008 the last phase the remain-
ing rural districts received the scheme. The order of the roll out was far from being
random. Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the districts falling in different
phases. Districts that received NREGA in earlier rounds had significantly lower agri-
cultural output per capita and wages. They were more likely to be considered under
left-wing extremist influence and more likely to be experiencing any conflict event.
Access to infrastructure, such as roads, health-care and postal services are also a lot
worse. The endogeneity of the roll-out makes it difficult for any empirical study that
aims to identify a level effect of the program.
The administration of NREGA is decentralized and aims to empower local gov-
ernance structures down to the Panchayat level, the lowest level of governance in
India. A panchayat typically comprises a few villages or hamlets. In case people
want to work under the scheme they approach their local panchayat representative
and express their interest to work. The Gram Panchayat will issue a Job Card used to
identify a household. Each household can request one Job Card and all adult mem-
bers of a household that are willing to work under NREGA will be registered on that
households job card. There is no cost for creating a job card borne by households.
The panchayat then has to provide work on a public project within a two week period
at the given state-level minimum wage.18 As NREGA employment requires house-
16See http://www.nrega.nic.in, accessed 12.02.2014.
17Excluded are a few purely urban districts. I refer to the scheme that is defined under the Act as
NREGA from hereon as well.
18Minimum Wage Laws existed before the inception of NREGA. These had limited impact as Mini-
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holds to exert effort by working on public infrastructure projects at minimum wages,
this ensures that households with ample economic opportunities have no incentive
to work under NREGA even when they could credibly signal that they have been
adversely affected by a shock. Such targeting is not achieved by any other govern-
ment schemes that could be classified as providing social protection; in particular, the
Public Distribution System or the system of Minimum Support Prices for agricultural
produce.19 If the panchayat fails to provide work, a daily unemployment allowance
(which is below minimum wage), financed by the state government, is to be paid.
The projects on which workers are employed have to be in close proximity to the
home of the worker (at most 5 km distance) and there is additional remuneration for
transportation costs or living expenses, while on the work site. The NREGA act fur-
ther requires that 60 percent of the budget for a project be allocated to wages. Also,
the use of machines or contractors is prohibited. Another requirement is that at least
1/3 of the workers need to be female.
The design of NREGA included a major push for financial inclusion by requiring
that all wage payments be made through the banking sector or through bank accounts
held with postal offices. NREGA income is to be paid weekly by wire transfer to
local post offices or bank accounts. This is not fully implemented across India to date
which is a big concern due to corruption in the scheme (see Niehaus and Sukhtankar,
2013b).
The types of works are decided at the local level. Districts prepare a shelf of
projects which need to be agreed on with local panchayats. In particular, the act seeks
to empower panchayats by giving them the right to assign priorities to infrastructure
projects that meet local needs and preferences. The type of infrastructure projects
range from drought proofing of land, to micro-irrigation works, rural-sanitation and
rural connectivity. As NREGA provides a legal entitlement that becomes available
when households demand employment it can be used by households as insurance
against adverse shocks. This allows NREGA to function as a form of social insurance,
providing protection against idiosyncratic shocks. Low Monsoon rainfall is robustly
correlated with low agricultural output and wages. Employment on public works
may be an attractive outside option in such situations. On the other hand, wages paid
under NREGA are not too high as they are fixed at the respective minimum wages.
This ensures that NREGA work becomes unattractive in times of ample economic
opportunities elsewhere.
In addition to the direct employment generation there are also indirect effects
that can contribute to the program functioning as insurance of local incomes. These
indirect effects may be attributable to the types of infrastructure being constructed
under the scheme. Micro-irrigation infrastructure, constructed through the scheme,
may persistently moderate the rainfall income relationship.
mum Wage Laws were either not enforced (Planning Commission, 2008) or simply did not apply as in
the case of self-employment which is the predominant form of agricultural employment.
19Despite a reform in 1997, turning the Public Distribution System into a Targeted Public Distribution
System targeting is still extremely poor (Gadenne, 2014).
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The scheme under the NREGA Act is the largest known workfare program, gen-
erating 2.84 billion person-days of employment during the financial year 2009-2010
for 53 million rural households and thus, benefiting 291 million individuals. For that
year, each participating household worked an average of 54 days under the scheme.
The fiscal expenditure for that financial year amounted to INR 37,900 crore, or USD
6.3 billion. Out of this, wages amounted to INR 25,500 crore, or USD 4.2 billion,
implying additional labor income of USD 79 per household and financial year. This
stands significant in contrast to an agricultural output per capita of INR 13,500 or
USD 226.20 NREGA flows into districts that are vulnerable to conflict. The 222 dis-
tricts out of 543 districts that experience conflict variation in my sample accounted
for more than 50% of the expenditures under NREGA throughout. The mere size of
the scheme in relation to any other development scheme generate the possibility for
NREGA to have a profound impact on the relationship between weather shocks and
agricultural sector income. In the next section, I discuss the main data sources used
in this study, before proceeding to the empirical strategy of the chapter.
1.2 Data
This chapter combines data from many different sources to provide an overarching
picture on how NREGA affected the dynamics of conflict. There are three main data
sources to be highlighted. First, the data covering conflict across India. This dataset
is developed using an approach that is novel to the conflict literature by relying on
language processing algorithms to code conflict events based on newspaper reports.
I complement this dataset with official crime reporting. The second major effort is
to develop agricultural income and wages data exploiting a multitude of different
data sources. Lastly I use some novel remote sensed rainfall data and various other
sources of weather data.
District Level Conflict data Empirical research on the economics of conflict almost
always suffers from severe data limitations. This lies in the nature of the subject of
study. Typically places that exhibit conflict are only weakly institutionalized with
little official reporting and little press and media coverage. Blattman and Miguel
(2010)’s review cites that the correlation across different civil war datasets ranges
from 0.42 to 0.96, which may be the reason why empirical results are often not re-
producible using similar identification strategies, but different datasets or variable
definitions (Ciccone, 2011).
For civil war datasets differences can easily be reconciled. However, the conflict
literature is moving increasingly to study more micro-datasets at finer spatial and
temporal resolutions. Researchers are often left with a set of primary data sources,
such as newspaper reports or news-feeds from wire services that need to be trans-
lated into a workable dataset for the econometrician, providing conflict event or inci-
20Agriculture accounts for 18% of GDP per capita, but employs 51% of the labor force. See World De-
velopment Indicators, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS, accessed 22.08.2014.
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dence counts at a certain spatial- and temporal resolution. As these research efforts
are decentralized this could result in many different datasets being coded up from
the same raw data sources. The datasets need not coincide as researchers apply dif-
ferent coding practices. This renders the datasets not easily comparable, subject to
subjectivity bias which also makes them difficult to expand. This chapter uses a
novel approach to code violence data for the whole of India stemming from 28,638
newspaper clippings collected by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). The SATP
newspaper clippings represents the most extensive and systematic collection of raw
sources covering conflict in India.21 The primary sources have been used in the con-
text of studying conflict in India by many different authors.22
This chapter is the first to use a novel approach for coding conflict event data
derived from primary sources. The idea is to use computer algorithms for language
processing to emulate the way humans would code conflict data. The core unit of
analysis is a sentence in a newspaper clipping. For each sentence key pieces of
information are obtained, namely the subject-, verb- and object, along with the time
and location that an event took place.23
Two unidentified terrorists︸ ︷︷ ︸
subject
verb︷ ︸︸ ︷
massacred
object︷ ︸︸ ︷
six members of a family
and
verb︷︸︸︷
left
object︷ ︸︸ ︷
a seventh
verb︷ ︸︸ ︷
injured
time & location︷ ︸︸ ︷
at Mangnar Top, Poonch district, on December 31, 2001.
To illustrate, consider the above example of a sentence. The routine identifies, for
every verb, its underlying subject, object and surrounding meta-information, such
as time and locations, which are indicated by prepositions or due to their syntactic
position in a sentence. With this processing step achieved, the data can be further
refined. In the above case, we may want to label the perpetrator (“two unidentified
terrorists”) of the act of “massacring” to be “terrorists” and the subject (“six members
of a family”) to be “civilians”. This allows a further study of the targets of violence
and an analysis of casualty figures.
This routine is an improvement compared to what the existing literature does.
Firstly, this approach allows the study of a myriad of “acts” that are reported. Many
21As the SATP presents only data from English language sources, there may be a systematic selection
problem as indicated by Gawande et al. (2012). For the purpose of this chapter this is not a concern
unless the selection is correlated systematically with rainfall shocks over time.
22There is a multitude of research papers that have separately hand coded subsets of the primary
SATP newspaper clippings covering various Indian states or various time-periods, see Dasgupta et al.
(2014); Gomes (2012); Hoelscher et al. (2012); Gawande et al. (2012); Khanna and Zimmermann (2013);
Rana (2013); Shrivastava (2014); Vanden Eynde (2011); Buhaug and Wischnath (2014).
23Language processing algorithms, developed for the English language, but increasingly for many
other languages as well, achieve very high accuracy rates in providing a correct syntactic analysis of a
sentence, see Fetzer (2013) for a detailed discussion.
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hand-coding approaches would restrict the analysis ex-ante to a set of verbs that are
indicative of violent activities, such as "to kill". In the automated approach, this can
be done ex-post. This way, one is able to include terrorist acts that did not involve
casualties, such as attacks on infrastructure, where the word "to kill" would not have
appeared. Furthermore, there is no limit to the geographic scope. Some authors
have restricted the analysis ex-ante to cover only certain Indian states to keep the
hand coding manageable or they have searched for district names.24 A third concern
that this approach addresses is human subjectivity. As the routine relies on natural
language processing algorithms it removes any subjectivity bias from the coding that
may emerge. A third advantage is the scalability of the routine. For the purpose
of this paper, I construct two main dependent variables. The first is an indicator
variable, that is simply a dummy variable that is one, in case there has been any
incident, be it violent or non-violent, in a district in a given time period. I will
refer to this as the incidence of violence. The second is the number of incidents that
occurred in a given time period, which is a broader measure. I will refer to this as
the violence intensity. The resulting dataset is a balanced district level panel covering
the time period from 2000 to 2012.25
The spatial unit used in this chapter is an Indian district. I use district definitions
from the 2001 census; since then, many districts have been carved out of existing ones
or renamed. I map these to the 2001 district boundaries. I study conflict in the whole
of India, excluding the Kashmir region. Out of this region, there are 222 districts
that experience variation in conflict intensity over the sample period. 130 districts
are classified as being left-wing extremist affected by the Ministry of Home Affairs
between 2000 and 2005. Of the remaining 92 districts, 45 are located in the North
East. The remainder are districts spread across the whole of India. Districts classified
as being under left-wing extremist influence account for the bulk of 52% of all conflict
events recorded. The states Assam and Manipur where insurgency movements have
close ties with the Naxalites or where there is significant Naxalite presence, account
for 41% of all other conflict events.
Appendix 1.A.4 provides an example of how the algorithm constructs an incident
count based on individual newspaper clippings, while Appendix 1.A.5 compares the
resulting dataset to the Global Terrorism Database. The insight is that the semi-
automatically retrieved dataset performs extremely well, compared with other vio-
lence datasets and even with manually coded data drawn from the same newspaper
clippings. In addition to this newly created conflict data, I complement this chapter
by studying crime as well. A particular emphasis is on violent crimes and crimes
against public order. These data are collected at the district level by the local police
and reported to the National Crime Records Bureau. In order to establish the link
between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural incomes, as a proxy for the livelihoods,
I collect wage- and agricultural output data at the district level. The next section
24This is problematic as a common problem in India is that there is a multitude of spelling variations
for similar district names. This could result in significant coding errors or omissions.
25The data collection through the SATP began only in mid 2000.
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describes this data.
Agricultural Production and Wages In order to test whether NREGA had an impact
on the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural wages or agricultural
production, I constructed two datasets to measure these. I use Agricultural Wage
Data from the Agricultural Wages in India (AWI) series which has been published
by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture since 1951. It is unique in offering monthly
wage rates by district (sometimes even containing multiple locations per district),
and separate wage series for several categories of labour and by gender. The quality
of the data is very poor however, with a large number of observations being missing
or simply flat wages being reported throughout. In order to increase the signal to
noise ratio, I average the data to generate an annual wage series. I detail some of the
issues with this dataset in appendix 1.A.9. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced
annual panel dataset at the district level covering the time period between 2001-2010.
More reliably measured is agricultural production. I use data on annual district level
production collected and published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics
with the Ministry of Agriculture. This data is reported at the financial year level,
which ranges from April- to March in the subsequent calendar year. I match the year
to the calendar year to ensure the largest period of overlap.26 For every district, I
only consider crops that have been consistently planted on at least 1000 hectares for
the period that the state reports data. I use state-level harvest prices to construct a
district level measure of agricultural output. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced
panel dataset covering the period from 2000-2009. The exogenous variation in this
chapter comes from a measurement of the intensity of rainfall during the Monsoon
season. As rainfall reporting from ground measurements is potentially problematic
in developing countries, I invoke some novel remote-sensed rainfall dataset.
Rainfall data This chapter uses data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission
(TRMM) satellite, which is jointly operated by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency (JAXA).
The satellite carries a set of five instruments to construct gridded rainfall rates at
very high spatial and temporal resolution. Due to the high spatial and temporal
resolution it is providing more consistent rainfall estimates than any other available
ground based observations and is considered the highest quality remote sensed rain-
fall dataset with global coverage that is currently available (see Li et al., 2012 and
Huffman et al., 2007). Its adequacy to pick up the spatial heterogeneity in precipita-
tion has been highlighted and verified in the Indian context by Rahman and Sengupta
(2007), who have shown that it outperforms e.g. the Global Precipitation Climatology
Centre (GPCC) rain gauge analysis data that has been used extensively in economics
research.27 The data has the advantage of using a consistent methodology and most
26This data is available on http://apy.dacnet.nic.in/cps.aspx, accessed 14.08.2013.
27For example by Miguel et al. (2004), Ferrara and Harari (2013) and Kudamatsu et al. (2014). My
results are robust to using the GPCC data (Schneider et al. (2011)).
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importantly, time invariant sources of input data derived from the instruments that
are carried by the satellites. This could be important as in appendix 1.A.6 I present
some evidence, suggesting that the number of ground based measurements that feed
into the GPCC could be systematically varying with levels of violence. The daily
rainfall from 2000 to 2012 comes at a fine spatial resolution of 0.25 by 0.25 degree
grid-cell size, which is converted into overall monthly rainfall in mm. For the iden-
tification, I will focus on the Monsoon season rainfall, which I define based on the
principal crops grown using the state specific Indian crop calendar.28 The Monsoon
period varies from state to state as the typical onset dates are early May for the north
east of India, while the onset may be as late as late June for central India. For most
states, the Monsoon-period ranges from June to September. The Monsoon period
rainfall accounts for at least 70% of the annual rainfall and most of the volatility.
The last important piece for the empirical analysis consists of NREGA take-up and
participation data. As I argue NREGA provides insurance against income shocks, I
study how program participation and expenditure is affected by rainfall shocks.
NREGA Participation Data I use the NREGA participation data derived from the
so-called Monthly Progress Reports (MPR) from before 2011 and from the Manage-
ment Information System (MIS) from 2011 onwards. The key variables I study are
extensive margin participation as the share of households in a district that participate
under NREGA in a given financial year, the days worked per household and the total
person days generated. I match the financial year ranging from April to March to the
nearest calendar year to be consistent throughout. I also obtained data on the num-
ber and total cost of ongoing projects, where I classify projects for road construction
and land development specifically.29 I study three major margins of NREGA take-up.
Firstly, extensive margin participation as the share of households in a district who are
employed in a year. Secondly, intensive margin participation as the log of the number
of days worked per household. Last but not least I consider total expenditures per
district and financial year. Table 1.1 presents some summary statistics suggesting that
NREGA participation is most widespread in districts that received NREGA in earlier
phases. There participation is almost twice as high, around 40% of households par-
ticipate. The expenditure per capita in districts that received the program the earliest
is also significantly higher, standing out with around 480 INR per year and person
in districts in the first two phases, compared to only 247 INR per capita and year for
the richest districts that received the program in the last round.
I the next section, I present the empirical strategy before presenting the core re-
sults.
28In particular the key reference is the crop specific calendar maintained by the Indian Food Se-
curity Mission, available via http://nfsm.gov.in/nfsmmis/RPT/CalenderReport.aspx, accessed on
12.05.2013.
29Refer to Appendix 1.A.10 for further discussion of the available NREGA participation data.
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1.3 Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy of this chapter consists of linking three variables: monsoon
rainfall, income and conflict. I study these relationships before and after the intro-
duction of the NREGA workfare program.
In the first step I analyze the effect of Monsoon season rainfall on agricultural
output and wages. I do so by estimating the relationship between agricultural out-
put, wages and Monsoon season rainfall using an unbalanced panel covering the
time-period before NREGA was introduced. This ensures that the estimates are not
affected by the impact that NREGA may have. I focus on Monsoon season rainfall.
The rain falling in this season is most important for India’s agricultural productivity.
The estimating equation is:
log(ydprt) = ad + bprt + θ × log(Rdprt) + edprt (1.1)
where the indices d stands for district, p stands for NREGA implementation phase
ranging from 1-3, r indicates region and t indicates time. The regressions include two
sets of fixed effects. First, there are district fixed effects ad which absorb any time-
invariant district characteristics that may explain levels of agricultural productivity.
These are characteristics, such as soil characteristics, elevation or terrain rugged-
ness. The second set of fixed effects are time-effects bprt. These time fixed effects are
region- and NREGA implementation phase specific and thus remove region specific
time shocks that affect districts that received NREGA in the first round differentially
from districts that received the program in rounds two and three.30 The coefficient of
interest is θ. This coefficient measures the elasticity between Monsoon season rain-
fall and agricultural wages or GDP. For the specifications with agricultural wages, I
include a set of state by NREGA phase specific linear time trends.
In the second step I empirically establish the link between Monsoon season rain-
fall and conflict. I study two margins: conflict incidence and conflict intensity. Con-
flict incidence is an indicator of whether there was any conflict event reported in a
district and year. Conflict intensity is the number of all incidences reported in a dis-
trict and year. The dataset is a balanced panel covering all mainland Indian districts
with the exception of Kashmir.31 The specification using conflict incidence is a linear
probability model with the estimating specification being:
Adprt = ad + bprt + η × log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt (1.2)
The fixed effects are as before. The coefficient that measures the link between
conflict incidence and Monsoon rain is η. This coefficient is interpreted as the rate
30I define three regions: the North-East, comprised of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Megha-
laya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and Sikkim, the Naxalite Red Corridor, formed by the states Andhra
Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Orissa, and West Bengal, and a third
region comprised of the remaining states consisting of Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Kerala,
Punjab, Rajasthan Tamil Nadu and Uttaranchal.
31I exclude Kashmir as this conflict exhibits strong inter-state dimensions.
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of change by which changes in Monsoon season rainfall translate into changes in
conflict incidence.
The choice of the empirical design follows closely the existing literature on con-
flict in India, which has found a lagged effect of income or proxies of income on the
intensity of the Naxalite conflict (see Vanden Eynde, 2011 or Gawande et al., 2012).
The choice of timing can be rationalized on grounds of the cycles of agricultural
activity. Periods of peak labor demand are the planting season at the onset of the
Monsoon, when e.g. rice plant seedlings are transplanted to the field and the harvest
season that stretches from October to December (see Figure 1.12). Incomes are only
realized at the end of the year. This holds true particularly for the self-employed
farmers, which account for 58% of rural employment across India.32 A good Mon-
soon creates the chance for a second crop to be grown during the dry season between
November to May in the subsequent year. All these imply that household income
(and expectations) at the beginning of each calendar year depend strongly on the
previous Monsoon season rains.
The second empirical specification studies the intensity of violence using a con-
ditional fixed effect Poisson model as in Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This type of
model accounts for the count nature of the number of conflict events as dependent
variable.33 The specification is:
E(Adprt) = αd exp (bprt + η × log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt) (1.3)
The coefficient of interest is again η which is interpreted as an elasticity. The spec-
ification is estimated using a balanced panel for the whole of India. However, districts
that do not experience any variation in the dependent variable do not contribute to
the estimation of the coefficients. For that reason, the tables will present a varying
number of districts across specifications. Specifications 1.2 and 1.3 are reduced forms.
It is also possible to perform an instrumental variables analysis to establish the causal
link between Monsoon rainfall and conflict.34 The use of lagged rainfall as an instru-
ment for lagged agricultural output alleviates some direct concerns about the validity
of the instrument. However, I focus mainly on the reduced form in this analysis.35
The above empirical analysis will be presented in one condensed table presenting
the impact of Monsoon rainfall on agricultural output per capita, wages and conflict
together. The main hypothesis is that before the introduction of NREGA, there is
a strong relation between lagged Monsoon season rainfall and conflict. The subse-
32See Planning Commission (2005).
33I use a Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Poisson (PPML) estimator as implemented by Silva and Ten-
reyro (2006). This estimator overcomes some of the numerical problems in common implementations
in statistical packages such as Stata (see Silva, 2011). The PPML estimator does not require the data
to have equi-dispersion. It is consistent, so long as the conditional mean is correctly specified. The
estimator is even optimal if the conditional variance is proportional to the mean, hence over dispersion
is not an issue.
34See Table 1.14. The table also presents results for OLS and Negative Binomials as main specification.
35An additional problem that arises in particular for the post-NREGA period is the lack of balance
in the panel on agricultural output and wages. The data stop in 2009 or 2010 respectively, so there is
missing data for many districts that experience conflict both before and after.
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quent part will study how the introduction of NREGA lead to a moderation of this
relationship.
I do this in the same empirical setup by adding an interaction term to the previous
specifications, where Monsoon rainfall is interacted with an indicator Tdprt = 1 in case
a district d receives NREGA from point t onwards. Note that eventually all districts
would receive NREGA.
Tdprt =
1 if NREGA available in district d from time t onwards,0 else.
The identifying assumption for this chapter is that the timing of the introduction
of NREGA was not correlated with other omitted variables that could affect the re-
lationship between Monsoon rain and conflict. This identifying assumption is valid
even if the timing of the introduction of NREGA was endogenous to levels of vio-
lence.
I proceed by studying the moderating effect of NREGA following the same steps.
I first focus on the relationship between Monsoon rain and agricultural output and
wages. The specification with agricultural output and wages becomes:
log(ydprt) = ad + bprt + η × log(Rdpr,t) + θ × Tdprt × Rdpr,t + edprt (1.4)
Note that the simple treatment dummy Tdprt is perfectly collinear with the region-
by NREGA phase time fixed effects. This specification does not attempt to estimate a
level effect due to the endogeneity of the roll out.36 The specification asks whether the
way rainfall translates into agricultural wages or GDP changes with the introduction
of NREGA. As NREGA employment is available when households demand it, it pro-
vides an alternative source of income for households. The stabilization of household
incomes should materialize also in stabilized agricultural wages as NREGA effec-
tively creates a wage floor and can directly stabilize labor markets. Bringing it back
to the regression the interest is on the joint significance of the estimated coefficients
ηˆ − θˆ.
While the actual employment provision under NREGA make it reasonable for
there to be a direct effect on wage rates as determined by the agricultural labor
market, it is not clear if and whether there should be an impact on the relationship
between Monsoon rain and agricultural output in the short run as well.37 In the
longer run it is well possible that NREGA makes agricultural production less sensitive
to Monsoon season rainfall as NREGA aims to create infrastructure, e.g. for drought
proofing or micro-irrigation.
Turning to studying the relationship between Monsoon rainfall shocks and con-
36In Appendix section 1.A.2, I explore the level effect of the program as well; however, the identifica-
tion of a level effect is much more difficult.
37NREGA could create income that is used for fertilizer and other agricultural inputs in the short
run, which could improve agricultural output. It is questionable however, whether the use of such
additional inputs could directly weaken the link between Monsoon rainfall and output.
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flict, the empirical specifications are analogous:
Adprt = ad + bprt + η × log(Rdpr,t−1) + γ× Tdprt × log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt (1.5)
E(Adprt) = δd exp (bprt + η × log(Rdpr,t−1) + γ× Tdprt × log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt) (1.6)
Its easiest to think of the Monsoon rain and conflict relationship after the intro-
duction of NREGA as an inward rotation: the relationship between Monsoon rainfall
and conflict becomes less steep. This means that after NREGA is introduced, Mon-
soon shocks of similar magnitude may still translate into conflict, but by a smaller
amount in comparison to before NREGA. In the extreme case, the relationship be-
tween Monsoon rainfall and conflict becomes entirely flat, suggesting that Monsoon
shocks cease to have an effect on conflict. A common concern with difference-in-
difference type estimators is to ensure that common trends hold. I verify this by
transforming the treatment variable into a district-specific time variable measuring
the time to the introduction of NREGA. This results in fifteen time-steps.38 I then
estimate a separate coefficient for the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship for
each year. The specifications are:
Adprt = ad + bprt + bpct +
15
∑
t=1
ηt × log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt)
E(Adprt) = δd exp (bprt +
15
∑
t=1
ηt × log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt)
The estimated coefficients ηt can be plotted out along with confidence bounds.
The expected coefficient patterns are such that the ηt’s are negative for the period
before NREGA and become insignificant for the period after NREGA was introduced.
The argument of this chapter is that NREGA breaks the link between Mon-
soon rainfall and conflict due to NREGA’s moderating impact on household in-
come. Household income becomes less responsive to Monsoon rainfall shocks be-
cause households can earn income through NREGA when facing adverse conditions.
The study of agricultural wages and output is already one indication. The stabiliza-
tion of agricultural wages should happen through increased NREGA participation.
Whether NREGA functions as insurance is an empirical question. I study NREGA
utilization along two margins: overall program expenses and total person days of
employment provided in a district over time. The latter is broken up into extensive-
and intensive margin participation. Since NREGA is available on a per-household
level, participation is measured at that level. Extensive margin participation is mea-
38Note that this is longer, even though the panel only ranges from 2000 - 2012. The reason is simple:
districts in the first phase have a shorter pre-treatment period, but a longer post-treatment period, while
for districts in later phases, this is reversed.
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sured as the share of households in a district that participate in the program, while
intensive margin participation measures the days per household worked. Let these
measures be denoted by Pdprt, the specification estimated is:
Pdprt = δak + bprt + φ× log(Rdpr,t−1) + edprt (1.7)
The set of fixed effects used are similar: bprt are region and NREGA implementa-
tion phase specific time-fixed effects, δak are district fixed effects that I allow to change
for the period from 2011 onwards.39 The coefficient of interest from these regressions
is φ. I expect this coefficient to be negative, which indicates that good Monsoon real-
izations are correlated with lower levels of NREGA participation. This highlights how
NREGA take-up is responsive to Monsoon shocks. This allows NREGA to function
as a stabilizer to incomes following adverse shocks, breaking the direct relationship
between local Monsoon shocks and income. This is key to explaining why the link
between Monsoon rainfall, wages and conflict disappears. The next section presents
the results from this analysis and highlights that they are robust to various ways of
studying the data.
1.4 Results
The results are presented in the same sequence as presented in the empirical strategy.
I proceed by establishing the relationships between Monsoon season rainfall, agricul-
tural output, wages and conflict before the introduction of NREGA. In the second
step, I present results pertaining to the whole period to study how the introduc-
tion of NREGA has affected the relationship between Monsoon rainfall, agricultural
output, wages and conflict.
1.4.1 Before NREGA: Agriculture, Wages and Conflict
The first section presents the results pertaining to the relationship between Monsoon
rainfall, agricultural output, wages and conflict. The regression results are presented
in Table 1.2. Column (1) presents the results using agricultural output per capita as
dependent variable. The coefficient on contemporaneous Monsoon rainfall is inter-
preted as an elasticity indicating that a 1% deficient Monsoon reduces agricultural
output per capita by 0.362%. This indicates a strong dependence of agricultural pro-
duction on Monsoon rainfall.40 The strong relationship between agricultural output
and Monsoon season rainfall is particularly relevant for self-employed farmers as
they are directly hit by adverse shocks. Self-employment in agriculture accounts for
at least 58% of rural employment (see Planning Commission, 2005) which establishes
39 This is because the underlying data-sources for the NREGA participation data changes from 2011
onwards, which creates jumps in the NREGA participation data that are specific to each district. Refer
to appendix 1.A.10 for more details.
40This finding is in line with a long standing literature that has studied the relationship between
Monsoon rainfall and the welfare of rural households in the Indian context (see e.g. Rosenzweig and
Binswanger (1993), Burgess et al. (2011), Cole et al. (2010))
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a direct link between agricultural production and household incomes. In appendix
Table 1.12 I show that the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and output is driven
by production of staple crops.
The second source of income in rural areas is casual wage employment in the
agricultural sector. A second step is to analyze whether agricultural productivity
shocks in form of rainfall shocks translate into lower wages. This generates a second
margin along which productivity shocks can depress household incomes. This is
studied using data on agricultural wages in the second column of table 1.2. Again the
coefficient is interpreted as elasticity. The effect is small but significant: a 1% decrease
in Monsoon rainfall decreases agricultural wages by 0.058%. The effects of Monsoon
rainfall on the agricultural labor market are highly complex, yet, this finding relates
well with the existing literature (see Jayachandran (2006)). In appendix Table 1.13
I study wages in the planting- relative to the harvest season. The two findings are
two important pieces of information that establish links between rural incomes and
rainfall variation.
In the next step I address the question on whether Monsoon rain variation ex-
plains conflict. The results are presented in columns (3) and (4). Column (3) presents
a linear probability model studying the incidence of conflict in a given year. The coef-
ficient is negative and significant: a good Monsoon translates into a lower probability
of conflict in a district. A 20% deficiency would increase the probability of conflict
by 0.7 percentage points. Given that 17.6 % of district years exhibit conflict, this is
an increase by 3.9%. Column (4) presents the results from the Poisson regression.
Note that the regression is estimated using the whole balanced panel, however, only
141 districts provide time-variation in the dependent variable and thus, contribute
to the estimation of the coefficients. The coefficient is interpreted as elasticity, indi-
cating that a 1% reduction in Monsoon rainfall translates into an increase in conflict
by 0.846%. This coefficient compares very well with estimates of previous studies,
in particular, Vanden Eynde (2011) and Gawande et al. (2012) who study the Maoist
conflict. This establishes a direct link between Monsoon season rainfall and conflict.41
The three relationships between Monsoon rainfall, agricultural output, wages and
conflict can also be studied in a non-parametric manner to highlight non-linearities
(see Hsiang et al. (2013)). The idea of this non-parametric approach is to obtain local
estimates of the relationship studied and to visually display them.42 Panel A on top
41In appendix tables 1.14 I perform a set or robustness checks highlighting that I obtain similar results
using an instrumental variables approach and that the results are robust to the choice of empirical
model.
42The procedure has two steps. First, the data is demeaned by the fixed effects. This ensures that
the scales are identical. A loess regression of the residuals of the weather variable and the dependent
variable of interest is then estimated repeatedly using a bootstrapping procedure. The residuals for the
horizontal axis, in this case the residuals for (lagged) Monsoon-rainfall, are subdivided into a set of 200
grid points. Each bootstrapped regression is evaluated at the grid-points for the horizontal-axis. This
results in a set of fitted values for each grid point along the horizontal axis. In the second step the
fitted values are plotted. For each horizontal grid point, a kernel density is estimated. The colouring
is related to two things. First, the overall color intensity at each horizontal axis grid point is related to
the overall mass of data that accrues there. This color is then streched out vertically in relation to the
density of the fitted values. 95% confidence bounds are plotted as dashed lines.
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in Figure 1.3 presents the relationship between Monsoon rain and agricultural output
per capita. This relationship seems fairly monotone. The second graph depicts the
relationship between wages and Monsoon rainfall; again, a fairly monotone relation-
ship emerges, as indicated by the linear fit. The conflict non-parametric exhibits some
non-linear patterns. The estimated coefficients are positive for Monsoon rain deficits,
indicating that deficient Monsoon is correlated with higher levels of violence. Large
and positive Monsoon rain deviations are generally correlated with less conflict; the
relationship is appears to be bending back up suggesting that extremely positive
rainfalls can also induce conflict. This is not unsurprising: the agricultural output
non-parametric seems to be bending down at very high Monsoon realisations.43 In
the next section I study how these relationships are affected by the introduction of
NREGA.
1.4.2 After NREGA: Moderation of Monsoon and Conflict Relationship
The focus of this chapter is how NREGA changes the slope linking Monsoon rainfall
and conflict. The instrumental link through which moderation is achieved is through
stabilizing agricultural incomes. I proceed by presenting results on the relationship
between Monsoon rainfall, agricultural output, wages and conflict as in the previous
section. The only addition here is that I allow the slope linking Monsoon rainfall
with each of these three variables to be different after the introduction of NREGA as
discussed in the empirical strategy.
The results are presented in Table 1.3 in a condensed form. Column (1) presents
the results using agricultural output per capita as dependent variable. The focus is on
the relationship between the coefficient on Monsoon rainfall with the coefficient on
the interaction between the NREGA treatment dummy and Monsoon rainfall. While
the former is positive and significant, the latter is negative and insignificant at con-
ventional levels. This suggests that the relationship between rainfall and agricultural
output per capita has not changed, at least up to the year 2009 when the agricultural
output data stops. This is not surprising. NREGA aims to produce sustainable local
infrastructure which could, in the longer run, increase agricultural output and make
it more resilient to Monsoon rainfall shocks. Nevertheless these should not have an
immediate effect on this deeply structural relationship. It is thus not surprising that
agricultural output is still very much a function of Monsoon rainfall. Column (2)
presents the results for agricultural wages. NREGA is a major intervention in the
agricultural labor market; in periods in which otherwise, agricultural wages would
have been depressed due to an adverse weather shock, NREGA provides an out-
side option which should stabilize agricultural wages making them less responsive
to rainfall shocks. The regression indicates this to be the case. The coefficient on
the interaction term is positive and significant. The sum of the two coefficients is
insignificant as indicated by the F-test. This implies that agricultural wages cease
43A general linear fit appears adequate given the data. The slight non-linearity for positive extremes,
if anything, implies that I underestimate the steepness as the regression line is pulled back up.
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to be a function of Monsoon rainfall following the introduction of NREGA, indicat-
ing that NREGA can stabilize agricultural wages for households who do not directly
participate in the program through a general equilibrium effect. This finding is com-
plementing the existing empirical research that has documented that NREGA lead
to increased wage levels (Azam, 2011; Berg et al., 2012; Imbert and Papp, 2015; Zim-
mermann, 2012). The last two columns study the relationship between conflict and
Monsoon rainfall. The coefficients in both columns indicate that the Monsoon rain
conflict relationship for conflict incidence (column (3)) and conflict intensity (column
(4)) has moderated dramatically. In order to assess the degree of moderation sta-
tistically, I perform an F-test on the joint significance of the two Monsoon rainfall
coefficients. The F-test is insignificant with a p-value of 0.267. This suggests that
there remains a negative relationship indicating that low Monsoon rainfall translates
into conflict; the relationship is however, a lot weaker and statistically insignificant.
This suggests that NREGA has completely removed the rainfall dependence of con-
flict. This relates well with findings in historical China, where the introduction of
the drought resistant sweet potato has moderated the impact of weather shocks on
peasant revolts (Jia, 2014).44
It is important to highlight that this finding is distinct from empirical approaches
that aim to identify a level effect of NREGA on conflict levels. Poor districts and
districts that experienced conflict received NREGA earlier, making districts that re-
ceived NREGA later a poor counterfactual. My identification strategy steers clear
of this concern. Nevertheless it becomes instructive to estimate level effects of the
introduction of NREGA. In appendix 1.A.2 I estimate level effects using a simple
difference-in-difference strategy. The estimated coefficients suggest that levels of con-
flict are 30%-50% lower. This estimated effect has two sources: first, there may be a
direct level effect of NREGA as NREGA has lead to an increase in wage levels inde-
pendent of weather shocks. In the context of classical opportunity cost based models
of conflict, this can be seen as pushing out the participation constraint. However,
the second margin is an insurance effect which prevents wages to drop in case a bad
state is realized. The results on the level effect map well into the findings of Dasgupta
et al. (2014). They use a difference-in-difference estimator to estimate the level effect
of NREGA. The identifying variation this relies on is coming from the sequential roll
out of NREGA and hence, is essentially coming from just two years of data. Khanna
and Zimmermann (2013) obtain different results. They address the endogeneity of
the roll out directly and use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design for identification.
They reverse engineer the NREGA roll out algorithm to identify districts that were
near the cutoff of being assigned into an earlier or later phase. Districts close to the
cutoff serve as counterfactual. Their results indicate that the introduction of NREGA
lead to an increase in levels of conflict in the short run. They argue that this is due to
an increase in civilian collaboration with security forces. This induces more violence
in the short run, but a moderation in conflict levels in the longer run. A concern with
44Related is the recent work by Kung and Ma (2014), who show that cultural norms seem to moderate
the effect of adverse shocks on revolts in historical China as well.
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the research design is that it is driven by relatively few districts near the cutoff that
experience conflict variation. While this finding does not square with the insurance
effect that I document in this chapter, it is at odds with the levels effect estimated.
In order to study the dynamics of this effect, an event study analysis can high-
light the degree to which the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and conflict
has evolved prior to the introduction of NREGA. The treatment variable is trans-
formed into a district-specific time variable measuring the time to the introduction
of NREGA. Note that this is longer, even though the panel only ranges from 2000 -
2012. The reason that districts in the first phase have a shorter pre-treatment period,
but a longer post-treatment period, while for districts in later phases, this is reversed.
The result is a sequence of estimated coefficients ηˆ that are best visually presented,
see Figure 1.2. I only plot coefficients that are estimated using districts from all three
phases as otherwise the picture would be distorted due to a compositional effect. I
will decompose the effect by NREGA implementation phase to study the effect for
the different phases separately. The vertical line around zero refers to the point in
time that NREGA was introduced. The dashed blue lines indicate the regression co-
efficients obtained from the baseline specification. The estimated coefficients suggest
a consistently negative relationship between Monsoon rainfall and conflict before the
introduction of NREGA. With the introduction of NREGA, the relationship disap-
pears. It does so not instantaneously but gradually with the coefficient becoming
insignificant only one after roughly two years after NREGA was introduced. The
results suggest that common trends do hold. As the non-parametric analysis sug-
gested that the relationship exhibits some non-linearities, it is important to explore
this for the post-NREGA period as well. The results are presented in Panel B of Fig-
ure 1.3. Its best to directly compare Panel A from before NREGA with Panel B from
after NREGA. Note that the scales are identical from both graphs, allowing a direct
comparison. The apparent patterns are very similar to what the linear regressions in-
dicate. The relationship between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural output per capita
has remained very similar. However, the relationship between agricultural wages
and Monsoon rainfall has rotated inward: following the introduction of NREGA,
there appears no statistically significant relationship linking Monsoon rainfall and
agricultural wages. This indicates that the stable outside option NREGA provides
serves as a cushion for wages determined in the labor market. The relationship be-
tween Monsoon rainfall and conflict follows in the last column. The non-parametric
paint a very suggestive picture: the relationship becomes flat. While in the period
before NREGA, the relationship was weakly U-shaped indicating that weather ex-
tremes translate into conflict, following the introduction of NREGA, the relationship
has disappeared. This indicates that since the introduction of NREGA, Monsoon
rainfall variation ceases to have an effect on conflict.
Before exploring heterogeneity and mechanisms through which this moderation
in the Monsoon conflict relationship was achieved, I perform various robustness
checks to highlight that the core result is robust.
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1.4.3 Robustness Checks
I categorize the robustness checks into three sets: first checks, involving adding more
control variables and time varying fixed effects. The second set using different data
sets or measures of Monsoon rain, while the last set includes some placebo tests.
The first set of robustness checks are exploring the robustness of the results to
the inclusion of different sets of fixed-effects or adding controls. They are presented
in Table 1.4. The first three columns study conflict incidence, while columns (4) - (7)
study conflict intensity. I discuss the corresponding conflict incidence and conflict
intensity specifications together. Column (1) and column (4) explore the robustness
of the results to the inclusion of a set of time-invariant district characteristics from
the 2001 census interacted with a set of year fixed effects. This is in the spirit of the
semi-parametric difference in difference analysis as developed in Abadie (2005).45
The estimated coefficient changes sign and becomes insignificant for the conflict inci-
dence regressions; however, the results for the conflict intensity specification is robust.
The fact that the linear probability model becomes insignificant is not too concern-
ing, as the there is too little variation in the dependent variable. In column (2) and
column (6) introduce time-varying district fixed effects where I estimate a separate
set of district fixed effects for the period before and after the introduction of NREGA.
The inclusion of such fixed effects would capture any district specific level effect that
the introduction of NREGA may have had on conflict. While it is unlikely that the
presence of the scheme triggers a dramatic conflict response, these fixed effects shut
down this channel. The insight is that despite the inclusion of the fixed effects, the
estimated coefficients change slightly for the conflict intensity specification; again,
the interaction for the incidence regressions becomes insignificant, which is not sur-
prising given that the time varying fixed effects effects explain most of the variation
in the dependent variable. Column (3) and (7) introduce state by year fixed effects,
while controlling for the NREGA treatment dummy. These fixed effects are absorb-
ing a lot of the variation in Monsoon rainfall. As law- and order is in the domain
of the Indian states, rather than the Union government, it is reassuring that the co-
efficient pattern remains similar. Lastly, column (4) studies only districts that have
experienced conflict before the introduction of NREGA. The estimated effect for this
subset of districts is very similar to the main specification. This ensures that the effect
is not driven by an expansion of the geography of conflict that is correlated with the
introduction of NREGA and Monsoon rainfall.
The second set of robustness checks concerns the measurement of local Monsoon
shocks. I present robustness checks using different rainfall data or agricultural pro-
ductivity proxies. These exercises are presented in Table 1.5. Again the analysis is
45The district characteristics are: terrain ruggedness, elevation, rural population share, tribal popula-
tion share, scheduled caste share, illiteracy rates, household size, share of population younger than 6
years, population growth rate from census 1991 to 2001, gender gap, share of villages in district with
primary school, share of villages in district with mud road approach, share of households in district
that live in permanent housing, share of villages in district with primary health care facilities, share of
villages with electric power, share of villages with a bus stop and the share of villages with a postal
office.
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presented on conflict incidence and intensity margins.
Columns (1) and (7) present results from a specification where district level rain-
fall is normalized by its standard deviation. This is problematic, as the 14 year time
period that the TRMM data is available may be too short for a stable estimate of the
mean volatility to emerge. Nevertheless, the results are very similar using this mea-
sure of rainfall. Columns (2) and (6) present results when studying a different rainfall
dataset. I present results based on the GPCC data, which is based on ground level
rain gauge measurements.46 While I believe that the satellite based TRMM data is
likely to be better, as rainfall reporting may be endogenous to conflict (see appendix
1.A.6) it is nevertheless reassuring that using a different dataset, I obtain very similar
results. As both the GPCC data as well as the TRMM data has been processed us-
ing climatology algorithms, a general concern is “error propagation” (see Leung et al.
(2005) and Burnicki et al. (2007)). As the raw data is transformed in the analytical pro-
cess, simple small measurement errors may be propagated due to the mathematical
and numerical transformations. This could generate spurious correlations that could
affect the results. A simple way to address this is to instrument one rainfall dataset
with the other one. This removes any systematic and non-systematic measurement
error and ensures that the results that I obtain from the two different datasets are
driven by the same underlying variation. The results are presented in columns (3)
and (7) and are very similar to the core finding. Monsoon rainfall is only one proxy
for local weather shocks. The analysis of the agricultural output relationship suggests
that it is absorbing a lot of the variation in agricultural productivity. Nevertheless, it
may make sense to explore a different measure. A candidate that has been proposed
by Gawande et al. (2012) is a vegetation index measuring the degree of photosynthetic
activity. Photosynthetic activity is driving plant growth and thus, agricultural output
and is obviously affected not only by rainfall, but by other climatic conditions as well.
Columns (4) and (8) present the results when studying the lagged Normalised Vege-
tation Index (NDVI) and its interaction with NREGA. The coefficient pattern is very
similar as in the preferred specification. However, NDVI contains a lot less variation,
which makes it more difficult for the coefficients to gain significance. Nevertheless,
the results are very similar using this proxy. These results render me confident that I
am genuinely picking up an effect of Monsoon rainfalls impact on conflict. I now turn
to a third set of robustness checks, which explore different placebo tests. I perform
two main placebo tests. The first one is simply following the standard approach in
difference in difference type empirical setups: moving the reform to an earlier date.
This allows me to test whether the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and con-
flict began to change already before NREGA was introduced. The previous exercise
studying the effect of Monsoon rainfall over time already indicates that this is not the
case. Moving the treatment to an earlier date should wash out the estimated NREGA
effect. The second placebo check is testing whether rainfall outside the main grow-
46The data has been widely used in the economics literature and in the conflict literature in particular.
Some prominent references are Ferrara and Harari (2013), Miguel et al. (2004), and Kudamatsu et al.
(2014) and many others.
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ing season has some effects on conflict. If Monsoon rainfall is capturing an effect on
rural livelihoods, than rainfall outside the Monsoon season should not interact with
NREGA in any systematic way explaining conflict. The results are presented in Table
1.6. Column (1)-(3) and columns (5)-(7) present results when moving the NREGA
introduction three, two and one years ahead of time respectively. Moving NREGA
treatment to an earlier date should wash out the estimated NREGA effect, since in
truth the rainfall conflict relationship was present for the time period between the
placebo NREGA introduction date and its true introduction date. Conversely, the
closer the placebo is moved to the true NREGA introduction date, the more likely
should we observe an NREGA effect for the placebo. This is the exact pattern that
emerges in the data when studying the regression coefficients for conflict intensity
in columns (5)-(7). The conflict incidence regressions have positive and significant
coefficients on the Placebo interactions. If I restrict the analysis to only the period
prior to the true NREGA introduction, the coefficients become insignificant and flip
signs. This suggests that the positive and significant coefficients on the Placebo re-
form is driven by the period after the actual NREGA was introduced. Column (4)
and column (8) present results when studying rainfall outside the Monsoon season.
As expected, the coefficients are insignificant, though they share the coefficient pat-
tern for conflict intensity. This is likely due to rainfall outside the Monsoon season
being positive correlated with rainfall during the Monsoon. These exercises suggest
that the introduction of NREGA fundamentally changed the relationship between
Monsoon rainfall and conflict. In the next section I show that this also applies more
generally to violent crimes, suggesting that NREGA also has indirect effects on the
dynamics of crime more generally.
1.4.4 Effects on Crime
The existing literature highlights that there exists a relationship between weather and
crime in the context of India. The common observation is that adverse rainfall shocks
drive crimes against vulnerable populations, in particular crimes against populations
from scheduled caste and scheduled tribes (see Sekhri and Storeygard (2013), Iyer and
Topalova (2014)) and violent as well as property crimes in general (see Blakeslee and
Fishman (2014)). I obtained the same district-level crime data used by these authors
for the period 2002-2012 to study the impact of NREGA on the relationship between
Monsoon rainfall on crime. I present results using the main specification as in the
previous section with lagged Monsoon rainfall. As dependent variable I use the log
of the number of crimes reported by broad categories.47 The results are presented in
Table 1.7. The coefficients suggest a moderation of the crime and rainfall relationship
most prominently for violent crimes as well as for disruptions of public order. This
crime category includes incidences of rioting and arson. These results map well into
47Poisson models as used in the rest of the chapter yield very similar results and are available upon
request. I follow the categorisation of Iyer et al. (2012), Appendix 1. The only modification is that I do
not consider only murders, but violent crimes includes the crime categories: murder, attempted murder,
kidnapping and hurt.
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my findings on insurgency related violence. Some of the events captured in conflict
data may also be measured in the violent crime data. The results are driven by
districts under left-wing extremist influence and districts that received NREGA in
earlier phases. This maps very well into the results found using the conflict data.48
A key concern with the crime data is that, especially for property crimes, data from
cities is highly overrepresented. To illustrate: the state of West Bengal has about
91 million inhabitants, and the capital Calcutta has roughly 4.6 million inhabitants,
accounting for about 5 % of the population. In the raw crime data, Calcutta accounts
for 21% of all thefts in West Bengal in 2005 and about 3% of the murders. This suggest
a strong urban bias for the crime reporting.49 This is in itself not a problem but it
could wash out the variation in the crime data attributable to Monsoon shocks if the
relationship between crime and Monsoon shocks is different for cities relative to rural
areas.50 For violent crimes and crimes against public order, in particular murders
and rioting, the reporting bias is weaker as these are highly visible crimes. A non-
parametric analysis for the violent crime data suggests a pattern very similar to the
one observed for the conflict data: before the introduction of NREGA, extremes in
Monsoon rainfall in the preceding year translate into more violent crimes. Following
the introduction of NREGA, this relationship is moderated significantly: the U-shape
becomes flat (see Figure 1.6). Estimating the effect of lagged Monsoon rain over time
suggests a similar response: negative coefficients for the period before NREGA was
introduced and insignificant coefficients following NREGA introduction (see Figure
1.7).
In the next steps, I study some heterogeneity in the estimated NREGA effects.
In particular, I study which NREGA implementation phases seem to drive the esti-
mated effect. The expectation is that this is coming from districts that received the
program earlier, as they are more vulnerable in general. Secondly, I highlight that the
estimated effects are strongly driven by districts that are considered by the Ministry
of Home Affairs to be affected by left-wing extremism. Lastly, I study who is a target
of violence and how this changes with the introduction of NREGA.
48My results differ from those presented in Iyer and Topalova (2014) who do not find any systematic
moderating effect of the NREGA on the crime- and rainfall relationship. This can be due to a set of
differences in the two papers. Firstly, they use different rainfall data for their paper and control for
contemporaneous, rather than lagged Monsoon rainfall. Secondly, specifications are estimated on a
longer panel for which TRMM rainfall data is not available. This however, however, comes at the cost
of loosing spatial variation in the rainfall measure as balancing the panel requires merging of districts
to reflect district boundary changes. Last, but not least, the differences could also be due to the fact that
they use different sets of fixed effects.
49Unfortunately, one can not “clean” the data by removing crime reported in cities falling into a
district since the threshold city size was later changed to include only cities with at least 1 million
inhabitants.
50There is some evidence that this is the case. An analysis for the 75 cities that report crime data
for the period under study suggests an insignificant relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and
violent crime, but a significant and positive relationship for property crimes. These results are available
upon request from the author.
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1.4.5 Heterogeneity
Effects by Implementation Phase NREGA was introduced in three distinct phases.
This allows me to estimate effects by NREGA implementation phase. This becomes
insightful in determining which districts seem to be driving the overall observed
effects. I present results as before in studying the relationship between lagged Mon-
soon rainfall and conflict over time. The results are presented in Figure 1.4. The
key observation is that the moderation of the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relation-
ship is driven by districts which received NREGA in earlier phases. The estimated
coefficient on Monsoon rainfall is negative before NREGA and becomes generally
insignificant for the period after NREGA. This pattern is visible for districts that re-
ceived NREGA in phases 1 and 2, while for districts in phase 3, there is no statistically
discernible effect. As districts for phases 1 and 2 where poorer relative to the rest of
India, the observed patterns are quite reasonable. Districts in earlier phases are most
vulnerable. For districts that received NREGA in the third phase, the conflict inci-
dence regressions suggest a statistically insignificant relationship, while the conflict
intensity results suggest a mixed result. Around the NREGA introduction date, the
Monsoon rainfall and conflict coefficients are negative and significant, but become
insignificant towards the end of the sample period. This highlights that the effect
is driven by poorer and more vulnerable districts. For districts that are, on average,
richer, the results are less conclusive.
As it has been pointed out in the context discussion, NREGA was more likely to
be introduced early in districts that are under the influence of Maoists. This makes it
reasonable to study the distinct effect of NREGA specific to districts that have been
classified of being under left-wing extremist influence: districts that form the Red
Corridor.
Effects by Conflict The roll-out of NREGA suggests that districts that are under the
influence of left-wing extremist were more likely to receive the program in earlier
phases. This makes it important to study the impact of the scheme on the Monsoon
rainfall and conflict relationship for districts under left-wing extremist influence rel-
ative to the rest of India. I present results plotting out the estimated coefficients of
Monsoon rainfall over time constraining the analysis to districts classified as being
under left-wing extremist influence and separately, for the rest of India. The results
are presented in Figure 1.5. The top panel studies districts under left-wing extremist
influence. These account for 130 of the 222 districts that experience conflict variation
over time. The coefficient pattern strongly follows the suggested pattern, indicating
that Monsoon rainfall is a predictor of conflict in these districts before the introduc-
tion of NREGA. This relationship has become a lot weaker since the introduction of
NREGA. For non-left wing extremist affected districts that experience conflict, the
results are less clear. The main variation is here coming from Assam and Manipur
which captures 41% of all conflict events in the data. It is not clear whether one
should study conflict in these states separately from the Maoist insurgency, as at
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least in Assam there is significant Maoist presence. For conflict incidence there is
no relationship to begin with: there is hardly a district in these states that does ex-
perience no conflict. For conflict intensity, the coefficients are negative around the
NREGA introduction date but then become insignificant in more recent years. An
analysis of the agricultural output relationship for the North East is less straightfor-
ward as non-linearities in the Monsoon rainfall and output relationship are much
more pronounced in the North East. A logarithmic transformation may not do the
agricultural output relationship justice. Unfortunately, the production data for the
North East is particularly thin, making it difficult to dig deeper into the underlying
nature of the relationship. The results from this analysis suggest that the bulk of the
NREGA effect is coming from districts that are classified of being under left-wing
extremist influence by the Ministry of Home Affairs between 2000-2005.
The next section provides evidence that the NREGA moderation is driven by
less (targeted) violence against civilians. This suggests that NREGA could help take
civilians out of the line of fire.
NREGA and Targets of Violence The relationship linking Monsoon rainfall and
conflict could be heterogeneous by who is the subject of violence. Vanden Eynde
(2011) argues that civilians, facing an income shock, find themselves torn between
becoming paid police informers. This comes at a cost, as insurgents react with more
violence against civilians. As NREGA primarily stabilizes rural incomes, violence
targeted against civilians may become less responsive to conflict. The conflict data
allows a rough classification of the subject of violent activities into groups: civilians,
security forces and terrorists. In Fetzer (2013) I highlight how this is done with the
aid of humans to classify ambiguous cases. I proceed as before, except that now
I change the dependent variable as being the number of conflict events in a year,
where the subject of the event has been classified to be either civilian, security forces
or insurgents. The results are presented in Table 1.8.
Columns (1) to (3) of table 1.8 performs the analysis of the NREGA effect studying
conflict incidence, while columns (4) to (6) study intensity. The coefficient pattern
that emerges that all types of violence are responsive to lagged Monsoon. However,
the moderating effect of NREGA is most strongly seen for violence targeted against
civilians in column (1) and (4). Violence against security forces in column (2) and
(4) also exhibits a NREGA effect. The sum of the two coefficients actually is positive
but insignificant, which could suggest that violence against security forces is starts
to become positively correlated with Monsoon rainfall. The third column looks at
incidences where the subject of the incidence was a terrorist. There appears to be only
a weak moderating effect of NREGA. This evidence suggests that NREGA moderates
the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and violence, with the bulk of that effect
coming from less violence against civilians. This indicates that NREGA may help
bring civilians out of the line of fire.
The key concern for identification is whether the NREGA treatment timing was
44
correlated with other policies or events that could have been correlated with Monsoon
rainfall and through that, affect the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and con-
flict. In Appendix 1.A.1, I rule out a whole range of alternative explanations for the
observed moderation in the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship. The first set
rules out other development schemes that could moderate the Monsoon rainfall and
conflict relationship either directly or indirectly. This includes the Pradhan Mantri
Gram Sadak Yojana Rural Road Construction Scheme (PMGSY) and the Integrated
Action Plan, which channels additional funds into left-wing extremist affected dis-
tricts. The second concern relates to a major military intervention “Operation Green
Hunt”, that has been underway since early 2011. Due to a lack of troop deployment
data, I can not address this directly. Lastly, I rule out that the NREGA is not cap-
turing a structurally different Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship that is due
to mining activity in a district. This could arise as the timing of the introduction
of NREGA is correlated with a commodity price boom. Lastly, there could be an
indirect way through which road construction under NREGA affects conflict. Fearon
and Laitin (2003) highlight that guerrilla warfare thrives in places that are difficult to
access by the state. Insurgency movements may have an incentive to prevent develop-
ment of public infrastructure, in particular, roads in rural areas as they could lead to
more government presence. That is to say, road construction could trigger more con-
flict. If road construction under NREGA was correlated with lagged Monsoon season
rainfall, then this could explain part of the observed effects. In Appendix 1.A.3 I pro-
vide evidence that NREGA road construction may be correlated with conflict levels;
I show that this effect is unlikely to go through Monsoon rainfall.
The chapter thus far has focused on how NREGA lead to an inward rotation of
the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship. The implicit argument is that NREGA
provides insurance against adverse income shocks. If the relationship between local
Monsoon shocks and conflict was going through income, insulating income from
adverse Monsoon shocks should break this relationship. The next section answers the
question whether NREGA provides insurance and provides a rough quantification
exercise for how much insurance is provided.
1.5 Does NREGA Provide Insurance?
The chapter has highlighted that the relationship between conflict and Monsoon
shocks changes fundamentally with the introduction of NREGA. The implicit ar-
gument is that NREGA provides insurance, mitigating adverse weather shocks and
thus, providing a cushion for incomes of rural households. By cushioning incomes,
the link between income and conflict and some forms of crime is broken. This rela-
tionship needs to be empirically verified by studying how NREGA participation and
expenditure responds following adverse Monsoon shocks. The hypothesis is that
NREGA take-up is responsive to adverse Monsoon shocks: the slope linking Mon-
soon rainfall and NREGA participation is downward sloping indicating that positive
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rainfall realizations translate into lower participation as in these situations, the work-
ers outside options are better which makes employment under NREGA at minimum
wages less appealing. I study how adverse Monsoon shocks in the preceding growing
season translate into increased NREGA participation. Since the harvest season is to-
wards the end of the year (November-December), NREGA employment should only
respond in the following spring. The results from the baseline analysis are presented
in Table 1.9. The fist column measures the log of total expenditure in a financial year
for ongoing projects. The elasticity is negative, indicating that good Monsoon rainfall
in the preceding growing season translate into low expenditure. A 1% decrease in
Monsoon rainfall increases expenditures by 0.257%.
Columns (2)-(4) study margins of participation. Overall take-up is measured as
the total number of days worked under the scheme in a district and year. Again,
the coefficient is negative: with good Monsoon, there is less need for NREGA em-
ployment. The coefficient indicates that a 1% drop in Monsoon in preceding growing
season increases participation by 0.21%. This is high, but not unreasonable given the
large share of self-employed farmers in rural India. The overall take-up effect is de-
composed into extensive- and intensive margin participation in columns (3) and (4).
The extensive margin measures the share of households who participate, while the
intensive margin is the log of the number of days per household. Since the program
is provided on a per-household level, this is the correct way to measure extensive
margin participation. The measure also indicates a negative relationship. The in-
tensive margin coefficient suggests that a 1% decrease in Monsoon rainfall, increases
the number of days worked under NREGA by 0.12%. This suggests that a signifi-
cant share of the overall observed participation response in column (2) is driven by
extensive margin participation.
Columns (5) and (6) consider the heterogeneity in extensive margin participa-
tion: the relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and NREGA participation by
implementation phase (column (5)) and by whether a district is classified as being
under left-wing extremist influence according to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The
pattern suggests that the effect of Monsoon rainfall on extensive margin participa-
tion is strongest for districts in phase 1. Furthermore, in left-wing extremist districts,
the relationship between NREGA take-up and Monsoon rainfall is a lot stronger as
well. This maps well into the findings from the previous section. The moderation
was mostly driven by districts in the first phase and districts that are vulnerable to
left-wing extremist activity.51
This suggests that NREGA does function as insurance: NREGA employment
and program participation is higher, following local Monsoon shocks. This effect
is driven by districts most vulnerable to conflict: districts that received NREGA in
earlier phases and districts classified as being under left-wing extremist influence.
The open question is how much insurance is provided.
51Similar to the previous analysis, I also present results from a non-parametric approach to highlight
potential non-linearities in the response of NREGA participation with regards to Monsoon rainfall.
These are presented in Figure 1.8.
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To what extent do NREGA expenditures offset income losses due to adverse Mon-
soon shocks? Ideally this question would be answered using a household panel
dataset. Such a dataset covering many parts of India does not exist to date.52 The best
I can do in this chapter is to provide a rough quantification exercise for how much
insurance is provided exploiting variation in agricultural output value per capita due
Monsoon variation at the district level. I relate this variation with NREGA expen-
diture per district. This allows a crude quantification exercise to measure the extent
to which district output losses are compensated through increased NREGA expendi-
tures. The question is by how much a INR 100 loss in agricultural output per capita
is offset by increased NREGA expenditure per capita. I study the relationships in
levels of expenditure and agricultural output per capita which allows direct compar-
ison. As there are significant outliers in both data, I trim the bottom and top 1% of
observations from both variables.53
The results are presented in Table 1.10. Column (1) is the agricultural produc-
tion function that links Monsoon rainfall with output value in levels. The coefficient
on Monsoon rainfall is a semi-elasticity indicating that a 10% increase in Monsoon
rainfall increases nominal agricultural output value by INR 54.1. This can be inter-
preted as the first-stage for the analysis. Column (2) estimates how lagged Monsoon
rainfall translates into increased NREGA expenditure per district. The coefficient in-
dicates that a 10% reduction in Monsoon rainfall in the preceding growing season
increases NREGA expenditure per capita by INR 10.1. This suggests that there is
partial insurance coverage: every INR 10 loss is accommodated by an increase in
NREGA expenditure by INR 1.86. This can be further refined. Column (3) I present
results from an instrumental variables exercise. Lagged agricultural output is instru-
mented with lagged Monsoon rainfall. The coefficient suggests that a INR 100 loss
in agricultural output due to Monsoon variation translates into increased NREGA
expenditure by INR 30.1. If we study only labor expenses the coverage is INR 21.6.
The combined results suggest that a significant share of the risk in crop cultivation
due to local weather variation is offset by NREGA expenditures in a district. The
estimates should be taken with a grain of salt. First, the number is not adjusted
for marginal leakage in the program. Especially for the first years that NREGA was
introduced, leakage rates from the program were significant as studied in Niehaus
and Sukhtankar (2013a,b). This would suggest that the measure is likely to be an up-
per bound. On the other hand, the results in the previous section suggest that there
is significant indirect insurance due to stabilization of agricultural wages. This has
an indirect insurance effect that is not captured by the mere NREGA expenditures
flowing into a district.
52The India Human Development Survey is a candidate dataset; the first round of interviews was
completed in 2005 and the second round of data was collected in 2011-2012. Unfortunately, the data are
not released until early 2015.
53Please consult appendix 1.A.8 for a discussion of how agricultural output value is scaled to ensure
that it comes closer to the true agricultural output using district domestic product for 2000.
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1.6 Conclusion
This chapter has studied the impact of social insurance on conflict in India. The
existing literature studying conflict has devised various identification strategies to
exploit arguably exogenous variation in incomes to study the relationship between
income and conflict. The findings of this literature have a direct policy implication:
any measure that helps insulate household incomes following adverse shocks should
moderate the relationship between these exogenous productivity shocks and conflict.
This chapter has taken up this question and evaluates the impact of the introduction
of a public employment program established through the National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Act in India on the relationship between local Monsoon shocks and
conflict and crime. The key findings suggest that the introduction of the public em-
ployment program has eliminated the link between Monsoon shocks and conflict and
some forms of crime. Even after the introduction of the public employment program,
productivity shocks continue to affect rural areas. However, with the public employ-
ment program in place, these shocks cease to translate into conflict. As conflict is a
phenomena with a lot of persistence, removing the link between productivity shocks
and conflict can lead to persistently lower levels of conflict. This seems to be the case
in India. The insurance value delivered by the public employment scheme is sig-
nificant. A simple quantification exercise suggests that roughly one third of district
level income losses due to adverse Monsoon conditions are directly offset through
increased expenditure under the program. This only captures the direct transfers.
The indirect benefits due to reduction in the pass through of productivity shocks on
wages are an added indirect insurance benefit.
The chapter has important implications for policy makers. Incomes in develop-
ing countries are much more volatile, leaving households exposed to a lot more risk
in comparison to developed countries. Climate models suggest that erratic weather
events could become even more pronounced. This has lead to concerns about increas-
ing conflict in the future (see Hsiang et al. (2013)). Yet, many developing countries
have not been able to devise policies to provide adequate protection. This chapter
highlights that social insurance taking the form of a public employment program
may be a policy that can be adopted in other developing countries as well.
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Figures for Main Text
Figure 1.1: Districts Affected by Left-Wing Extremism According to Government of
India.
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Figure 1.2: Effect of Monsoon Rain on Conflict Over Time. The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction date. The blue dashed lines
indicate the coefficients obtained from a simple regression interaction lagged Monsoon rainfall with the NREGA treatment indicator. The red
line are each point estimates of the relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and conflict. 95% confidence bands are indicated as dotted
black lines.
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Panel A: Before NREGA
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Panel B: After NREGA
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Figure 1.3: Non-Parametric Watercolor Regressions as in Hsiang et al. (2013): Effect of Monsoon Rain on agricultural output per Capita, Wages
and Conflict Before and After Introduction of NREGA. 95% confidence bands are indicated as dashed lines. The color shading is related to the
overall density of Monsoon rainfall realizations along the horizontal axis and to the density of fitted values from loess regressions along the
vertical axis.
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Panel A: Incidence
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Figure 1.4: Effect of Monsoon Rain on Conflict Over Time By NREGA Implementation Phase. The vertical line indicates the NREGA introduction
date. The blue dashed lines indicate the coefficients obtained from a regression interaction lagged Monsoon rainfall with the NREGA treatment
indicator. The red line are each point estimates of the relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and conflict. 95% confidence bands are
indicated as dotted black lines.
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Panel A: Incidence Panel B: Intensity
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Figure 1.5: Effect of Monsoon Rain on Conflict Over Time in Red Corridor (top) and the Rest of India (bottom). The vertical line indicates the
NREGA introduction date. The blue dashed lines indicate the coefficients obtained from a regression interaction lagged Monsoon rainfall with
the NREGA treatment indicator. The red line are each point estimates of the relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and conflict. 95%
confidence bands are indicated as dotted black lines.
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Figure 1.6: Non-Parametric Watercolor Regressions as in Hsiang et al. (2013): Relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and violent crime
before (left) and after (right) the introduction of NREGA. 95% confidence bands are indicated as dashed lines. The color shading is related to
the overall density of Monsoon rainfall realizations along the horizontal axis and to the density of fitted values from loess regressions along the
vertical axis.
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Figure 1.7: Effect of Monsoon Rain on Violent Crime (left) and on Crimes Against Public Order (right) over Time. The vertical line indicates the
NREGA introduction date. The blue dashed lines indicate the coefficients obtained from a regression interaction lagged Monsoon rainfall with
the NREGA treatment indicator. The red line are each point estimates of the relationship between lagged Monsoon rainfall and conflict. 95%
confidence bands are indicated as dotted black lines.
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Figure 1.8: NREGA Take-Up and Lagged Monsoon Rainfall
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Tables for the Main Text
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Districts Be-
fore NREGA by NREGA Implementation Phase
Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3
Conflict Left-Wing Affected 0.563 0.372 0.233
Any Violence 0.270 0.166 0.105
Conflict Events 1.643 1.001 0.634
Income Agricultural Output Value per Capita [INR] 2746.668 2962.016 4792.635
Agricultural Wages [INR] 53.628 62.165 77.525
Share of District Night Lights 0.383 0.463 0.666
Weather Average Monsoon Season Temp [Degrees] 23.753 24.401 23.610
Annual Rainfall [mm] 1333.619 1446.971 1258.493
Monsoon Season Rainfall [mm] 1028.777 1052.379 878.994
NDVI Index 0.483 0.512 0.491
Terrain Elevation 476.021 415.810 418.082
Ruggedness 47.760 54.268 67.933
Socio-Economic Rural Population [share] 0.853 0.808 0.715
Tribal Population [share] 0.226 0.163 0.112
Scheduled Caste [share] 0.154 0.151 0.149
Illiterate Population [share] 0.525 0.472 0.414
Household Size [persons] 5.400 5.515 5.414
Population younger than 6 [share] 0.262 0.253 0.239
Population Growth 1991-2001 21.652 24.445 21.213
Gender Gap [per 1000 inhabitants] 25.114 21.568 20.414
Infrastructure Primary School [share] 0.810 0.820 0.857
Mudroad [share] 0.679 0.657 0.575
Permanent Housing [share] 0.356 0.434 0.566
Primary Health Care [share] 0.322 0.374 0.457
Electricity [share] 0.678 0.784 0.909
Bus Stop [share] 0.329 0.401 0.561
Post Office [share] 0.368 0.467 0.601
NREGA Expenditure per Capita [INR] 436.936 523.060 247.880
Labor Expenditure per Capita [INR] 302.197 358.869 183.402
Days per Household 47.974 42.496 40.486
Share of Households Participating 0.442 0.382 0.204
Notes: Socio-economic and district Infrastructure statistics based on the 2001 Census for India.
Infrastructure statistics is the share of villages in a district with access to a particular type of infras-
tructure.
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Table 1.2: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Reduced Form Relation-
ship between Rainfall, Agricultural Production, Wages and Violence
Agricultural Income Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Output/Capita) ln(Wage) Incidence Intensity
log(Monsoon) 0.362*** 0.058*** -0.030** -0.897***
(0.086) (0.018) (0.015) (0.309)
Observations 3239 1419 3843 932
Number of Districts 471 314 543 144
Estimation OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time fixed effects and dis-
trict fixed effects and constrain the analysis to the period before NREGA was introduced.
Columns (1) and (2) study agricultural production and wages on an unbalanced annual
district level panel, using contemporaneous Monsoon rainfall as independent variable.
Column (2) also controls for state- by NREGA implementation phase linear time trends.
Columns (3) and (4) are estimated on a balanced district level annual panel. Column (3)
is a linear probability model using a dummy variable as dependent variable indicating
whether a district experienced any conflict events in a given year. Column (4) estimates
a Poisson regression with the dependent variable being the number of conflict events
per district and year. Note that conditional fixed effect poisson models drop districts
which do not have any variation in the dependent variable. For columns (1)-(3) standard
errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial
autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. Pois-
son regressions present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.3: After the Introduction of NREGA: Reduced Form Relationship
between Rainfall, Agricultural Production, Wages and Violence
Agricultural Income Conflict
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Output/Capita) ln(Wage) Incidence Intensity
log(Monsoon) 0.374*** 0.062*** -0.049*** -1.386***
(0.078) (0.019) (0.018) (0.291)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) -0.132 -0.086*** 0.043*** 1.058***
(0.083) (0.016) (0.014) (0.392)
F-Test 6.36 1.68 .06 2.02
p-value .01 .19 .8 .16
Observations 4480 2455 7059 2760
Number of Districts 471 336 543 222
Estimation OLS OLS OLS Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time fixed effects and district
fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) study agricultural production and wages on an unbalanced
annual district level panel from 2000-2009 and 2001-2010 respectively, using contemporaneous
Monsoon rainfall as independent variable. Column (2) also controls for state- by NREGA
implementation phase linear time trends. Columns (3) and (4) are estimated on a balanced
district level annual panel. Column (3) is a linear probability model using a dummy variable
as dependent variable indicating whether a district experienced any conflict events in a given
year. Column (4) estimates a Poisson regression with the dependent variable being the number
of conflict events per district and year. Note that conditional fixed effect poisson models
drop districts which do not have any variation in the dependent variable. For columns (1)-
(3) standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km.
Poisson regressions present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.4: Robustness to Adding Controls: Moderating Effect of NREGA on Conflict
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Controls NREGA x FE State x Year FE Prev Conflict Controls NREGA x FE State x Year FE
log(Monsoon) -0.019 -0.030** -0.044** -1.360*** -0.800*** -0.930*** -0.455
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.305) (0.240) (0.295) (0.362)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) -0.008 0.011 0.008 0.975** 0.951*** 1.133*** 0.250
(0.014) (0.028) (0.013) (0.415) (0.327) (0.385) (0.340)
Observations 7059 7059 7059 1794 2760 2217 2580
Number of Districts 543 543 543 144 222 222 222
Notes: Data is on a balanced panel of conflict events from 2000-2012. Column (1)-(3) are linear probability models using a dummy variable as
dependent variable indicating whether a district experienced any conflict events in a given year. Column (4) - (7) estimates a Poisson regression with
the dependent variable being the number of conflict events per district and year. Note that conditional fixed effect poisson models drop districts
which do not have any variation in the dependent variable. Column (1) and (5) include controls interacted with year fixed effects. The district
characteristics are: terrain ruggedness, elevation, rural population share, tribal population share, scheduled caste share, illiteracy rates, household
size, share of population younger than 6 years, population growth rate from census 1991 to 2001, gender gap, share of villages in district with
primary school, share of villages in district with mud road approach, share of households in district that live in permanent housing, share of villages
in district with primary health care facilities, share of villages with electric power, share of villages with a bus stop and the share of villages with
a postal office. Columns (2) and (6) interact the NREGA treatment dummy with district fixed effects. Columns (3) and (7) control for state by year
fixed effects. In column (4) I constrain the analysis to the districts that experienced conflict prior to NREGA. For columns (1)-(3) standard errors
are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a
cutoff of 500 km. Poisson regressions present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.5: Robustness to Weather Measures: Moderating Effect of NREGA on Conflict
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Normalized Monsoon -0.013** -0.225***
(0.006) (0.043)
NREGA x Normalized Monsoon 0.006 0.157***
(0.005) (0.057)
log(GPCC Rain) -0.031** -1.437***
(0.015) (0.277)
NREGA x log(GPCC Rain) 0.040*** 1.695***
(0.012) (0.352)
Fitted log(Monsoon) -0.042* -1.208***
(0.023) (0.401)
NREGA x Fitted log(Monsoon) 0.047*** 0.981**
(0.014) (0.441)
NDVI -0.287* -2.918
(0.172) (2.987)
NREGA x NDVI 0.154*** 2.222*
(0.042) (1.176)
Observations 7059 7059 7059 6516 2760 2760 2760 2536
Number of Districts 543 543 543 543 222 222 222 219
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Notes: Data is a balanced
panel of conflict events from 2000-2012. All weather measures are lagged by one year. Column (1)-(4) are linear probability models
using a dummy variable as dependent variable indicating whether a district experienced any conflict event in a given year. Column
(5) - (8) estimates a Poisson regression with the dependent variable being the number of conflict events per district and year. Note that
conditional fixed effect poisson models drop districts which do not have any variation in the dependent variable. Columns (1) and (4)
present results where Monsoon rainfall is normalized by its standard deviation. Columns (2) and (5) use the GPCC rainfall data as
alternative rainfall data source. Columns (3) and (6) instrument the TRMM rainfall data with the GPCC data to remove measurement
error. Columns (4) and (8) use the Modis Vegetation index as measure of photosynthetic activity available from 2000-2011. For
columns (1)-(4) standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is
assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. Poisson regressions in columns (5) - (8) present standard errors
clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.6: Robustness to Treatment Timing: Moderating Effect of NREGA on Conflict
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Monsoon) -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.050*** -1.166*** -1.043*** -1.002***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.310) (0.334) (0.374)
NREGA Placebo 1 x log(Monsoon) 0.029* 0.627*
(0.015) (0.370)
NREGA Placebo 2 x log(Monsoon) 0.030** 0.409
(0.014) (0.378)
NREGA Placebo 3 x log(Monsoon) 0.026* 0.310
(0.014) (0.385)
log(Outside Monsoon) -0.002 -0.216
(0.008) (0.264)
NREGA x log(Outside Monsoon) -0.001 0.162
(0.004) (0.316)
Observations 7059 7059 7059 7059 2760 2760 2760 2760
Number of Districts 543 543 543 543 222 222 222 222
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Column (1)-(4) are linear
probability models using a dummy variable as dependent variable indicating whether a district experienced any conflict event in a given
year. Column (5) - (8) estimates a Poisson regression with the dependent variable being the number of conflict events per district and
year. Note that conditional fixed effect poisson models drop districts which do not have any variation in the dependent variable. Placebo
1 -3 move the NREGA treatment indicator 1, 2, 3 years ahead of time, respectively. For columns (1)-(4) standard errors are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff
of 500 km. Poisson regressions present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.7: Extended Results: Effects on Overall Crime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Violent Property Public Order Women
log(Monsoon) 0.009 -0.061** 0.033 -0.118*** 0.059*
(0.021) (0.031) (0.029) (0.042) (0.032)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 0.028** 0.072*** -0.016 0.165*** 0.039
(0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.044) (0.029)
Observations 5356 5356 5356 5356 5356
Number of Districts 537 537 537 537 537
F-test 2.64 .09 .2 .92 6.15
p-value .1 .76 .65 .34 .01
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects.
Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realisation. The depen-
dent variable is the log of the number of reported crime incidents in the category given in
the column head per district and year from 2002-2012. Standard errors are adjusted to re-
flect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to
linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from
district centroids. stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 1.8: Explaining the NREGA Effect: Monsoon Rainfall and Targets of Vio-
lence
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Civilian Security Terrorist Civilian Securitry Terrorist
log(Monsoon) -0.061*** -0.021** -0.019 -1.532*** -0.950** -1.196***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.012) (0.309) (0.392) (0.346)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 0.044*** 0.026*** 0.022* 1.352*** 1.317*** 0.622
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.402) (0.500) (0.407)
Observations 7059 7059 7059 2490 1673 1893
Number of Districts 543 543 543 203 137 153
Notes: All regressions include region by NREGA phase and time fixed effects and district fixed
effects. Columns (1)-(3) are linear probability models using a dummy variable as dependent
variable indicating whether a district experienced any conflict events in a given year. Columns
(4)-(6) estimate Poisson regressions with the dependent variable being the number of conflict
events per district and year. Conflict events are categorized into whether the subject of a conflict
event was a civilian, security force or terrorists. Note that conditional fixed effect poisson models
drop districts which do not have any variation in the dependent variable. For columns (1)-(3)
standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial
autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. Poisson
regressions present standard errors clustered at the district level, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, **
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.9: Explaining the NREGA Effect: Monsoon Rainfall and NREGA Participa-
tion
Costs Participation Heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Projects Overall Extensive Intensive Phase LWE
log(Monsoon) -0.257** -0.212*** -0.055*** -0.114** -0.078*** -0.030**
(0.101) (0.075) (0.014) (0.056) (0.024) (0.014)
Phase 2 x log(Monsoon) 0.046*
(0.025)
Phase 3 x log(Monsoon) 0.038
(0.025)
LWE Affected x log(Monsoon) -0.056**
(0.024)
Observations 2872 3060 3060 3060 3060 3060
Number of Districts 504 537 537 537 537 537
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Monsoon
rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realisation. Column (1) studies the log of
total cost of achtive NREGA projects, columns (2)-(4) study participation as log of total person days
employed in column (2), share of households in a district in column (3) and the log of number of days
employed per household in column (4). Columns (5) and (6) study heterogeneity in extensive margin
participation. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999).
Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District
distances are computed from district centroids. stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 1.10: Insurance Value of NREGA: Monsoon Rainfall, Output
Losses and NREGA Expenditures
Output Value/Capita NREGA Expenditure/Capita
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS IV
log(Monsoont) 541.335***
(160.249)
log(Monsoont−1) -101.219***
(32.984)
Output Value/ Capitat−1 -0.308***
(0.103)
First Stage 12.2
Observations 4086 3059 1465
Number of Districts 438 537 410
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed ef-
fects. Column (1) relates Monsoon rainfall with agricultural output per capita. Col-
umn (2) studies lagged Monsoon rainfall and its effect on levels of NREGA expendi-
ture in a district per capita. Column (3) is an instrumental variables exercise, instru-
menting lagged agricultural output value per capita with lagged Monsoon rainfall.
Standard errors are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley
(1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cut-
off of 500 km. District distances are computed from district centroids. stars indicate
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Other Explanations
This section rules out a range of alternative explanations or policies that could explain
why the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship has become weaker. Most notably
is the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana Rural Road Construction Scheme (PMGSY)
that was implemented around the same time as NREGA was devised and introduced.
Other confounders are the Integrated Action Plan, which channels additional funds
into left-wing extremist affected districts. I also address a concern that large mineral
sectors are driving the observed moderation. Lastly, I address issues concerning a
Military Operation that has been underway since early 2011.
Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana Rural Road Construction Scheme A concern
with the analysis is that the Indian government has put forth many other develop-
ment programs, whose implementation may affect the relationship between Monsoon
and conflict at the same time and may be correlated with the roll-out of NREGA.
In this case, the results would falsely attribute the observed inward rotation of the
Monsoon-rainfall and conflict relationship to the employment guarantee scheme. The
most prominent developmental scheme that was implemented around the same time
is the Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY). This scheme was introduced in
2000 and aims to provide improved road access for rural households. The scheme
in particular aimed to provide roads to all villages with at least 1000 inhabitants by
2003, with a population of 500 and more by 2007 and had special provisions for tiny
villages with at least 250 inhabitants for the hill states, tribal areas and desert areas.
These were to be connected by 2007. As early NREGA districts are among the poor-
est and least urbanised, they are more likely to have received treatment through the
PMGSY as well, which could partly explain my reduced form findings.
The crucial role that transport infrastructure may have in mitigating adverse
weather shocks has been highlighted in Burgess and Donaldson (2010) and Donald-
son (2010). Aggarwal (2014) evaluates the impact of the PMGSY using a difference-in-
difference design and finds that the scheme increased incomes by increasing the po-
tential market size for locally produced agricultural commodities; in addition, there is
less price dispersion across market centers. I use her data to see whether the PMGSY
moderates the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and conflict. I construct two
variables: first, the share of all unconnected habitats connected in a year and second,
the cumulative share of habitats among the unconnected habitats that received road
access by the end of each year. The former measure may pick up direct effects from
road construction on violence, while the latter variable, in its interaction with rain-
fall, could pick up the more persistent effects of this scheme by connecting previously
unconnected villages.
The empirical design is identical to the main analysis, except that I now add these
controls and interaction terms to the main specification. The results are presented
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in Table 1.15. Column (1) and (2) study violence intensity, while column (3) and (4)
look at incidence. Panel A presents the results for contemporary road construction,
while Panel B looks at cumulative connectivity. Columns (1) and (3) look at the rural
connectivity and its interaction with rainfall by itself, while column (3) and (4) are
a type of horse race. In neither specifications do the road construction interactions
with rainfall achieve predictive power. This renders me confident that my results
genuinely reflect the effect of the workfare scheme on the dynamics of conflict.
Integrated Action Plan A second important policy aimed to tackle the Naxalite
conflict is the Integrated Action Plan (henceforth, IAP). The plan was presented in
2010 and provides special funding for for districts that are considered to be severely
affected by left-wing extremism. Originally it was designed for 33 districts, but since
then, it expanded to provide additional funding for 82 districts. The money is to
be spend on projects such as roads and other public infrastructure to improve rural
livelihoods; some projects are specifically aimed to improving the way NREGA is
made accessible in these districts: some IAP funding may be used to complement
NREGA projects. Another margin through which the IAP may have a distinct level
effect on conflict is provided as money may be used to reinforce police stations to
expand the states’ presence in rural areas.
Investment in infrastructure funded by the IAP could moderate the rainfall de-
pendence of income and thus, on conflict. I don’t think that the IAP would have
the effects described in this paper, as its implementation would have to correlate
meaningfully with lagged Monsoon rainfall. Since the grants are block grants, this
is unlikely to be the case. Nevertheless I study this and the results are presented in
Table 1.16. In any case, there are three simple things I can do to rule out effects of the
IAP driving my results. Firstly, I can drop the 33 districts which received the scheme
from 2010 onwards.54 The results from this is presented in columns (2) and (5). The
interaction term becomes smaller and size and statistical significance, especially for
the conflict intensity regressions. This is not implausible as the districts that receive
the IAP are ones with most variation in conflict. In second exercise, I can restrict the
analysis to the period from 2000 - 2010. Again, the estimated coefficient on the post
NREGA period become weaker, but the core result is still there. In the last exercise I
study IAP fund expenditures, which measures utilisation of the disbursal amounts.
Column (1) indicates that IAP expenditures are not correlated with lagged Monsoon
rainfall. Column (3) and (6) study the effect of IAP expenditures on conflict. There
appears to be a positive relationship between the two. The estimated coefficient on
the NREGA interaction remains the same, thus rendering the core result robust.
54The districts translate into 30 districts according to the 2001 Indian census district definitions, they
are: Aurangabad (Bihar), Arwal, Balaghat, Bastar, Bokaro, Chatra, Dantewada, Deogarh, Gadchiroli, Ga-
japati, Gaya, Garhwa, Gondiya, Gumla, Hazaribagh, Jamui, Jehanabad, Khammam, Lohardaga, Midna-
pore, Nabarangpur, Palamu, Pashchim singhbhum, Purba singhbhum, Rajnandgaon, Rayagada, Rohtas,
Sambalpur, Sonbhadra, Surguja, Malkangiri.
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Operation Green Hunt A major military operation to tackle Naxalite violence has
been underway since late November 2009. The operation involves the deployment of
Central Armed Reserve Police force to aide state governments tackle Naxalite threat.
If deployment of troops is correlated with lagged Monsoon season rainfall, this could
explain some of the observed patterns. It is not clear in which direction the effect
should be. If military deployment was correlated with lagged rainfall, increased mil-
itary deployment following an adverse shock could either lead to a conflict escalation
or a reduction in conflict. Unfortunately, data on military deployment is not available.
As with the integrated action plan, I can limit the analysis to the period before 2010
or by removing a set of districts that likely, were the primary target for a military op-
eration. The second main concern is the relationship between the local prevalence of
mineral resources. Mineral resources are a natural stabiliser to district level income,
as the resource revenues are less likely to depend strongly on Monsoon rainfall. As
the period around 2007 saw a major commodity boom, this could have boosted min-
eral resource revenues. While it is not clear that this was correlated with Monsoon
rainfall in a systematic manner, it is still an important to assess the relevance of this
channel as it relates this paper back to the existing literature.
Mineral Resources Another concern is that the NREGA interactions may be picking
up moderation of rainfall shocks due to a sectoral shift away from agriculture to the
mining sector, which is less affected by rainfall variation. Vanden Eynde (2011) shows
that districts with a large mining sector see a smaller elasticity between rainfall and
conflict. If the introduction of NREGA is correlated with a sectoral shift towards
the mineral resource sector, the NREGA interactions could be picking up this effect.
This is not entirely implausible as the mid 2000s saw a commodity price boom which
could have induced a lot more investment in the mining sector. In order to control
for this I construct a share of a district’s income that is due to the mining sector.55
Again, the specifications I present are very similar, adding a simple interaction
with the mining sector share in district domestic product interacted with the Mon-
soon season rainfall. The results are presented in Table 1.17. Column (1) presents
the results on violence intensity without the NREGA interactions. It becomes evident
that districts with a larger share of the mining sector experience a weaker relation-
ship between violence and Monsoon rain. This maps into the findings of Vanden
Eynde (2011). Once including the NREGA interaction, the coefficient on the Mining
sector interaction becomes insignificant with a p-value of 12%. More importantly,
the NREGA interaction remains strongly significant. This suggests that the NREGA
effect seems not to be picking up a moderation in the Monsoon shock and conflict
relationship due to the presence of a large mineral resource sector.
The next section provides tentative results of a level effect of NREGA on conflict
levels.
55I use district domestic product data for years between 1998 to 2005 available from
http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/index.php?state=ssphdbody.htm, accessed
on 21.06.2014. The district domestic product construction is discussed in detail in Katyal et al. (2001).
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1.A.2 Level Effect of NREGA
The preceding results suggested that NREGA does have a moderating effect on the
cyclical nature of violence, in particular, the violence targeted against civilians. How-
ever, the existing literature evaluating the economic impacts of NREGA also indicate
strong increases in wage levels.56 An increase in wage levels can be seen as an in-
crease in the returns to labour in both, good- and bad states of the world. This does
have an independent level effect on conflict. It is challenging to identify a level ef-
fect due to the endogeneity of the roll-out. Nevertheless, in this section I provide an
estimate of the level effect of NREGA. I estimate specifications with less demanding
time-fixed effects that vary by region. This ensures that the coefficient on the NREGA
treatment dummy is not collinear with the time effects and can thus, be interpreted.
The specification I estimate is as follows:
E(Adprt) = δd exp (brt + αTdprt + ηRdpr,t−1 + γTdprt × Rdpr,t−1 + edprt) (1.8)
where brt are now region by time fixed effects, rather than region by phase and
time fixed effects. This set of fixed effects allows the estimation of the parameter α,
which can be interpreted as the level effect of NREGA if we are willing to assume that
the roll-out of NREGA was exogenuous. This is not a classical difference in difference
estimator with one set of treated and one set of untreated locations since eventually,
all districts receive NREGA. The coefficient α is estimated off the time variation due to
the sequential roll out of NREGA. This implies that the NREGA treatment indicator is
estimated soley from the variation for the years in which some districts had already
received NREGA relative to other districts that did not have NREGA yet; that is,
the coefficient solely lives off the variation in differences in conflict across phases
for the years 2006 and 2007. When adding interaction terms with Monsoon rainfall
and NREGA, the interaction term becomes, in addition, a heterogenous effect for the
level effect of NREGA in these two years. In order to get the average treatment effect
I demean Monsoon rainfall variable for these regressions. I estimate three versions
of the above specification. First, imposing the constraint that η = γ. In this case, I
force the effect of rainfall to be the same before and after the introduction of NREGA.
I also estimate a specification with the constraint η = γ = 0, which effectively means
not controlling for rainfall. The key question is how this will affect the estimated
coefficient αˆ. In both cases, the coefficient αˆ should overstate the effect of NREGA in
absolute value.
The results are presented in table 1.18. The first column presents the constrained
regression where I do not control for rainfall. The level effect coefficient is negative
and statistically significant. This coefficient is a mixture of the level effect and the
implied effect due to a reduced rainfall and conflict elasticity. In the second column,
I control for rainfall, which renders the coefficient slightly larger in absolute value.
56See Zimmermann (2012), Berg et al. (2012), Imbert and Papp (2015) and Azam (2011).
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The third column is the unconstrained coefficient, allowing the functional relation-
ship between rainfall and conflict to change with the introduction of NREGA. The
interesting observation is that the coefficient on the level effect goes down and is esti-
mated relatively imprecisely, moving from a p-value close to 0.001 to p-value of 0.45.
This suggests that the dynamic effect of NREGA, operating by mitigating income
shocks, is being partially captured in estimates of αˆ, when one does not explicitly
control for this important economic channel through which NREGA operates. When
comparing column (2) and column (3), this suggests that at least 1/3 of the estimated
reduction in violence levels is due to the reduced rainfall dependence of conflict.
This paper provides evidence that NREGA functions as insurance. This sug-
gests that the correct way to evaluate NREGA is through its dynamic effect through
program participation. Nevertheless recently, Dasgupta et al. (2014) and Khanna
and Zimmermann (2013) separately estimated level effects of the introduction of
NREGA. They arrive at different conclusions. Khanna and Zimmermann (2013) use a
regression-discontinuity design relying on a reverse engineered NREGA roll-out al-
gorithm to identify districts that were close to the cutoff of being assigned into either
an earlier, or a later phase. They argue that this provides a good counterfactual for
a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and estimate the effect of the NREGA treat-
ment. They find that NREGA increased conflict levels in the short-run. Dasgupta
et al. (2014) use a difference in difference estimator as I discussed above. This de-
sign lives off variation in differences in conflict arising due to the gradual roll-out. I
provide some evidence of level effects in this paper, estimating a similar difference-in-
difference specification as in Dasgupta et al. (2014). The results are presented in Table
1.19. The first column presents the basic level effect estimate of contemporaneous
treatment. The second column adds lagged effects of the NREGA treatment indica-
tor, suggesting that the first lag is highly significant. The point estimate suggest that
the introduction of NREGA reduced levels of violence by between 30% to 50% for av-
erage Monsoon rainfalls. Columns (4)-(9) explore the heterogeneity of the estimated
effect by interacting the treatment indicator with a set of district-characteristics. The
district characteristics are demeaned for ease of interpretation of the marginal effects.
The results suggest that the level effect is weaker for districts with a high scheduled
tribe share, but stronger for districts with higher scheduled caste share. Indicative is
the coefficient on average household size. This suggests that the level effect is signif-
icantly weaker for districts with a larger average household size. Since the NREGA
program provides an allowance for 100 days of work per household, larger households
are disadvantaged in that respect. Column (8) interacts the treatment indicator with
the the mean level of agricultural output per capita before 2005 expressed in INR
1000. The coefficient is negative and significant, suggesting that richer districts saw a
stronger drop in conflict. While the results on the dynamics of conflict do not square
with Khanna and Zimmermann (2013), the estimated level effects do stand at odds
with the ones estimated in their paper but map well into the findings of Dasgupta
et al. (2014). That being said, as NREGA is aimed to provide insurance in bad states
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of the world, this insurance value should be driving the change in conflict levels.
This is captured in this paper through the changing slope linking Monsoon rain and
conflict.
1.A.3 NREGA Road Construction and Conflict
NREGA aims to “create durable assets which have potential to generate additional
employment in the years to come in rural areas.”57 While the analysis of the agri-
cultural production function did not suggest a dramatic change in the relationship
between Monsoon rainfall and agricultural output in the short run, asset construc-
tion under NREGA could still affect the dynamics of conflict. There is anecdotal
evidence suggesting that Naxalites oppose road construction under the scheme (see
Banerjee and Saha (2010)). The anecdotal accounts suggest that this is for fear that
roads could provide easier access for police and military. There is anecdotal evidence
suggesting that Naxalites have taken road construction contractors hostage or killed
them, suggesting that road construction could drive conflict.58 There are two ways
that road-construction could affect the results here. First, road construction may itself
be correlated with lagged Monsoon rainfall and through that affect the dynamics of
conflict in a way that is correlated with Monsoon rainfall. There could also be an
independent effect from road construction that affects conflict levels. This section
shows two things. I show that road construction is correlated with lagged Monsoon
rainfall; however, this relationship is not present for districts for which the modera-
tion in the rainfall and conflict relationship is strongest. There appears to be a distinct
effect of road construction on conflict that is not related to Monsoon season rainfall.
Districts in which the share of overall NREGA funds allocated to road construction
in the years since NREGA was introduced is higher, experience more conflict in re-
cent years. This effect is a mere correlation due to the endogeneity of NREGA road
construction. It is however, indicative for further research.
Monsoon Rainfall and Road Construction If road construction itself was correlated
with lagged Monsoon rainfall, this could explain the finding of the inward rotation of
the relationship between Monsoon rainfall and conflict. The argument is quite simple.
Before NREGA, good Monsoon rains would reduce conflict. With NREGA available,
strong Monsoon rainfalls may be associated with increasing road construction to
repair mud roads that have been damaged due to the Monsoon. This may lead
to more conflict, reversing the previously existing relationship. This is a genuine
concern and is studied in this section.
A brief look at summary statistics is already quite telling. Studying districts that
have been categorized as being under left wing extremist influence or have seen some
conflict for the period prior to NREGA suggests that these districts see a significantly
57 See http://www.nrega.nic.in, accessed 12.02.2014.
58See for example http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/detailsmall_news.asp?date1=7/16/2011&id=
5, accessed 11.10.2014.
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lower share of NREGA expenditure going to road construction. The total expenditure
weighted share in 2010 is around 31.3%, while it is 36.3% for the other districts. This
is an important insight, as it suggests that the types of assets created under NREGA
may reflect local preferences.
Table 1.20 presents results studying how the share of overall NREGA expenditures
in road construction (columns 1-3) or for land development (column 4-6) in a financial
year respond to Monsoon rainfall in the previous season. The relationship suggests
that lagged Monsoon rainfall predicts an increasing share of road construction (col-
umn 1), but not for projects that can be classified for land development (column
4). This gives rise to the genuine concern that rainfall may drive road construction
which, in turn, is driving conflict as suggested. I rule out this explanation by study-
ing the heterogeneity across NREGA implementation phase, by whether districts are
classified as being under left-wing extremist influence and by studying whether it is
excessive Monsoon rains that drive this effect.
Columns (2) and (4) study this relationship for districts by implementation phase:
it appears that the positive Monsoon rainfall and road construction relationship is
driven by districts that receive NREGA in early phases. Columns (3) and (6) study
the responsiveness of NREGA asset construction for districts classified under left-
wing extremist influence. Neither expenditures for land-development (column 6)
nor road construction (column 3) meaningfully correlate with Monsoon rainfall for
these districts. This is reassuring given that the moderating effect of NREGA on the
Monsoon conflict relationship is coming mostly from these districts.
A non-parametric analysis further suggests that it is positive rainfall that corre-
lates with road construction for phase 1 districts (see Figure 1.9). This is an important
insight as the non-parametric analysis of the Monsoon rainfall and conflict (or crime)
relationship indicated that NREGA’s moderating effect on that relationship is due its
impact on below normal Monsoon rainfall. This renders me confident that, while
road construction may have an independent effect on conflict, this effect is not con-
founding the moderation in the Monsoon rainfall and conflict relationship studied in
this paper.
This is also conceptually reasonable: road construction due to excessive Monsoon
may simply repair and replace already existing mud roads, which are most prevalent
in districts that received NREGA in the first phase (see Table 1.1). This is qualitatively
a lot different from new roads being constructed. Places, in which a lot of roads are
constructed, may experience a change in the conflict dynamic, as it is new roads
that improve access to remote places for the military and not the improvement or
repairing of existing roads. That is to say: places that receive a lot of road construction
through NREGA independent of Monsoon rainfall may experience a change in the
conflict dynamics that is, however, unrelated to the moderation in the Monsoon and
conflict relationship studied here. This is highlighted in the next paragraph.
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Independent Effect of New Road Construction In order to study the direct effect
of road construction on conflict that is unrelated to Monsoon rainfall, I construct
a measure of road construction intensity as the share of all funds devoted to road
construction activity for all the post NREGA years. This overall measure may reflect
local preferences for different development projects that is, due to the averaging,
independent of Monsoon rainfall. Let this measure be denoted as ρd. I estimate the
event study analysis interacting the time to treatment with the measure ρd and plot
out the coefficients. The coefficients are estimated off the variation in NREGA road
construction intensity across districts. The results are presented in Figure 1.10. The
pattern that emerges suggests that NREGA road construction intensity is correlated
with higher incidence and intensity of conflict following the introduction of NREGA.
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Figures and Tables for Robustness Appendix
Figure 1.9: NREGA Infrastructure Expenditure Shares and Lagged Monsoon Rainfall
for Phase 1 Districts
Figure 1.10: Effect of NREGA Cumulative Road Construction Expenditure Share on
Conflict over Time.
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Table 1.11: Socio-Economic Characteristics of
Districts with Naxalite Presence
LWE Affected Other Districts
Number of Districts 206 365
Panel A: Demographic
Rural Population 77.17 69.52
Tribal Population 9.47 7.49
Scheduled Caste 16.55 15.75
Illiterate 46.07 44.56
Population Age < 6 24.39 24.81
Permanent House 46.69 55.81
Panel B: Infrastructure
Primary School 74.27 81.57
Mud Road 72.11 59.63
Primary Health Care 29.72 33.19
Electricity 65.41 84.86
Bus Stop 29.66 40.35
Post Office 34.03 46.83
Notes: Statistics derived from the 2001 Census for India.
Panel A presents demographic indicators as shares of the
overall population. Panel B presents Infrastructure indica-
tors derived from the share of villages that have access to a
particular type of infrastructure.
74
Table 1.12: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship between Weather Variables
and Agricultural Output
log(Output Value/Capita) log(Grain Value/Capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Outside Monsoon Temperature Controls Outside Monsoon Temperature Controls
log(Monsoon) 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.424*** 0.369*** 0.369*** 0.335***
(0.086) (0.087) (0.080) (0.076) (0.076) (0.073)
log(Outside Monsoon) 0.122** 0.124** 0.129*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.090**
(0.051) (0.051) (0.046) (0.043) (0.043) (0.042)
Temperature -0.063 -0.030 -0.028 -0.053*
(0.051) (0.031) (0.040) (0.030)
Observations 3239 3239 3239 3196 3196 3196
Number of Districts 471 471 471 464 464 464
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Temperature measures the average
temperature during the Monsoon months. Columns (1)-(3) study agricultural output value per capita, while columns (4) -
(6) study the value of grain production encompassing ragi, rice, wheat, bajra, jowar, maize, pules and barley. Columns (3)
and (6) add a set of district characteristics interacted with a set of year fixed effects. The district characteristics are: terrain
ruggedness, elevation, rural population share, tribal population share, scheduled caste share, illiteracy rates, household
size, share of population younger than 6 years, population growth rate from census 1991 to 2001, gender gap, share of
villages in district with primary school, share of villages in district with mud road approach, share of households in district
that live in permanent housing, share of villages in district with primary health care facilities, share of villages with electric
power, share of villages with a bus stop and the share of villages with a postal office. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect
spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up
to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from district centroids, stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1.
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Table 1.13: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship between
Weather Variables and Agricultural Wages
log(Annual Wage) log(Seasonal Wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Outside Monsoon Temperature Controls Harvesting Planting
log(Monsoon) 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.046* 0.010
(0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.028) (0.017)
log(Outside Monsoon) 0.006 0.006 0.011
(0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Temperature 0.001 0.021
(0.015) (0.013)
State by NREGA Phase Trend Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 1419 1419 1419 1387 1195
Number of Districts 314 314 314 318 260
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. State by NREGA-
Phase Trend are linear trends at the State by NREGA implementation phase level. Temperature measures
the average temperature during the Monsoon months. Data is an unbalanced district level panel of annual
agricultural wages in India. Columns (1)-(3) study agricultural wages, while columns (4) and (5) study
wages at the planting stage compared to wages at harvesting stage towards the end of the year. Column
(3) adds a set of district characteristics interacted with a set of year fixed effects. The district characteristics
are: terrain ruggedness, elevation, rural population share, tribal population share, scheduled caste share,
illiteracy rates, household size, share of population younger than 6 years, population growth rate from
census 1991 to 2001, gender gap, share of villages in district with primary school, share of villages in
district with mud road approach, share of households in district that live in permanent housing, share of
villages in district with primary health care facilities, share of villages with electric power, share of villages
with a bus stop and the share of villages with a postal office. Standard errors are adjusted to reflect
spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease
in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from district centroids, stars indicate
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.14: Before the Introduction of NREGA: Robustness of Relationship between Monsoon Rainfall and
Conflict
Robustness to Choice of Empirical Model Controls and Interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Poisson-IV Neg Bin OLS Weather Controls Interactions
log(Fitted Output Value/Capitat−1) -2.362**
(0.986)
log(Monsoont−1) -0.830*** -0.313** -0.960*** -0.811** -1.192***
(0.230) (0.147) (0.346) (0.328) (0.422)
log(Outside Monsoont−1) -0.384*
(0.205)
Temperaturet−1 0.504
(0.314)
log(Monsoont) -0.056
(0.257)
Temperaturet 0.096
(0.310)
District Controls No No No No Yes No
Monsoon Rain Interactions No No No No No Yes
Observations 646 932 3843 932 932 932
Number of Districts 117 144 543 144 144 144
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Column (1) presents the results of an IV
regression, instrumenting lagged agricultural output per capita with lagged Monsoon rainfall. Column (2) is a negative binomial,
while column (3) presents OLS results. Column (4) includes temperature during the Monsoon season as well as contemporaneous
weather. Column (5) interacts a set of district controls with a set of year fixed effects, while column (6) interacts Monsoon rainfall
with the demeaned district characteristics. The district characteristics are: terrain ruggedness, elevation, rural population share, tribal
population share, scheduled caste share, illiteracy rates, household size, share of population younger than 6 years, population growth
rate from census 1991 to 2001, gender gap, share of villages in district with primary school, share of villages in district with mud
road approach, share of households in district that live in permanent housing, share of villages in district with primary health care
facilities, share of villages with electric power, share of villages with a bus stop and the share of villages with a postal office. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.15: Alternative Mechanism: Rural Connectivity and Moderation of
Rainfall and Conflict Relationship
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Road Construction
log(Monsoon) -0.040** -0.059*** -0.712*** -1.418***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.212) (0.358)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 0.047*** 1.093***
(0.017) (0.394)
Roads -0.387 -0.622 5.127 4.153
(0.571) (0.571) (5.249) (5.203)
Roads x log(Monsoon) 0.073 0.108 -0.647 -0.521
(0.092) (0.091) (0.753) (0.756)
Panel B: Cumulative Road Construction
log(Monsoon) -0.049** -0.055** -0.927*** -1.325***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.311) (0.347)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 0.044*** 1.415***
(0.016) (0.354)
Cumulative Roads -0.248 0.005 -7.788* 4.778
(0.248) (0.226) (4.647) (4.011)
Cumulative Roads x log(Monsoon) 0.040 0.002 0.917 -0.880
(0.037) (0.034) (0.661) (0.586)
Observations 5775 5775 2230 2230
Number of Districts 525 525 210 210
Estimation OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Mon-
soon rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realisation. The dependent variable
is the number of violent incidences per quarter in columns (1) and (2) and an indicator whether
there was any violent incidence in columns (3) and (4). Panel A studies the effect of contempo-
raneous road construction on violence, while Panel B studies the impact of rainfall through the
overall share of unconnected habitats that became connected up to 2012. Standard errors are
clustered at district level in column (1) and (2), while in column (3) and (4) they are adjusted
to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed
to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed from
district centroids. stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.16: Alternative Mechanism: Integrated Action Plan Disbursals and the Moder-
ation of Monsoon Rainfall and Conflict Relationship
IAP Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
log(Monsoon) 0.407 -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.048*** -1.257*** -1.170*** -1.352***
(0.426) (0.017) (0.015) (0.018) (0.279) (0.271) (0.286)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.642* 0.880** 1.008***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.366) (0.424) (0.384)
IAP Expenditure 0.011 0.084***
(0.010) (0.029)
Observations 184 6669 5973 7059 2354 2152 2760
Number of Districts 72 513 543 543 192 205 222
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson Poisson Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. Monsoon rain
is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realization. Column (1) studies IAP expenditure as a
function of lagged Monsoon rain. The dependent variable in columns (2)-(4) is an indicator whether there
was any conflict event in a district and year, while it is the number of conflict events per year in columns
(5)-(7). Columns (2) and (5) remove the 33 districts that received the IAP originally. Columns (3) and (6)
restrict the analysis to the period 2000-2010. Columns (4) and (7) control for IAP expenditure. Standard
errors in column (1)-(4) are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial
autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are
computed from district centroids. Errors in columns (3) and (4) are clustered at the district level, with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Table 1.17: Alternative Mechanism: Mining Sector Share,
Commodity Boom and Moderation of Rainfall and Conflict
Relationship
Incidence Intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(Monsoon) -0.042** -0.054*** -0.947*** -1.797***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.199) (0.283)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 0.049*** 1.369***
(0.015) (0.389)
Mining Sector Share 0.011 0.012 4.554* 3.820*
x log(Monsoon) (0.315) (0.313) (2.348) (2.256)
Observations 6552 6552 2504 2504
Number of Districts 504 504 204 204
Estimation OLS OLS Poisson Poisson
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and dis-
trict fixed effects. Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s Mon-
soon rainfall realisation. The dependent variable is an indicator whether
there was any conflict event in columns (1) and (2) and the number of
violent incidences per year in columns (3) and (4). Mining Sector Share
is the share of the districts domestic product that is generated in the
Mining sector based on data between 1998 and 2005. Standard errors in
column (1) and (2) are adjusted to reflect spatial dependence as modelled
in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is assumed to linearly decrease
in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are computed
from district centroids. Errors in columns (3) and (4) are clustered at the
district level, with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.18: Dynamic Versus Direct Level Effect of NREGA
(1) (2) (3)
η = γ = 0 η = γ Unconstrained
NREGA -0.437*** -0.498*** -0.300*
(0.165) (0.178) (0.170)
log(Monsoon) -0.859*** -1.758***
(0.237) (0.356)
NREGA x log(Monsoon) 1.457***
(0.369)
Observations 2886 2886 2886
Number of Districts 222 222 222
Notes: All regressions include region-by-time fixed effects and district
fixed effects. Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon
rainfall realisation; Monsoon rainfall is demeaned for ease of interpre-
tation of the interaction terms. All regressions are estimated using
Poisson models with the dependent variable being the number of con-
flict events per district and year. The first column does not control for
Monsoon rainfall, while the second column constraints the rainfall co-
efficient to be the same before, and after the introduction of NREGA.
Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the
parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.19: Level Effect of NREGA
Level Effect Estimates Heterogeneity of Level Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
NREGA -0.300* -0.225 -0.533*** -0.724*** -0.297* -0.263 -0.695*** -0.930***
(0.170) (0.150) (0.197) (0.198) (0.173) (0.171) (0.234) (0.232)
NREGAt− 1 -0.470**
(0.201)
Heterogeneity: NREGA ×
Scheduled Tribe 1.051*** 0.540
(0.400) (0.448)
Scheduled Caste -5.974*** -2.651
(1.539) (2.166)
Illiteracy 0.564 -0.708
(1.439) (1.469)
Householdsize 0.461*** 0.250
(0.178) (0.188)
Agricultural GDP Before 2005 -0.224** -0.181*
(0.096) (0.093)
NREGA Dynamic Effect
Monsoon Rain -1.758*** -1.725*** -1.708*** -1.852*** -1.760*** -1.596*** -1.883*** -1.812***
(0.356) (0.348) (0.351) (0.333) (0.355) (0.373) (0.420) (0.428)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.457*** 1.489*** 1.381*** 1.565*** 1.459*** 1.401*** 1.589*** 1.585***
(0.369) (0.372) (0.361) (0.360) (0.368) (0.373) (0.454) (0.464)
Observations 2886 2886 2886 2886 2886 2886 2496 2496
Number of Districts 222 222 222 222 222 222 192 192
Notes: All regressions include region-by-time fixed effects and district fixed effects. The time period is restricted to the period
before NREGA was introduced. All regressions are estimated using Poisson models with the dependent variable being the
number of conflict events per district and year. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 1.20: Explaining the NREGA Effect: Monsoon Rainfall and
NREGA Infrastructure Construction
Road Construction Land Development
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Monsoon 0.033** 0.040* 0.059*** -0.020 -0.056** -0.042**
(0.014) (0.021) (0.017) (0.013) (0.025) (0.021)
Phase 2 x Monsoon -0.006 0.031
(0.030) (0.030)
Phase 3 x Monsoon -0.016 0.084***
(0.027) (0.030)
LWE Affected x -0.056*** 0.050*
Monsoon (0.022) (0.026)
Observations 2894 2894 2894 2894 2894 2894
Number of Districts 504 504 504 504 504 504
Notes: All regressions include region-phase-time fixed effects and district fixed ef-
fects. Monsoon rain is the previous growing season’s Monsoon rainfall realisation.
The dependent variable is the share of NREGA expenditures in a district that go
into road construction relative to land development. Standard errors are clustered at
district level in column (1) and (2), while in column (3) and (4) they are adjusted to
reflect spatial dependence as modelled in Conley (1999). Spatial autocorrelation is as-
sumed to linearly decrease in distance up to a cutoff of 500 km. District distances are
computed from district centroids. stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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1.A.4 Conflict Data
Empirical research on the economics of conflict almost always suffer from severe data
limitations. This lies in the nature of the subject of study, that typically places that
exhibit conflict are only weakly institutionalised with little official report of violence
and little press and media coverage. Blattman and Miguel (2010)’s review cites that
the correlation across different civil war datasets ranges from 0.42 to 0.96, which
may be the reason why empirical results are often not reproducible using similar
identification strategies, but different datasets or variable definitions (e.g. Ciccone
(2011)).
There exists no broad conflict dataset that covers India or South East Asia as a
whole. This gap was filled through the violence dataset introduced in Fetzer (2013).
This paper documents the process through which in the Indian context 28,638 news-
paper reports were transformed into a workable conflict dataset using both machine-
learning, semi-automated coding techniques and scalable manual hand-coding meth-
ods.59 This section sketches the semi-automated process through which the daily
newspaper clippings are transformed (more details are provided in Fetzer (2013)). A
typical sample may look as follows:
Two unidentified terrorists massacred six members of a family and left a
seventh injured at Mangnar Top, Poonch district, on December 31, 2001.
Local residents refused to cremate the bodies of the slain victims, insist-
ing that a Union Minister should visit the area and take notice of the
increasing terrorist violence there.
The semi-automated routine defines a terrorist-incident as an Event-tuple, E =
{L, T, V, S, O} defined by a location L, a date or time of the event T, a verb V that
indicates the type of violent act, and the verb’s associated subject S, the perpetrator
of the act and the object O that was subjected to the act V. The semi-automated
routine tries to fill all these elements of the tuple for each sentence using common
machine-learning algorithms implemented in natural language processing packages.
I work with the following set of Trained Natural Language Processing Algorithms:
1. Sentence Detection to break up individual sentences.
2. Semantic Role Labelling (SRL) to tag the grammatical structure of words in
relation to one another.
3. Named Entity Recognition (NER) to identify names (places, institutions, names)
lives off spelling, preposition and gazetteer. Complemented with dictionary of
1,978 spelling variations.
4. Part of Speech Tagging (POS) to tag role of words (subject, verb, object)
59The raw material was a set of 28,638 newspaper clippings collected by the Institute for Conflict
Management in New Delhi through the South Asian Panel on Terrorism (SATP) since 2001, see http:
//www.satp.org, accessed in October 2012.
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These are together implemented in SENNA (Collobert et al., 2011), available as
open-source in C. The sample output for the above sentence would look like:
Two B-A0 B-A0
unidentified I-A0 I-A0
terrorists E-A0 E-A0
massacred massacred S-V
six B-A1
members I-A1
of I-A1
a I-A1
family E-A1
and
left left S-V
a B-A1 B-A1
seventh I-A1 E-A1
injured injured I-A1 S-V
at I-A1 B-AM-LOC
Mangnar B-LOC I-A1 I-AM-LOC
Top E-LOC I-A1 I-AM-LOC
, I-A1 I-AM-LOC
Poonch S-LOC I-A1 I-AM-LOC
district I-A1 E-AM-LOC
, I-A1
on I-A1
December I-A1
31 I-A1
, I-A1
2001 E-A1
In the above text-snippet, only one sentence satisfies the requirement of all ele-
ments forming an event tuple E = {L, T, V, S, O} being present. This yields:
E1 = {′Mangar Top Poonch′,′December 31 2001′,
′massacre′,′ two unidentified terrorists′,
′six members of a family at Mangnar Top, Poonch district′}
An incident is counted as long as all pieces of information can be deduced from
the underlying sentence. This is essentially mimicking the process through which
humans would code this data manually. An exhaustive list of verbs is used to spot
events and a sentence is normalised to contain at most one event. The individual
elements of the tuple E are then transformed by assigning labels to the snippets
indicating whether the actor was a terrorist, security force or a civilian and similarly
for who subjected to the act V. Note that in the sentence there exists a further event:
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E2 = {′Mangar Top Poonch′,′December 31 2001′,
′left′,′ two unidentified terrorists′,
′a seventh injured at Mangnar Top, Poonch district′}
As described in Fetzer (2013), a sentence will be counted as containing infor-
mation of at most one incident. The data has been evaluated in Fetzer (2013) and
correlates very well with hand-coded data. The correlation between this automati-
cally retrieved data and the hand-coded data for the Naxalite conflict used by Vanden
Eynde (2011) is at least 93%.
1.A.5 Comparison of Results with Global Terrorism Database
This section highlights that the results obtained in This chapter can not be replicated
when studying the conflict for India contained in the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) collected by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to
Terrorism at the University of Maryland. This database has been used in more than 30
journal publications and thus, serves as an interesting testing ground. Unfortunately,
the GTD database does not come at a district level spatial resolution. However, it
provides the nearest big town to where the incident occurred. In order to be able to
compare the datasets, I geo-code the locations of the nearest towns to obtain a similar
district level count variable of the number of conflict events. I then estimate the
main specifications using the number of terrorist incidences in the global terrorism
database as a left-hand side. The results are presented in Table 1.21.
Table 1.21: NREGA Effect in the GTD and Fetzer (2013) dataset
Fetzer (2013) Dataset Global Terrorism Database
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre NREGA Dynamic Level Pre NREGA Dynamic Levels
Monsoon -0.866*** -1.330*** -0.680*** -0.985 -1.338* -1.062**
(0.270) (0.306) (0.261) (0.684) (0.764) (0.462)
NREGA x Monsoon 1.098*** 0.359
(0.388) (0.676)
NREGA -0.540*** -1.098
(0.166) (1.264)
Observations 2841 8868 10199 851 5268 5268
Number of Districts 148 217 217 57 186 186
Notes: All regressions are estimated using a pseduo-maximum likelihood estimator, whose moment
conditions coincide with a Poisson model. Regressions in columns (1)-(2) and (4)-(5) include region-
phase-time fixed effects as well as district fixed effects, while results for columns (3) and (6) come from a
regression with time- and district fixed effects. The dependent variable is the number of incidences per
district and quarter. Robust standard errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses
with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
Columns (1)-(3) study the dataset used in this paper, while columns (4)-(6) use the
GTD database. In column (4) it becomes obvious that in the GTD data, there appears
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to be no statistically significant correlation between rainfall and conflict, while there is
a strong documented in the Fetzer (2013) data in column (1). The geographic coverage
of the GTD dataset is a lot more limited before the introduction of NREGA, with only
57 districts reported as having violent incidences before NREGA was introduced
while there are almost three times as many districts reported in the other datasets.
The moderating effect of NREGA is seen only in column (2), but not in column (5),
albeit the coefficient is positive.
As the number of districts covered in the GTD database seems to increase dramat-
ically when expanding the analysis to the whole time-period in column (5) it becomes
instructive to study how the correlation between these two datasets has evolved over
time. I regress the two datasets onto one another, allowing for there to be a separate
coefficient for each year:
GTDdt = δd + brt +
2010
∑
t=2000
γt Adt + edt
The estimated coefficients γt are plotted out in Figure 1.11.
Figure 1.11: Relationship between Fetzer (2013) and GTD Data over Time
The specification, by using district- and region by time fixed effects takes out any
fixed- conflict region and time varying reporting differences, while the district fixed
effects remove any time-invariant district specific reporting biases. The coefficients
paint a very stark picture: the datasets do not compare well at all before 2007. The
good news is that the coefficients are consistently positive, suggesting that the overall
correlation is positive. However, the point estimates are very small and only some-
times statistically significantly different from zero. This suggests that int he earlier
years it is extremely unlikely for an incident captured in one dataset to appear in the
other. In more recent years, the data become increasingly similar.
Why have the two datasets converged? It appears that the underlying data source
in the GTD database has evolved significantly over time. Since 2008, the SATP reports
feed into the GTD database, while before that the GTD database was mainly fed by
newswire services. By 2010, more than 53% of the incidences in the GTD database
were directly referenced with a report from the SATP newspaper clippings dataset.
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This is clearly, a lower bound since for many reports in the GTD dataset one can
manually find references in the SATP dataset, but not necessarily vice versa.
While the level of violence reported in the GTD database seems to be significantly
lower for early years, it is important for the identification whether this mismatch in
reporting is correlated with rainfall realisations.
In order to explore this, I measure the differences and the absolute value of the
differences between the two datasets and run the three specifications from above
again.
The results are presented in table 1.22. The coefficients suggest that a positive
rainfall realisation in the preceding month is significantly correlated with a lower re-
porting difference, i.e. implying that the mismatch between the Fetzer (2013) dataset
and the GTD dataset is smaller. This highlights that reporting is likely to be endoge-
nous to past weather and thus, past income realisations. While this is something that
can fundamentally, not be checked, I believe that this is more likely to be a problem
for the GTD database, where reporting has been found to correlate with Foreign Di-
rect Investment in Fetzer (2013). The introduction of NREGA appears to have further
reduced the mismatch between the two datasets.
Table 1.22: Evolution of Reporting Differences between GTD and Fetzer (2013) datasets
Reporting Difference Absolute Value of Reporting Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pre NREGA Dynamic Level Pre NREGA Dynamic Levels
Monsoon -0.078** -0.090** -0.107*** -0.136***
(0.032) (0.036) (0.030) (0.034)
NREGA x Monsoon 0.051 0.060
(0.042) (0.043)
NREGA -0.398 -0.048 -0.503* -0.094*
(0.269) (0.055) (0.278) (0.050)
Observations 12657 25521 27693 12657 25521 27693
Number of Districts 543 543 543 543 543 543
Notes: All regressions are simple linear regressions with time- and district fixed effects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the district level are given in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05,
* p < 0.1.
If we take this and the previous results together, this suggests that there is some
systematic differences to the GTD dataset which correlates with rainfall in a sys-
tematic way and the introduction of NREGA may have lead to a moderation of this
reporting difference. Since the two datasets appear to be converging over time and
the coverage of the GTD dataset actually expanding, it seems reasonable to conclude
that the SATP data source on which the Fetzer (2013) dataset is a more consistent
way to measure conflict.
1.A.6 TRMM Rainfall Data
This paper is the first one in economics to use data from the Tropical Rainfall Measur-
ing Mission (TRMM) satellite, which is jointly operated by the National Aeronautics
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and Space Administration (NASA) and the Japan Aerospace and Exploration Agency
(JAXA). The satellite carries a set of five instruments to construct gridded rainfall
rates at very high spatial and temporal resolution.
The TRMM Multi-Satellite Precipitation Analysis provides daily rainfall from 1998
to 2012 at a fine spatial resolution of 0.25 by 0.25 degree grid-cell size. The data
from the various instruments aboard the satellite are cleaned and calibrated using
additional data from the accumulated Climate Assessment and Monitoring System
(CAMS). The output of the algorithm are 3-hourly rainfall rates for that time-period.
This is then scaled up to obtain monthly mean precipitation rates, which in turn are
transformed into overall monthly rainfall.
Figure 1.12: Rainfall and Growing Season for Andhra Pradesh
Remotely sensed weather data is an important source of data, in particular, for less
developed countries, where observational data is scarce. This is particularly relevant
in the case of India, where observational weather may vary in systematic ways. There
are three main drawbacks. First, most observations come from rain gauges, where
measurements are taken once a day. Climatologist are concerned about rain gauges
in particular in tropical- or subtropical areas, since most rainfall is convective. Such
convective rainfalls are highly local, generating intermittent and scattered rainfall,
which may not be picked up using rain gauges, if the network is not spatially fine
enough. The TRMM satellite orbits the earth every 90 minutes, thus providing mul-
tiple observations each day. An alternative is to consider data from weather radars.
Rainfall radar may provide estimates for rainfall in a radius of 200 km around the
station, however it is unreliable for distances in excess of 200 km. In the Indian
case, rainfall radar data is not made available and would be problematic, since most
reporting radar stations are clustered along the coast. The third general concern
regarding observational weather data is the fact that reporting may be endogenous
e.g. to violence or other variables that are correlated with the dynamics of violence.
This has been highlighted recently by Smith et al. (2011), who show that Somalian
piracy has generated a "black hole" in the Indian ocean, where observational weather
data from merchant vessels is not available anymore, as vessels take routes avoiding
piracy infested areas.60
60Another example is the case of Vanden Eynde (2011), who had to merge several districts together in
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I prefer the TRMM data as it is less subject to systematic measurement error, as the
underlying data source is consistent over time. This is not the case with rain gauge
based data, such as the GPCC as used by Miguel et al. (2004), Ferrara and Harari
(2013) and Kudamatsu et al. (2014) and many others. In the case of India, the number
of reporting weather stations for the GPCC data set varies from year to year. In 2001
there were a total of 1197 stations that reported at least some data, while in year 2008
that number dropped to 978. On average, 15.7 % of the district-year observations have
some rainfall station reporting data. This pattern varies systematically with violence
as is shown in table 1.23. The table presents results from the same specification as
in the main part of the paper, including region-by NREGA phase time fixed effects
and district fixed effects. The dependent variable is an indicator whether any station
reported data for that district and year. The regressor is either an indicator whether
a district experienced any violent incident in the last year (column (1)) or the number
of incidents in column (2).
Table 1.23: Weather Station Reporting in
GPCC Varies with Violence
(1) (2)
Any Violence -0.013
(0.009)
Attacks -0.002**
(0.001)
Mean of DV .157 .157
Observations 5440 5440
Number of Districts 544 544
Notes: All regressions are simple linear regres-
sions with time- and district fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the district level are
given in the parentheses with stars indicating ***
p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The coefficient on the violence indicator is insignificant, with a p-value of 18.5%.
The coefficient on the number of attacks is significant at 5%, indicating that one
additional attack per year decreases the probability of a rain gauge station reporting
data in the subsequent year by 1.3% percent, when evaluating it against the mean of
the dependent variable. Despite this general concern, my results are robust to using
either the GPCC data (Schneider et al. (2011)) or the Indian Meterological Department
data used in Vanden Eynde (2011).
1.A.7 Temperature Reanalysis Data
As a solution to the problem of limited data availability for ground measurements,
I construct temperature readings from a gridded daily reanalysis dataset that uses
remote sensing data and sophisticated climate models to construct daily temperature
order to obtain consistent rainfall estimates, since many stations simply fail to report rainfall estimates.
Most of these stations are located in places with conflict or in newly created districts or states.
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on a 0.75◦ (latitude) x 0.75◦ (longitude) grid (equivalent to 83km x 83km at the equa-
tor).61 The ERA-Interim reanalysis is provided by the European Centre for Medium-
Term Weather Forecasting (ECMWF).62 As the grid is significantly coarser than the
rainfall data, I construct inverse distance weighted daily mean temperatures for all
grid points within 100 km of the geographic centre of each district. The weighting
used is the inverse of the distance squared from the district centroid.
1.A.8 Agricultural Production, State Level Harvest Prices and District Do-
mestic Product
For every district, I only consider crops that have been consistently planted on at
least 1000 acres for the whole period that the state reports agricultural production
to the data dissemination service of the Directorate of Economics and Statistics with
the Ministry of Agriculture.63 This leaves the following crops: bajra, barley, castor-
seed, chilly, cotton, gram, groundnut, jowar, jute, linseed, maize, mesta, potato, ragi,
rapeseed, rice, sesamum, sugarcane, tobacco, tumeric, tur-arhar and wheat. These
capture India’s most important staple crops as well as cash crops. Underrepresented
is production of fruits or other horticulture products.
For each of these crops, I obtained state-level farm harvest prices to compute a
district level measure of the agricultural output value. Unfortunately, district level
harvest prices were not available throughout or only for a limited number of crops
that did not match well with the actual planted crops. For that reason, I stuck with
the state-level prices. The resulting dataset is an unbalanced panel, since not all states
consistently report data to the Ministry of Agriculture information systems.
For the quantification exercise on the insurance value, I scale up the district level
agricultural output value to match the district domestic product for the year 2000.
The district domestic product is an estimate of local area incomes that has been pro-
duced for the period 1998-2005, but is not available for more recent years.64 It relies
on a large set of input statistics, including the Annual Survey of Industry, the Na-
tional Sample Survey and Crop Production Surveys. The district domestic product
construction is discussed in detail in Katyal et al. (2001). I obtain a baseline measure
of the agricultural output per capita from the district domestic product. This measure
will be unambiguously larger than the computed agricultural output value derived
from the crop production statistics, as I only include crops that have been consistently
reported for the time period that a state reports data to the Directorate of Economics
and Statistics. I compute for each district a scaling factor ωd that measures the share
of the agricultural output value per capita that is captured in the agricultural district
domestic product. I then simply scale up the agricultural output value per capita by
61To convert degrees to km, multiply 83 by the cosine of the latitude, e.g at 40 degrees latitude 0.75 x
0.75 cells are 83 x cos(40) = 63.5 km x 63.5 km.
62See Dee et al. 2011 for a detailed discussion of the ERA-Interim data.
63This data is available on http://apy.dacnet.nic.in/cps.aspx, accessed 14.12.2013.
64The data is available from http://planningcommission.nic.in/plans/stateplan/index.php?
state=ssphdbody.htm, accessed on 21.06.2014.
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this scaling factor. This preserves the variation but likely gets the agricultural output
value closer to the true. This scaled agricultural output value per capita will be used
for the quantification exercise to evaluate how much insurance NREGA provides.
1.A.9 Agricultural Wages in India
This appendix describes the process of how the agricultural wage data was cleaned
and put in shape for the analysis in the paper. The data is only source providing
consistently reported wage data for the whole of India. The raw data gives monthly
wages for male, female and children, broken into skilled- and unskilled agricultural
labour and different types of labour. The types of skilled labour are blacksmith, car-
penter and cobbler, while unskilled labour combines ploughman, reaper/harvester,
sower, weeder, other agricultural labour. In some states, these separate unskilled
labour categories are not reported65, but rather, a category “Field Labour Wages” is
reported. This is conceived to be an average of the different categories.
In some districts these wages are reported throughout the year, while in others
the wages are reported only in the parts of the year, when particular activities are
actually carried out (i.e. sowing wages in the early Kharif season of May, June and
July), while harvesting wages are reported in the fall of a given year.
After digitising and entering the raw data, I proceed to construct an annual level
agricultural field-labour wage as my main dependent variable. For each district, there
may be multiple wage-observations in case there are multiple reporting centres. I
generate a balanced panel requiring each quarter of the year to have at least one non-
missing observation of agricultural wages belonging to the particular category of
unskilled labour. I then construct the simple average across these wage-observations.
There are advantages and disadvantages to this approach. In particular, by con-
struction, this implies that within a year, some field labour wage observations are
noisier then others. This can be taken into account by adequately weighting the ob-
servations. As an alternative, I can impose the requirement that there be at least one
observation for each different unskilled labour category within a quarter. This condi-
tion is very stringent, as it fails to recognise the types of agricultural activities that are
pursued during a year. This approach reduces the number of districts significantly,
but the results remain the same.
1.A.10 NREGA Data Sources and Roll Out
The data for the roll-out of NREGA come from the Ministry of Rural Development,
which is responsible for administering the scheme. The sequence of roll-out was
highly endogenous to a set of district level characteristics, such as the share of sched-
uled caste, scheduled tribe population, baseline agricultural productivity, literacy and
existing levels of conflict. This becomes obvious when considering Figure 1.13. This
picture highlights that a lot of districts in the east of India received NREGA in the
65The states for which this is the case are Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra.
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first round. A lot of these districts did suffer from Naxalite violence. As discussed in
the main body, I do not require exogeneity of treatment to levels of violence for my
empirical design. There are two main sources for data on NREGA take-up. These are
the district-level monthly-progress reports (MPR) and data coming from the Manage-
ment Information System (MIS). The latter is a completely non-paper based system
that has only become mandatory to use in the financial year but was still not fully
operational until 2010-2011.
Figure 1.13: Phases of the NREGA Roll-out across India
There are a lot of issues regarding the reliability of either datasets, as there is quite
some mismatch between the two datasets, especially in the earlier years when the
MIS was introduced.66 This may be due to partial compliance in the MIS after it
had been introduced, but could be also because the MPR system is more subject to
manipulation. It is difficult to asses the underlying divergence in the two databases.
The MPR data is available continually from 2006 to the financial year 2010-2011,
from which point onwards I rely on data from the MIS.67 The format of the reports
has changed considerably, with the major break occurring in 2011. This is partly
due to the evolving nature of NREGA. Ministry of Rural Development (2009) details
that several programs by the Ministry of Water Resources are to be joined with the
NREGA by 2011. An important part of this program are rural sanitation projects that
are funded by the Ministry of Water Resources for a set of targeted districts. This
implies that there are district-specific breaks in the NREGA data. In the empirical
66See for example mismatch between MIS data and National Sample Survey returns data highlighted
by http://www.indiatogether.org/2013/jun/gov-nregs.htm,accessed on 12.06.2013.
67Thanks to Clement Imbert for sharing NREGA MPR data for the earliest years.
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specifications which combine data from before and after 2011, I flexibly control for
these breaks by allowing the district fixed effects to be different before and after 2011.
I focus on a set of variables measuring take-up, project expenditures and overall
expenditures at the district level. For the take-up I study cumulative person days
provided, cumulative number of (distinct) households provided employment as well
as the number of days per household at the district level. I also look at the number
of person days for scheduled caste and scheduled tribe populations, as well as the
share of person days that accrue to females.
For the NREGA project measures, I study the total cost or number of ongoing
projects at the end of each financial year.68 For overall expenditures, I study total
expenditure in a district and year or total labour expenditures.
Despite having access to NREGA for many months in a financial year, I only study
the reported metrics at the end of each financial year (that is March of each calendar
year). This becomes necessary as there are significant reporting delays which induce
large jumps in the cumulative month on month measures which are less likely driven
by participation, but more likely due to reporting issues.
I construct the NREGA take-up, participation and project data to match the Mon-
soon calendar as in the main exercises.
68The categories in the data that are consistently reported are: "Micro Irrigation Works","Drought
Proofing","Water Conservation and Water Harvesting","Provision of Irrigation facility to Land Owned
by Scheduled Caste/ Scheduled Tribe".
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Chapter 2
The Welfare Cost of Lawlessness:
Evidence from Somali Piracy
For centuries, piracy has posed a threat to ocean-going trade. In essence, it is orga-
nized private predation which thrives in locations in which law and order is weak,
either because particular states provide a safe haven or due to poor international
cooperation. And it has repercussions for worldwide trade.1
However, despite the long-standing importance of piracy, little is known about
its economic costs.2 The issue has been brought into sharp relief by the upsurge of
piracy in the Gulf of Aden which poses a threat to one of the world’s busiest shipping
routes. Frequently attributed to the collapse of effective authority in Somalia, it has
provoked an international response.
We match data on piracy attacks in the maritime area around Somalia to data on
around 24,000 shipping contracts by constructing the closest navigable sea distance
between each origin and destination port for which a ship has been chartered. This
allows us to exploit the monthly time-series variation in the frequency of piracy
attacks in the main areas affected by Somali piracy to estimate the impact of piracy
on shipping costs. We then use these estimates to calibrate a model of the welfare
cost of Somali piracy.
Figure 2.1 previews our findings by showing the relationship between piracy at-
tacks in Somalia and a non-parametric estimate of the additional shipping cost paid
on routes through the piracy area.3 There is a visible association between the two
variables. Both shift upwards in mid 2008 after the maritime area is declared a piracy
risk area by the maritime insurance industry in May 2008.
1For example, North (1968) argues that a decline in piracy from 1600 to 1850 accounts for a significant
proportion of the observed productivity increases in transatlantic shipping in this period.
2Bensassi and Martinez-Zazosa (2010) study the impact of piracy in the Strait of Malacca on trade
costs. Most cited numbers are from the One Earth Future Foundation (2011) reports. Our direct ap-
proach is distinct from these reports. A recent World Bank (2013) report calculates the welfare effects
with a gravity trade model but finds mostly insignificant effects of piracy on trade.
3We constructed Figure 1 by regressing shipping costs on route and time fixed effects and a set
of time dummies for those trade routes going through the Somalia area. The coefficients on these
dummies allow us to draw charter rate differentials across time. Figure 2.1 shows the rolling average of
the estimated coefficients of this regression together with the rolling average of attacks.
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Figure 2.1: Non-Parametric Visualization of Piracy Effect on Chartering Rates
Our regression results show that shipping costs for dry bulk goods rose by be-
tween 8 and 12 percent when pirate activity increased in Somalia. We also show that
these larger shifts mask significant variation across months. Charter rates fluctuate
by 18 percent between the most and least dangerous months. This seasonal pattern
in shipping prices is absent prior to the upsurge in pirate activity in the region dur-
ing 2008. Accounting for this seasonal variation highlights that the average shipping
costs through the Somali area did not increase during the months in which weather
conditions inhibit pirates from operating.
The extra shipping costs that we uncover are mostly due to higher insurance costs
and the increased security measures that are needed to repel pirate attacks. These
constitute a welfare cost to the extent that labor and resources are allocated from
productive tasks towards protection. Our model compares the extraction of resources
through pirate attacks to a tax on shipping which finances an equivalent transfer. This
allows us to calculate the welfare loss caused by piracy. Our central estimate suggests
that the resource costs incurred in transferring around 120 million USD annually to
Somali pirates is well in excess of 630 million USD.
Studying Somali piracy provides a unique opportunity to measure the costs of
economic predation. Moreover, the factors that lie behind the welfare costs in this
context are generic. In particular, it is useful to reflect on why taxation is less costly
than predation. Ideally, a state that levies taxes has the capacity to ensure compli-
ance and to commit to providing security to those who pay those taxes. Economic
predators typically lack both of these capacities. Somali pirates can extract resources
only by attacking ships while ship owners only have the option to invest in defence
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or bear the cost of predation. We show empirically that, in this situation, large costs
can be occurred even when the amount extracted from predation is fairly small.4
This article belongs to a wider literature on the value of establishing the rule of
law and its role in securing trade and investment.5 A traditional problem in weakly-
institutionalized environments is that bringing goods to market is subject to preda-
tion and theft.6 The consequences of the failure to establish and enforce property
rights is a core theme in the development literature such as Knack and Keefer (1995)
and Acemoglu et al. (2001). Piracy is a specific consequence of state failure because it
creates a spill-over of insecurity from one country to a maritime region. We show that
in the case of Somalia this has taken on striking dimensions with shipping through
the whole Indian Ocean now affected. We show that the consequent predation gen-
erates sizeable costs relative to the revenues that it raises for pirates.
A recent literature has studied the economic effects of an extreme case of state
failure, namely violent conflict.7 Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) provide the example
of diamond mining companies benefiting from local conflict. Besley and Mueller
(2012) provide a framework to capture the effect of expected violence on housing
prices which we use for our estimation. Voors et al. (2012) show that violence in
Burundi affected individual preferences permanently. In particular, they find that
individuals that were exposed to violence became more risk seeking. Disruptive,
high risk activities, like piracy, are therefore more likely to arise in a conflict setting.
Piracy poses a particular issue because of the difficulty of securing international
agreement over the assignment of responsibility to deal with the problem and how
the costs of such efforts are to be shared. Private solutions to increase security such as
carrying guards aboard ships are inherently less efficient compared to dealing with
the public good of security for all. Our calculation of the welfare cost gives a sense
of the magnitude of this benefit.
Insecurity due to piracy leads to a rise in shipping costs which are an important
part of total trade costs. In this respect, our paper relates to studies of the conse-
quences of trade costs for trade patterns. In particular, it is related to Mirza and
Verdier (2008) which studies how international terrorism affects trade costs.8 Our
model allows us to calculate the likely impact of the estimated increase in shipping
costs on trade. For this purpose we use recent findings by Feyrer (2009) who stud-
ies the Suez Canal closure 1967-1975. It has been argued in the context of Somali
piracy that it has reduced shipping and led to a re-routing of ships.9 We show em-
4Our arguments are akin to the distinction between roving and stationary bandits in Olson (1993).
Bandiera (2003) argues that fractionalized ownership reinforces this problem in the context of the Sicil-
ian Mafia.
5See Dixit (2004) and Rose-Ackerman (2010) for literature overviews.
6Anderson et al. (2002) and Anderson and Bandiera (2006) study the link between predation and
trade. Olken and Barron (2009) study predation in the context of trucking in Indonesia.
7See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an review of the literature on civil war.
8For reviews of the extent of trade costs and their importance in explaining patterns of trade see
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Behar and Venables (2011) and Hummels (2007). Donaldson (2010)
is a recent study of the impact of a change in trade costs due to the construction of railroads in India.
9One Earth Future Foundation (2010) calculates large costs from re-routing around the cape of Good
Hope. This cost is dropped in the One Earth Future Foundation (2011) report which argues that re-
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pirically and theoretically that effects on trade volumes related to piracy have likely
been small.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss
the background to both our piracy and shipping cost data. Section three presents
our estimation procedure and discusses the results while section four provides a
framework for thinking about the welfare loss and uses this, along with our estimates,
to develop estimates of the welfare loss from piracy. Concluding comments are in
section five.
2.1 Background and Data
In this section we discuss our data on piracy and shipping costs. We present potential
channels for piracy to affect these costs. We also discuss how susceptibility to piracy
can be matched to specific shipping routes.
2.1.1 Piracy Data
Our data on piracy attacks comes from the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB)
annual reports which provide the exact position of the attack, details on the ship and
its status (anchored or steaming) and the type of attack (attempted, boarded, fired
upon, hijacked).10
We geo-code attacks and focus on the Somali area which we define as the rectan-
gle spanned by the coordinates S11, E38.4 and N18.3, E74.7 depicted as the shaded
area in Figure 2.2. We focus on this area because we believe that there are common
factors driving piracy attacks within this zone, i.e. if pirates attack in some point
along the Somali coast, it is informative about the likelihood of an attack elsewhere
within the area. The crosses in Figure 2.2 represent the locations of the piracy attacks.
Figure 2.2 also depicts a geographically narrower area in a darker shade, the Gulf of
Aden, which we use as a robustness check on our main results below. Piracy in the
Somalia area is a sophisticated crime with a large number of ships being hijacked.
Pirates rely on external finance, political support and safe havens on the Somali coast
to operate effectively.11
routing around the cape was unlikely to be an issue.
10We discuss our data in more detail in appendix 2.A. Table 2.8 provides summary statistics.
11A previous draft of this paper studied piracy in the broader Indonesia area. However, the type
of piracy which takes place there is distinct from Somali piracy. It consists mainly of armed robbery,
which takes place in ports. Hence, arguably its consequences are less severe and are easier to control.
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Figure 2.2: Calculated Shipping Lanes and Treatment Areas
Note: The light shaded rectangle is the "Somalia" treatment area, while the darker shaded area is the
"Gulf of Aden" treatment area. The location of attacks is indicated by a cross. The circles indicate the
shipping lanes, the colouring of which is proportional to the number of observation on each shipping
lane according to the continuous colour scheme.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the time-series variation in piracy attacks, showing the up-
surge in attacks during 2008. We exploit this to study the effect of Somali piracy on
shipping costs. Interpreting this as an effect of piracy requires us to be sure that there
was no change in amounts shipped due to piracy during 2008. We show in section
2.2.5 that, if anything, shipping through Somalia decreased during 2008 making it
highly unlikely that changes in traffic patterns were responsible for the increase in
pirate activity. There is a consensus among experts on Somali piracy that the origins
of the increase in pirate activity lie in what happened on land rather than at sea.
Hansen (2009), for example, argues that a key trigger for the increase in piracy at-
tacks was the crisis in public finances in the Puntland government in Somalia which
left it unable to pay the police. This, he argues, along with the generally weak state of
law and order in Somalia, made it increasingly feasible for pirates to operate without
sanction. Pirates had long masqueraded as coast guards protecting Somali territo-
rial waters from illegal fishing. This cloaked a build up of organized violence which
emerged strongly after May 2008.
The developments were closely observed by the maritime insurance industry. Ta-
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Figure 2.3: Time Series of Attacks in Somalia
ble 2.1 summarizes the piracy data around the date that the Somalia area was de-
clared a war risk area by the maritime insurance industry (May 2008). The average
number of attacks increased from 2.8 attacks per month before that date to 17.1 at-
tacks per month from May 2008 onwards.
Aside from the structural break, seasonality induced by wind conditions plays a
crucial role in the pattern of piracy, something which we will exploit in our empirical
analysis. Most of the attacks are carried out using small vessels, known as “skiffs”.
These are typically between 7 and 10 metres long and at most two meters wide with
a low freeboard. This renders them particularly vulnerable to wind and waves. The
summary in Table 2.1 illustrates the resulting seasonal pattern. The post May 2008
column features a strikingly low piracy risk in the Monsoon months of July and
August, for example. In these months the level piracy attacks is rather similar to pre
May 2008 levels. The calm spring period is the most dangerous time with over 30
attacks in March and April. The close link between this seasonal pattern in attacks
and wind speeds is discussed in more detail in Appendix 2.A.1.
2.1.2 Shipping Cost Data
Our shipping cost data comes from the web-site of N. Cotzias Shipping Consultants
which provides monthly reports on the time charter market for the period November
2002 until December 2010.12 The data is comprised of 33,529 individual charters in
12In early 2011, Cotzias merged with Intermodial (www.intermodal.gr). As of 25th July 2012, the
Cotzias data was available on http://www.goo.gl/g5d0c. There are many shipping consultants, how-
ever, Cotzias consistently made data available for a long time period. The selection of a particular
shipping consultant will only affect our results in case there is a time varying bias to reporting charter
contracts on Somalia routes that is correlated with the onset or intensity of piracy. We do not believe
this is the case.
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the dry bulk cargo segment of the market. These are ships that transport primary
commodities such as iron ore or agricultural products such as grain. These types
of vessels constitute approximately one third of the tonnage of the global shipping
fleet. Short term chartering agreements are typical for bulk carrier ships, due to
the volatile nature of commodity markets. Since the starting point for these charter
agreements are previous agreements (‘last done’), shipowners and charterers take
an active interest in reports of recent transactions.13 The individual time charter
agreements are also used to construct general shipping indices such as the Baltic
Exchange Dry Index (BDI). Thus our data-set provides a window onto the wider
shipping market.
In a time charter agreement the shipowner places his ship, with crew and equip-
ment, at the disposal of the charterer and bears the costs of keeping the ship opera-
tional. The charterer pays a daily charter rate and decides the type and quantity of
cargo to be carried and the ports of loading and discharging. The charterer is also
responsible for paying for fuel (known as bunkers) and costs like port charges includ-
ing the payments due, for example, for using the Suez Canal. The fact that time
charter rates are provided on a daily basis makes them comparable across contracts
of differing lengths.
The summaries made available on the web-site provide, among other information,
the name of the ship, its deadweight tonnage (DWT) - a measure of ship size, the year
it was built, the port or country of origin and the port or country of destination. From
this information we construct our measure of shipping cost - the rate per day per
DWT. We also use the origin and destination to assign the ship’s voyage to countries
(see Appendix 2.A.1). Our data set contains information on around 1600 distinct
shipping routes. Most of the charters are from Asia with China making up the bulk
of origin and destination locations.
2.1.3 Piracy Risks and Shipping Costs
There have been a number of private responses to the piracy threat. A variety of
insurance arrangements have emerged to cover piracy risks with higher premia being
paid to travel in areas deemed to be at risk. Ships increasingly carry armed guards
and other preventive measures (mostly modifications to ship hulls) have become "best
practice" which makes them relevant for insurance purposes.14
The costs to the shipping industry can be decomposed into five main categories:
(i) damage to vessels (ii) loss of hire and delay to cargo delivery while a ship is held
to ransom (iii) costs of defensive measures (iv) cost of ransoms and negotiators fees
paid when a crew is kidnapped or a vessel is held (v) re-routing, speeding-up of
vessels to avoid areas at risk (vi) extra wages paid to the crew compensate for the
risk of being kidnapped. We discuss these cost factors in detail in Appendix 2.A.3.
13See Stopford (2009) for a detailed discussion of the time charter market.
14Best Practice manuals are published and updated regularly by the shipping industry. See http:
//www.goo.gl/zLlUt, accessed on 10.04.2012.
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Ship owners typically buy insurance to cover themselves against a number of these
costs with insurance costs being sensitive to developments in the number of piracy
attacks. Throughout the paper we assume a competitive insurance industry.15
We use shipping contracts to measure the cost of shipping. These reflect the
consequences of piracy to the extent that costs of piracy are borne by the ship owner
and passed on to the charterer. This is not unrealistic. The association of independent
tanker owners, for example, provides model clauses for chartering agreements with
regard to piracy risks, stating that:16
"Charterers shall indemnify Owners against all liabilities costs and ex-
penses arising out of actual or threatened acts of piracy or any preventive
or other measures taken by Owners [...], including but not limited to ad-
ditional insurance premiums, additional crew costs and costs of security
personnel or equipment.”
Hence, charterers have to compensate ship owners for extra costs created by
piracy risk on the chartered route. However, it is still possible that some of the
pirate costs are borne directly by the charterer which would result in us underesti-
mating the cost of piracy. In section (2.2.5) we therefore discuss the sensitivity of our
welfare estimates to the exact division of piracy costs between ship owners and char-
terers. Specifically, we calculate the welfare cost under the assumption that piracy
costs are shared according to the General Average (GA) rule which is widely used in
the shipping industry and is explained below.
2.1.4 Identifying Exposure to Piracy Risks
We assign a risk of exposure to piracy attacks to each shipping route by using the
information on the origin and destination of the shipping contract. For example, a
vessel with a destination in Germany and an origin in China is quite likely to travel
through the Somalia area. However, there are some cases where it is not entirely clear
whether the vessel would travel on a Pacific route or through the Indian Ocean and
Atlantic using the Suez canal. In assigning piracy risk to a specific route, we employ
a path algorithm to obtain an automatic coding of that route.17 We are then able to
see whether the shortest sea route passes though the piracy areas that we study. If it
does, we suppose that the shipping contract is subject to a piracy risk based on the
forecast number of attacks in the relevant region at a point in time.
Figure 2.2 provides a bird’s-eye view of the trade-routes for the areas around
Somalia based on our path algorithm. The points which are less opaque and more
deeply shaded in red represent more ships going through a particular route. We
suppose that a shipping route is more vulnerable to piracy attack if it crosses the
rectangles in Figure 2.2. As a check on our core results, we construct a measure of
15There are debates about whether this assumption is reasonable. If it were not the case then markups
in this industry would create a further potential welfare cost from piracy.
16Refer to http://www.goo.gl/yShgs, accessed on 10.04.2012.
17Details are discussed in the appendix 2.A.1.
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a route being vulnerable to piracy attack based on it passing through the convex
hull which is spanned by all such attacks up to each year. This measure is arguably
more satisfactory since it takes into account the fact that the Somali pirates were able
to expand their reach into the Indian Ocean since 2008. The empirical findings are
similar when either method of assigning vulnerability to piracy attacks is used.
It is possible that some ships re-routed around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid
exposure to piracy risks. We check for this possibility below and find no evidence for
changes in either the extent of traffic through the Suez Canal or in the composition
of ship size through affected areas after the upsurge in piracy attacks. Moreover,
assigning piracy risk to routes allowing the possibility of re-routing when this would
add relatively little distance to the journey, makes our results even stronger. This
supports the view of other commentators, such as One Earth Future Foundation
(2011), that re-routing around the Cape in response to piracy is not important.
We do not distinguish between attacks on different types of vessel (container,
tanker, dry bulk, etc.) since all varieties of ship, including all sizes, have been attacked
and hijacked in the piracy-affected area. The first successful hijack of a dry bulk ship
took place as early as May 2008.18 Attacks seem sufficiently random across of a range
of ship types and so we do not to attempt to distinguish empirically between different
bulk ships.
2.1.5 A Model of Piracy Attacks
To motivate the time-series variation in piracy attacks, consider the following simple
theoretical model. Suppose that there are M active pirate ships and that in each
period each pirate receives an opportunity to hijack a ship where Vit is the benefit
and cit is the cost.19 Pirate i at date t will launch an attack if the expected benefit
exceeds the cost:
ξtVit ≥ cit
where ξt is the success probability, Vit is the value of a successful attack and cit is the
cost.
A key parameter is the cost-benefit ratio ρit = cit/Vit. We suppose that ρit is drawn
for each pirate ship i at date t from a uniform distribution with mean θt. Given M
18According to a Lloyds List report on July 2008 the ship was freed 41 days later for a ransom of 0.75
million USD.
19To endogenize M, suppose that there is a fixed cost becoming an active pirate. Then we would
have that a pirate will enter if
E {Vit − cit : ξt} > Fi
in which case we would also predict that M would be a function of ξt, i.e.
Mt = H (ξt) .
So we would have
E [art] = ξt H (ξt)
and the expected number of pirate attacks will still depend on ξt reflecting underlying law and order.
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independent draws the expected number of pirate attacks at date t is given by:
E [at] = ξt M. (2.1)
The variation in expected piracy attacks in equation (2.1) is then captured by ξt which
we assume reflects two things. First, there can be short-term factors which shape
piracy costs and benefits, including weather variation. Second, there can be persis-
tent changes in law and order as we saw after after the break down in law order in
Puntland in 2008 which lead to a permanent shift in the feasibility to conduct piracy.
To capture these two factors we allow the success probability, ξt, to be related em-
pirically to climatic conditions and the insurance evaluation of the industry which
requires ships to insure against war risks since May 2008.
2.2 The Effect of Piracy on Shipping Costs
In this section, we present estimates of the effect of piracy attacks on shipping costs.
We will begin with a comparison of mean shipping costs between regions affected
by Somali piracy before and after the upsurge in attacks in 2008. We then present
regression-based estimates.
2.2.1 Difference in Difference Estimates
We present a simple difference-in-difference estimate of the effect of Somali piracy on
mean shipping costs by looking at the routes affected by piracy before and after May
2008 compared to all other routes. The result of this exercise is reported in Table
2.2 which gives the average rate per DWT on routes which pass through the Somalia
area compared to other shipping routes before and after May 2008.
Column (1) shows that the average shipping costs were not significantly different
between routes before May 2008. However, they diverge after that date with the mean
cost per DWT being significantly above the rate for other routes by 0.074 USD per
day per DWT. This represents an increase of around 15%. This result parallels the
finding in Figure 2.1 which also compared affected routes before and after piracy
began. The key identifying assumption is that the influence of other time-varying
factors which are affecting shipping costs have a common impact on both sets of
routes. In particular, the global recession which led to a fall in trade and shipping
rates in winter 2008 is assumed to influence routes that are affected by piracy and
those that are not to the same degree.20
We now turn to investigating how this finding holds up in regression evidence
based on individual shipping contracts.
20We run a number of robustness checks with regard to changes in the economic environment in
section 2.2.4.
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2.2.2 Piracy Attacks and Shipping Costs
Our core regression specification assumes that the dry bulk shipping market is con-
testable so that pricing is based on the average cost per day for each voyage.21 We
would then expect prices in that market to reflect expected piracy attacks and any
other factors that influence costs.
We denote the cost per dead weight ton (DWT) per day for a ship of size s on
route d in month t as:
C (s, d, t, Adt)
where Adt is the forecast number of attacks affecting route d at date t.22 An effect of
piracy on costs is not unrealistic as the shipping conditions at so-called "choke points"
(the straits of Hormuz and Malacca, the Suez and Panama canals, the Bosporus) are
known to affect freight rates. Since there are scale economies in shipping, we expect
this cost function to be decreasing in s.
For simplicity, we adopt the specification:
log C (s, d, t, Adt) = c (s, d, t) + γAdt + βxdst + ηdst (2.2)
where γ is the core parameter of interest, xdst are other time varying controls and ηdst
captures other idiosyncratic factors which are uncorrelated with Adt.
The cost from piracy depends on the route that the ship takes. As we have already
discussed, we construct a treatment indicator for each route depending on whether
it passes through the area of Somalia. Denote this as a dummy variable where δd = 1
if route d passes through piracy. Then:
Adt = δd × at.
is our measure of the cost shock expected on route d where, in the core specification,
at is the recorded level of pirate attacks in the Somali piracy area in month t. In the
basic specification, we do not the effect of piracy attacks to vary with ship size, s,
or route, d. However, we will allow for a heterogeneous effect in some specifications
that we report below.
This baseline specification, in effect, supposes that the best estimate of piracy en
route is the level of piracy attacks in the current month, i.e. E [at+1] = at. This is
somewhat implausible to the extent that there are known seasonal patterns and other
understandable features of the time series. Hence, below, we will consider some
21Shipping has the classic conditions for a perfectly contestable market: (i) no entry or exit barriers
(ii) no sunk costs and (iii) access to the same level of technology (to incumbent firms and new entrants).
This is essentially the model of the Bulk shipping market used in Kalouptsidi (2014) who also assumes
competitive freight rates. See Behar and Venables (2011) for a discussion of the extent of contestability
in shipping markets. In Appendix ?? we show that with constant pass-through we can identify the effect
of piracy attacks on shipping costs from changes in rates, even if shipping markets are not perfectly
competitive.
22Due to the absence of good monthly data on ship traffic for our period 2002-2010 we have to use
Adt as a measure of piracy risk. This disregards the fact that dense traffic makes journeys less risky for
each ship.
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alternative models for the expected level of piracy attacks.23
To reflect this discussion, our core empirical specification is:
zisdt = αs + αd + αt + γAdt + βxdt + ε isdt (2.3)
where zisdt is the (log of) daily charter rate per DWT for contract i on a ship of size s,
for route d in month t. The parameters (αs, αd, αt) are fixed effects for ship size, route
and month. The standard errors ε isdt are adjusted for two-way clustering on origin-
and destination country. Other controls in xdt include the age of the ship and the
ballast bonus per DWT (a bonus paid for empty return journeys).
Our key identifying assumption is that factors that drive piracy, the factors in ξt
in equation (2.1) are orthogonal to other drivers of shipping costs, conditional on the
controls that we use. Month fixed effects, αt, for example, should capture changes in
the operating costs which affect all routes. The fact that bulk shipping is a competitive
world market makes the inclusion of these dummies particularly important.
The main parameter of interest is γ which we interpret as the additional shipping
cost from anticipated piracy attacks. We are expecting that γ > 0. The empirical
approach can be thought of as a difference-in-difference specification where ships
that pass through a region where pirates are expected to attack are compared to ships
using different routes over the same time period. This exploits monthly time-series
variation in piracy attacks.
2.2.3 Core Results
Our core results are reported in Table Table Table 2.3 which uses the specification in
(2.3). We normalize the piracy attacks variable in columns (1) to (2) such that the
coefficients can be interpreted as the percentage point increase in shipping costs with
the shift in pirate activity around May 2008.
In column (1), the only controls are fixed effects for route, time and ship size. For
the latter, the omitted ship size category is "small" Capesize ships between 80,000
and 150,000 DWTs. There is a strongly significant positive coefficient on the expected
number of attacks. The point estimate says that shipping costs were around 8.2
percent higher after the upsurge in piracy.
The ship size dummy variables show evidence of significant scale economies in
shipping with the smallest ships being around 62 percent more expensive per DWT
than the excluded category. The point estimates decline across the ship size cate-
gories. This is a feature of all the estimates that we show.
In column (2), we add the additional ship controls: ballast bonus payments and
the vessel’s age. We find a large variation in rates paid for younger compared to older
vessels with chartering rates for older vessels being significantly lower. However, the
point estimate on piracy attacks does not change much after adding these controls.
23We discuss the prediction of pirate attacks in detail in appendix 2.A.2.
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As we discussed in section 2.1.1 piracy attacks after May 2008 were highly sea-
sonal. We now ask whether this seasonal variation in attacks affects shipping costs.
There are good reasons to believe that seasonal variation in risk is relevant for char-
ter rates. Supplementary insurance to pass through high risk areas, for example,
is priced based on specific weeks in high risk zones.24 Other cost factors such as
security crews and ship modifications are adjustable as well.
One way to exploit the seasonality in attacks is presented in column (3). Here we
identify the effect of piracy attacks only with data after May 2008. The coefficient
on piracy is still positive and significant but somewhat smaller in size. Thus, our
findings in column (1) and (2) are not entirely driven by changes on routes through
Somalia before and after 2008 but also by month-to-month variation within the years
with pirate activity.
Declaring an area as a special war risk area is a significant event in the insurance
industry and reflects risk perceptions at the time. So instead of using the level of
piracy attacks, we can simply use these dates. The representative of the marine hull
war insurance business in the London market, the Joint War Committee, added the
Gulf of Aden in May 2008. We use a dummy variable to represent this event in
equation (2.3) instead of the level of piracy attacks.25 This specification is bound to
capture the sharp increase in costs depicted in Figure 1. The result is in column (4)
of Table 2.3. The coefficient on the war risk dummy suggests a 12.3 percent increase
in shipping costs around May 2008.
A striking feature of the pattern of attacks is how closely they match with wind
speed in the area. In order to exploit exogenous variation in wind speed we create
an interaction term between the treatment dummy of column (4) with the monthly
average wind speed in the Somalia area. We code the wind speed variable such
that it goes from a value of 0 at the maximum wind speed in June to a value of 1
with minimum wind speed in March. In this way the coefficient can be interpreted
as the difference in shipping costs between months with maximum and minimum
wind speed. The resulting coefficient in the third row of column (5) suggests that
charters through Somalia after May 2008 were about 18 percent more costly in March
than in June.26 Moreover, the coefficient on the war risk dummy itself is insignificant
suggesting that it was not significantly more costly to charter ships through Somalia
sea area in June than it was before the rise in piracy in 2008.
The interaction between the wind speed variable and the indicator that a route is
susceptible to Somali piracy is negative. Thus, if anything, there has been the oppo-
site seasonal pattern in charter rates on Somalia routes in the absence of piracy. The
fact that pirate activity introduced a seasonal pattern that did not appear previously
24The absence of seasonal variation in charter rate differentials would provide opportunities for arbi-
trage in the insurance market.
25May 2008 is in the confidence interval based on our structural break analysis (presented below) but
does not coincide with the break date that we found which is July 2008. The results are similar if we
use a dummy variable that is equal to one at this slightly later date.
26There is a lag between windspeed and piracy attacks of one month. This implies that windspeed at
the time of the charter is a good predictor of piracy attacks on the charter route. See Appendix 2.A.1
for details.
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adds further credibility to the claim that piracy influenced shipping costs.
Figure 2.4 plots the fitted values from column (5) Table 2.3. It shows the shipping
cost predicted by the Somalia war risk, wind speed and their interaction. The graph
illustrates the sharp increase in seasonality in costs after May 2008; shipping costs
are roughly twice as high when wind conditions favor piracy attacks after this date.
Figure 2.4: Shipping Cost Prediction of Pirate Activity and Monsoon Season
Overall, these results suggest that piracy in the Somalia area has a positive effect
on the cost of shipping through this region. The effect is consistent with an average
increase in shipping costs of between 8 and 12 percent in the period after piracy
attacks increase off the coast of Somalia.
2.2.4 Robustness
In this section we look at the robustness of our results to alternative ways of forecast-
ing piracy attacks and discuss additional controls for economic conditions. We also
explore alternative definitions of exposure to piracy risk.
A Markov Chain Model for Piracy Attacks Our baseline specification, in effect,
supposes that the best estimate of piracy en route is the level of piracy attacks in the
current month, i.e. E [at+1] = at. As a more structural approach, we model the level
of piracy attacks using a Markov switching model based on an underlying (latent)
law and order state. This will have an advantage of picking up the persistence of the
shift that occurs in the piracy data and captures some of the features of the structural
break analysis we perform in section 2.2.5. In addition, the Markov Chain model
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allows for an intuitive way to integrate the discussed seasonality in attacks to make
predictions of piracy. This will be discussed in the following section.
To motivate the switching model, we can return to the theoretical approach above
and allow the probability of a successful pirate attack to depend on a latent state,
` ∈ {S, W} with ξ (S) < ξ (W) where S stands for “strong” and W for “weak”. We
assume that the probability of successfully hijacking a ship and demanding a ransom
is higher when law and order is weak. Using this in the model of piracy above, the
mean number of pirate attacks in state ` is
µ` ≡ ξ (`) M, ` ∈ {S, W} .
where µS < µW .
Dynamics across law and order states are modelled as a Markov chain governing
the process of state transitions. This gives us a filter for emerging data on pirate
attacks which can be used to construct a forecast for pirate attacks which can capture
the sharp non-linear pattern in the data. We show in Appendix 2.A.2 that this model
gives the following formula corresponding to equation (2.1) for the expected number
of attacks at t + 1 :
E [at+1] = Ω+ (µW − µS) λPt (` = W) (2.4)
where Ω is a constant, λ is a measure of persistence of the process and Pt (` = W)
is the probability that the region is in the weak state at time t. The latter is the only
time-varying factor in equation (2.4) and evolves according to the history of piracy
attacks. By estimating the parameters of the underlying process, we can construct an
empirical counterpart to equation (2.1).27
This type of model, first proposed in Hamilton (1989), has been popular among
time series economists modelling the non-linear properties of business cycle fluctu-
ations. The model’s core parameters are estimated using the data on attacks using
the Expectation Maximization (EM) Algorithm described in Hamilton (1990) which
generates an estimate of the parameters by iteration and is easy to implement.
The abrupt swings in the forecast number of attacks are driven by changes in
Pt (` = W) between values that are close to zero and one while the impact of the
estimated probability on expectations is driven by our estimate of (µˆW − µˆS) λˆ. It
is interesting to observe that the predictions made by our model are that the state
shifted in April 2008 which is very much in line with the assessment of the Joint War
Committee.
The results when (2.4) is used instead of at to estimate (2.3) is in column (1)
of Table 2.4. The coefficient on Somali piracy remains significant. Moreover, the
27We discuss details of the estimation in appendix 2.A.2. Note that P (`t = W) , is a function of
the particular history of attacks in month t and the set of Markov chain parameters: two state-specific
means, two persistence parameters which together determine λ and two state-specific variances. To
forecast piracy attacks, we use the observed number of attacks in month t to calculate the probability
P (`t = W) that the region is in a weak state given a set of known parameters. Equation (2.4) shows that
if P (`t = W) increases then the expected value of attacks next month increases by (µˆW − µˆS) λˆ. The
estimate for (µˆW − µˆS) λˆ is 11.45 attacks.
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estimated increase in piracy costs around May 2008 is similar with 9.2 percent which
is only slightly higher than the estimate in column (2) of Table 2.3.
Column (3) of Table 2.4 entertains an alternative measure of expectations. We
obtain data from Google search intensity for the term "Somalia Piracy". This may
capture overall expectations about piracy as well. As the coefficient suggests it does
predict shipping costs, but as table 2.9 confirms, it performs a lot worse than any of
our other forecast models.
Seasonality The baseline model identifies law and order as the only underlying
cause of fluctuations in piracy attacks over time. However, Table 2.1 also shows a
pronounced seasonal pattern which can be incorporated into the empirical model.
Suppose that there is a month-specific shock to the success probability, ξt. Now
the average number of pirate attacks will depend on the month and equation (2.1)
generalizes to
µm` = ξ (`)wm M (2.5)
where wm is the mean “weather” shock to piracy success in month m. This allows us
to rewrite the mean number of attacks as an interaction between an indicator for the
weak and strong state, ` ∈ {S, W}, and a monthly mean of attacks during times of
weak and strong law and order, αmW and αmS.
µm` = I [` = W] αmW + I [` = S] αmS.
Thus, we have a month-dependent mean in the underlying Markov chain which
switches between strong and weak law and order. This model allows us to capture
Table 2.1 perfectly.
The forecast number of attacks at t+ 1 when that month is m is now a function of
the probability of the weak state in t and the mean of attacks during weak and strong
law and order states for t + 1. Thus (2.4) generalizes to:
E [amt+1] = Ωm + (αmW − αmS) λPt (` = W) (2.6)
where Ωm is again a constant (now specific to month m).28
We show in the Appendix Table 2.9 that this model outperforms all other models
in its predictive power significantly. It allows us to predict 80 percent of the variation
in attacks.29 The coefficient in column (2) in Table 4 confirms previous estimates. We
find that the rise in piracy in 2008 led to an increase in shipping costs by 8.7 percent.
Column (3) of Table 2.4 entertains an alternative measure of expectations that may
capture that expectations are a driven by media coverage, instead of past attacks. We
obtain data from Google search intensity for the term "Somalia Piracy" for a reduced
28We can directly apply the estimation method described in the appendix to a richer parameterization
with 28 parameters.
29We also ran a out of sample forecast in which we predicted pirate attacks in the period 2011 to 2013
with the models in table 2.9. Again the seasonal EM algorithm outperforms the AR(2) process. Both
perform much worse than within sample, however.
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form measure of news reports. As the coefficient suggests it does predict shipping
costs very well.30
Omitted Economic Trends By including time dummy variables (for each month),
we are controlling for general developments in the global shipping market. These
may be important over this period given that the global financial crisis erupts in 2008
alongside a growth in the capacity in bulk shipping. For this to create a problem for
our analysis would require that the routes that we have classified as being affected
by piracy are differentially influenced by changes in market conditions in a way that
increases bulk shipping costs. The main trend in this period is, however, a switch in
bulk trade in Asia away from Europe and towards other Asian countries, in particular
Australia and the Americas.31 This would tend to work against our core findings as
we would expect it to put downward pressure on prices for bulk charter agreements
between Europe and Asia which pass through the piracy affected area. Nonetheless,
we look at two further ways of controlling for changes in route-specific economic
factors.
Column (4) of Table 2.4 adds GDP growth for the origin and destination of each
route to the specification. Due to the coarseness of the destination data in particu-
lar (discussed further in Appendix 2.A) we were forced to aggregate to the level of
regional GDP for this exercise. Controlling for either annual regional GDP levels (re-
gression not shown), interpolated monthly regional GDP levels (regression not show)
or regional GDP growth, as shown in column (5) does not change the main result.
A further possible concern is that trade patterns might change differentially and
systematically across time. This concern is particularly important in the light of
a recent World Bank (2013) study which tries to identify the effect of piracy from
changes in trade. In order to deal with this concern, we gathered monthly trade data
from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) and matched this trade data to our
charter contracts. In column (5) we control for the value of trade on the route of the
charter during the same month. Controlling for trade in this way has no impact on
our piracy cost estimate. The coefficient on trade is positive but insignificant. This
suggests that time and dyad fixed effects do a good job in capturing variation in the
conditions in shipping markets.
In column (6) of Table 2.4 we further address concerns about unobservable eco-
nomic trends by incorporating a separate set of region specific time trends for each
of the twenty-four regions from which shipping emanates (Eastern Africa, Southwest
Asia, etc.).32 Even with this rather saturated specification, the core finding regard-
ing the effect of piracy attacks is robust, albeit with a somewhat smaller coefficient
compared to column (2) of Table 2.3. Our core finding also holds up if we control for
30We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach. In Appendix table 2.9, we evaluate
the predictive power of news reports over and above passed attacks.
31See the detailed discussion in UNCTAD (2009) and UNCTAD (2010).
32This entails problems. The time trend for the Middle East, for example, will effectively capture part
of the variation induced by piracy as most charters in this area cross the piracy area.
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a separate time fixed effect for the region in which each shipping route starts and
finishes.
Shipping rates fell considerably when world trade collapsed in Fall 2008. One way
to see whether our results are robust to a break in trade patterns around this time is to
have separate sets of dyad fixed effects before and after the Lehman Brothers collapse
in September 2008. Column (7) in Table 2.4 shows that we still find a significant
positive effect of attacks on shipping rates.
Alternative Measures of Vulnerability to Piracy Attacks In order to match the
data on piracy attacks to the shipping contracts data, it is necessary to specify criteria
according to which some routes are vulnerable to piracy attack. As there is some
leeway in the choice of such criteria, we now present some further results which
show that our results are robust to alternative ways of doing this. These are shown
in Table 2.5.
Columns (1) and (2) study the robustness of our results to the computation of the
maritime routes. Ships could be travelling alternative routes in order to avoid the
Suez canal fees or the piracy region and we would expect such re-routing to be more
of an issue for maritime routes for which there is a feasible alternative route which
does not use the Suez Canal and which is not significantly longer compared to a
route using the Suez Canal (and thus passing through the piracy region). To examine
this, we used our algorithm to compute alternative routes while adding the constraint
that vessels cannot travel through the Suez Canal. We then assign treatment based
on these alternative routes if they are at most 10 percent (column (1)) or 20 percent
(column (2)) longer than the Suez Canal route. The point estimate for the Somalia
area becomes slightly higher but is indistinguishable from our main result in Table
2.3 column (2).
In column (3) we use a more narrowly defined piracy region focusing on the key
choke point: the Gulf of Aden.33 The result shows that piracy in the Gulf of Aden
still has a significantly positive impact on shipping prices through that area. Again
the magnitude of the effect of piracy is very similar to that reported in our core
specification.
Column (4) explores variation in exposure to piracy risk by introducing an in-
teraction between our treatment dummy and the share of a trade route that passes
through the Somalia area rectangle. We expect piracy attacks to affect the daily char-
ter rate more if a larger share of the charter goes through the piracy-risk area. Column
(4) provides a test of this by including the interaction of the share and attacks in ad-
dition to attacks. As expected, the interaction term is positive and significant which
implies that higher rates are paid on routes that are treated for longer. Conditional
on going through Somalia the average trade route is susceptible to piracy for about
20 percent of its length with the maximum being 68 percent. The coefficient on the
33For the Gulf of Aden, the bounding box is given by latitude ∈ [10.5, 17] and longitude ∈ [40, 52.2].
This is drawn as the dark blue area in Figure 2.2.
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interaction implies that a route with maximum exposure would become 20 percent
more expensive with the rise in piracy.
Column (5) includes only the interaction term between the share of a route through
the piracy area with the number of attacks as a measure of treatment. The rationale
here is to drop the correlated attacks variable to get a better idea of the magnitudes
involved. The coefficient is highly significant. The effect of an increase in number
of attacks after May 2008 on shipping rates for the average treatment share is 7.92
percent, which is close to our other estimates.
Columns (6) and (7) present the results from a similar exercise to that conducted in
columns (4) and (5). The key difference is that we now allow there to be time-variation
in the maritime area that is considered to be affected by piracy. This addresses a
potential concern that the choice of the broad Somalia box as our piracy area is
somewhat ad-hoc. We generate time variation in the piracy area by computing the
convex hull that is spanned by the coordinates of all the piracy attacks that had
occurred up to each year inside the rectangular area which we specified for Somalia
above (the shaded area in Figure 2.2).34 We then compute the share of a shipping
route that crosses each of these convex hulls. This gives us time-variation in the share
of a shipping route that is affected by piracy. Using this, we can conduct the same
exercises as we reported in columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.5. The results obtained are
very similar suggesting that our initial way of capturing the risk of piracy is robust.35
2.2.5 Composition Effects and Re-routing
We now explore the possibility that, as well as affecting costs, piracy attacks also
changed the desirability of shipping on routes affected by piracy.
Effects on Shipping Piracy attacks could be a deterrent to shipping goods through
areas that are susceptible to piracy attacks. We need to be able to rule this out,
because if piracy was positively correlated with the quantity shipped, the observed
higher shipping costs may simply reflect increased demand on this particular route.
We consider two dimensions in which piracy could affect shipping other than in-
creasing the cost of shipping. First, piracy could directly affect the amount of traffic
on piracy routes. Second, piracy could affect the composition of ships going through
the piracy areas.
Data on passages through the Suez canal offers a way to analyze the impact of
piracy on trade volumes. We obtain data on the quantities of cargo in deadweight
tons through the Suez canal for each month of our sample period. The task of iden-
tifying a piracy effect in this time series is complicated by the fact that the failure of
Lehman Brothers, an event which signalled the onset of the most serious phase of
34We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this exercise. The convex hulls for 2005 and 2010 are
plotted in figure 2.7.
35This is perhaps not too surprising given that the maritime insurance industry considers almost
the entire Indian ocean, similar to our Somalia bounding box, to be a war risk area from early 2009
onwards.
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the global financial crisis, occurs in September 2008 - only shortly after the upsurge
in piracy. As is well known, this led to a significant reduction in world trade.
To disentangle the effect of the economic crisis from the effect of piracy we look
for breaks in the time-series of cargo traffic and try to identify in which month, if
any, a break took place. Specifically, we use the method described in Bai (2009) to
determine the break points in the series for cargo volumes and for piracy attacks in
the Somalia region. For the trade volume exercise, we search for the optimal location
and number of break-points according to a BIC criterion using the following model:
Cargot = β0 + β1t + et
for all possible dates t. We find exactly one break-point for the period following
November 2008, roughly two months after Lehman Brothers failed. Bai and Perron
(2003) propose a method for obtaining a confidence band around an estimated break-
point. Applying their approach, we find that with 99% confidence the break occurs
in the period October to December 2008. This makes sense given that goods already
in transit and on which shipping contracts had been agreed would not have been
affected by the Lehman crash. Applying the same approach to piracy attacks, we
find that the break in the series is in July 2008. This is different from the break point
in the cargo series. That said, the 99% confidence band for the break in the mean
level of piracy is a lot wider and ranges from August 2007 to August 2008, the latter
still being before Lehman’s failure.
This motivates running regressions in which we include a dummy variable for
November 2008 onwards to pick up the effect of Lehman Brother’s failure when
looking for an effect of piracy attacks on the quantity of cargo being shipped through
the Suez canal. Thus we run
Cargot = λ0 + λ1at + λ2Lehmant + λ3t + ηt. (2.7)
where Lehmant is a dummy variable that switches from zero to one in November
2008.
The results from running (2.7) with and without the Lehman dummy are in
columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.6. Column (1) shows that if we only include the level
of piracy attacks, then we get a large and significant effect of piracy attacks on cargo;
the effect amounts to a 30 percent reduction at the mean level of monthly piracy at-
tacks after May 2008. Once we include the structural break identified by the method
outlined above, this becomes much smaller in size and insignificant as column (2)
shows.
These results suggest that piracy did not have a significant effect on the amount of
cargo shipped through the Suez canal. That said, the 95% interval of the estimate in
column (2) is consistent with a negative effect on trade of up to 3.5% which is in line
with the Feyrer (2009) estimates of the effect of transport costs on trade.36 Feyrer’s
36The average traffic pre May 2008 was 43, 000 metric tons. The change in the number of attacks was
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estimates suggest that an increase of trade costs by 8% would yield a decrease in
trade between 1.6% and 4%. As we cannot identify the effect on trade we therefore
use Feyrer’s estimates in an extension to our core welfare calculations.
We see these results as being very much in line with a recent World Bank report
that uses trade value data to identify the welfare effects of piracy. The report at-
tempts to estimate the effect of piracy on trade from gravity equations but finds only
marginally significant and inconclusive results.37
Effects on Average Ship-Size One possible reaction to piracy would be to use ships
that are less susceptible to piracy attack. We look for evidence of a shift in compo-
sition by looking at the average DWT of ships in our data over the period and see if
this varies in response to the threat of piracy. Thus, we use our data at the route level
to calculate the average weight of a ship on route d at t and run the regression:
DWTdt = αd + αt + γAdt + ψsdt
where (αd, αt) are route and month dummies. The effect of piracy is now identified
from variation within a route over time using the same treatment assignment as in
our core results above.
The result is reported in column (3) of Table 2.6. While there is a negative coeffi-
cient on Somali piracy attacks, this coefficient is not significant at conventional levels.
Thus, there does not seem to be any evidence of substitution in ship size in response
to piracy.
2.3 The Welfare Cost of Piracy
We now discuss what our results imply for the welfare cost of piracy. Our approach
is distinct from existing estimates such as One Earth Future Foundation (2010, 2011)
since we have estimated the impact of piracy on shipping costs directly rather than
using an accounting approach. We also adopt an explicit welfare criterion which
recognizes that piracy creates a transfer from consumers of traded goods (who ul-
timately bear the cost) to pirates. We compare piracy to the cost of making a more
efficient transfer via a tax. However, not all costs are necessarily captured by the im-
pact of piracy on shipping costs and we will consider the sensitivity of the estimates
to such concerns.
14.33. This implies a point estimate for the decrease in traffic of 32.89∗14.3343000 = 1.1%. The upper bound is
calculated from the 95% interval 1.1+ 1.96∗36.9∗14.3343000 = 3.5%.
37See World Bank (2013). This is not mentioned in the body of the report. However, the main result
and robustness table show that only four out of eleven estimated coefficients have the right sign and
are significant. The only coefficient that is significant at the 5 percent level has the wrong sign.
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2.3.1 Framework
Piracy leads to a transfer of resources to pirates via ransoms. Resources are used
by pirates in securing these ransoms and by ship owners and governments in resist-
ing them. The costs of the ransoms and damage to ships are also borne directly by
those who pay them. These costs are pooled across the industry through insurance.
Resources are also used in writing insurance costs and in the lengthy process of ne-
gotiations with pirates. As with any transfer program, there is a question of who
pays in the end. If the market for shipping is competitive then any increased cost will
be passed on to consumers of the final goods in the form of higher prices. And full
forward shifting is the benchmark that we consider.
Let ∆ denote the cost increase per unit of shipping due to piracy. Part of this cost
increase is a transfer to pirates, τ (∆), to which we could attach a distributional “wel-
fare” weight. It is somewhat debatable what this weight should be. Ransoms transfer
income to a poor country (Somalia) but they go mainly to organized criminals. It is
unclear how far these benefits trickle down to the wider Somali population.38 We
feel that it is best to be agnostic about this and base our welfare approach on Coate
(2000). Using his reasoning, we should care principally that any transfer made to
pirates is accomplished in the most efficient way and hence the welfare loss are the
resources spent in the process of delivering the transfer.
We therefore use the following thought experiment. Imagine there were an effi-
cient transfer scheme, t, to transfer money from final consumers to pirates. If we were
to keep pirates indifferent but use the efficient transfer, what would be the difference
in welfare costs between this hypothetical transfer and the actual costs caused by
piracy?39
In order to understand this welfare loss we need to first describe demand for final
goods as a function of shipping costs. Suppose that there demand for a composite
traded good, X, whose transport is susceptible to piracy attacks. Suppose that ship-
ping demand has a fixed coefficient technology so that demand for shipping is νX.
The number νX is best thought of as ton days, i.e. as the number of shipped tons mul-
tiplied by the average maritime journey time.40 Suppose that there is a representative
consumer with utility U (X) and additive quasi-linear utility.
Shipping costs influence demand through price adjustments. Denote demand for
the final good as Xˆ (ψ+ φ). Where ψ is the cost of production and φ is the shipping
costs per unit of the final good. Under piracy the shipping cost is
φ (∆) = ν [c + ∆]
38Shortland (2011) provides some evidence that piracy revenue trickles into Somali society and has a
positive developmental effect.
39Of course, a tax would be costly to administer and we are not including this in our thought exper-
iment. But neither are we including the costs to pirates of extracting the resource. We expect this to
induce a downward bias in our estimates of the welfare costs.
40This view is very much in line with the usual measure of mile tons. For an interesting discussion re-
garding this see Stopford (2009). We disregard variable shipping speeds which makes the two measures
equivalent.
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and under the efficient transfer scheme it is
φ (t) = ν [c + t]
where c is the cost of shipping.
If we were able to replace predation with taxation, the required unit tax, t, would
be given by
tνXˆ (ψ+ φ (t)) = τ (∆) νXˆ (ψ+ φ (∆)) . (2.8)
The left hand side of this equation shows total income from the tax. The right hand
side shows revenue from predation. Importantly, ∆ ≥ τ (∆), the cost incurred by
ship owners is potentially larger than what pirates make.
In this simple model the welfare loss caused by piracy is then given by
L (∆) =
{
U
(
Xˆ (ψ+ φ (t))
)− Xˆ (ψ+ φ (t)) [ψ+ φ (t)]} (2.9)
− {U (Xˆ (ψ+ φ (∆)))− Xˆ (ψ+ φ (∆)) [ψ+ φ (∆)]} .
where demand is potentially smaller under higher shipping costs, Xˆ (ψ+ φ (∆)) ≤
Xˆ (ψ+ φ (t)), because the price of the final good increases from ψ+ φ (t) to ψ+ φ (∆).
2.3.2 Benchmark Estimate
A benchmark (first-order) estimate of (2.9) can be found by ignoring any trade re-
sponse (i.e. demand response by consumers). Thus Xˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) is completely
inelastic and t = τ (∆) . In this case equation (2.9) takes on the simple form:
L1 (∆) = [∆− τ (∆)]× νXˆ. (2.10)
Estimates of equation (2.10) for the year 2010 are in column (1) of Table 2.7. Details of
all calculations are in Appendix 2.A.4. In Panel A we use the detailed data available
from the Suez Canal authority on the total amount of tons shipped through the Gulf
of Aden. We translate this number into an amount of DWT×days by using the mean
bulk ship speed (from Stopford (2009)) and the average length of the trip in the
respective sample.41 Panel B adds an estimate of the DWT×days that do not travel
through the Gulf of Aden but through the Indian Ocean.
To get a feel for the plausible range, we present a low and a high estimate. Our
low estimate uses the coefficient from column (1) in Table 2.3 and our high estimate
uses column (4) of Table 2.3. Panel B applies these numbers to trade through the
Indian Ocean.
We illustrate our calculations of L1 (∆) with the low estimate in panel A of Table
2.7. We use the coefficient in column (1) of Table 2.3 and the average rate charter rate
41We make the assumption all of this cargo is comparable to ours in terms of its exposure to higher
shipping costs, journey length and travels though the Gulf of Aden.
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of 0.4726. This yields the following estimate of total piracy costs:
∆× νXˆ = 0.082 ∗ 0.4726× 30.3 ∗ 646064000
= 758 million USD
for 2010.42 The average ship had a cargo capacity of 47,000 DWT which implies a
pirate cost of around 55, 000 USD.
Our estimate of τ (∆)× νXˆ is the gross ransoms paid less the costs incurred by
pirates in generating this. The main problem with calculating total ransom payments
is that not all ransom payments are observed. Depending on the assumptions made
on the unobserved payments, total ransom amounts vary widely. The One Earth
Future Foundation (2011) and Geopolicity (2011) report ransom amounts of up to 240
USD for 2010. A recent report by World Bank (2013) finds much lower numbers of
between 70 million USD and 90 million USD for the year 2010. Another World Bank
(2013) report finds that labour and capital costs leave a (political) rent of between
70 and 86 percent of revenues. With these estimates of revenues and rents we get a
range of 50 million USD up to 205 million USD for τ (∆)× νXˆ. For now we ignore
the margin of uncertainty and pick a value in the middle of this range, 120 million
USD.43
Together with our estimate of ∆× νXˆ this sums to the number
L1 (∆) = [758− 120] million USD = 638 million USD.
Even from this lower-bound estimate it should become clear that the additional costs
incurred due to the threat of piracy vastly exceeds what it would cost to offer pirates
a tax-financed transfer of comparable magnitude to the revenues that they earn.
Panel B shows, not surprisingly, that the estimated cost is much higher when we
calculate the value of shipping for the wider region including trade routes that do
not cross the Gulf of Aden. Our estimates of the welfare cost increase by around 70
percent.
One way to understand the welfare loss is to contrast expected ransoms faced by
the shipping industry with the increase in shipping costs. In 2010 there were 18,000
vessels travelling through the Suez Canal. In that year, pirates made 50 successful
attacks which generated up to 4 Million USD each. This implies an expected loss of
up to 11, 000 USD per vessel compared to an increase in shipping costs of 55, 000 USD.
Thus, the realized losses due to ransom payments were about five times lower than
our most conservative estimate of the welfare loss per vessel. This a fundamental
consequence of economic predation combined with private security investments as
42Obviously this number is subject to a large margin of error. For example, container traffic is likely
to be less affected. Were we to suppose that there was no effect on container ships then the size of the
affected deadweight tonnage would be only 279, 063, 000 and the cost would be considerably lower. We
abstract from this as the value of container goods is likely to be much larger which would increase the
cost.
43This is also consistent with the calculations at http://www.goo.gl/5T9nW.
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we discuss further below.
2.3.3 Extended Estimates
There are further reasons to believe that our estimates in column (1) of Table 2.7 are
a lower bound on the true cost. We now consider two of these: (i) the possibility of a
demand response which reduces trade and (ii) the possibility that only a fraction of
the cost of piracy is paid by the charterer.44
Allowing for the possibility of a demand response, we show in the Appendix
2.A.4 that the welfare loss due to a decrease in trade can be approximated by a
scaling factor on the estimate above, which depends on the elasticity of trade with
respect to transport costs, ηˆ, and is given by45
L2 (∆) = L1 (∆)
[
1+
1
2
∆− τ (∆)
c + ∆
ηˆ
]
. (2.11)
It is clear that L2 (∆) > L1 (∆) as long as ηˆ > 0.
There are several possible estimates of ηˆ that we could use. Recent estimates
from Feyrer (2009), who uses the Suez Canal closure from 1967 to 1975 as a shock
to distance, suggest that a value of ηˆ between 0.2 and 0.5 is reasonable. This is a
little lower than the estimate found in the meta study by Disdier (2008) which is 0.9.
However, given the context of the Feyrer (2009) study, we use an estimate of 0.5 in
column (2) of Table 2.7. This implies that L2 (∆) is larger than L1 (∆) by a factor of
between 1.017 and 1.03, i.e. the additional welfare loss due to changes in quantity are
relatively marginal (consistent with this being a second-order effect in our context).
This is confirmed when comparing the new estimates in column (2) of Table 2.7 with
column (1).
Column (3) of Table 2.7 allows for the possibility that the increase in shipping
rates fails to capture all of the additional costs imposed by piracy.46 To obtain an
upper bound on this we check what would happen if costs were split between the
ship owner and charterer according to the “general average rule” as it is known in
the shipping industry. This shares the costs of protecting the ship in proportion to the
value of the vessel and the cargo. Assume then that a share ζ of the piracy costs are
borne by the ship-owner. The charter rate increase ∆ is the transfer that compensates
the owner for piracy costs over and above what the charterer bears. Then if charter
rates increase by ∆ due to shipping costs the overall cost to the industry is given by
44Similarly, if we believe that the market for ship capacity is not competitive, we could see that piracy
related expenses may be forwarded with a markup. This is a possibility we do not explicitly consider
further.
45Note that we calculate an upper bound this way as charter costs are just a part of total (maritime)
transport costs.
46For example, time charter rates do not cover fuel expenses. If bulk ships speed up or re-route due
to piracy then this will not appear in the charter rate leading to an underestimate.
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∆
2ζ−1 .
47 This yields our third measure of welfare cost of:
L3 (∆) =
[
∆
2ζ − 1 − τ (∆)
]
× νXˆ (2.12)
which is reported in column (3) of Table 2.7. The details on the calibration of ζ can
be found in Appendix 2.A.4. This leads to estimates that are somewhat larger than in
column (1) of Table 2.7. For example, the low estimate allowing for general averaging
is 130 percent higher. The resulting numbers give us a good idea of how much
additional costs could be arising on the cargo owner’s side in terms of additional
fuel costs, insurance and re-routing.
Putting this together, our estimates for the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean are
between 1.1 billion USD and 3.7 billion USD. While the range of estimates is quite
large, the comparison between these estimates and those of the transfer received by
pirates is telling. We used a figure of 120 million USD for the transfer to pirates
and the welfare costs would still be substantial even we used the highest estimate of
240 million USD from One Earth Future Foundation (2011) and Geopolicity (2011).
And the welfare cost would be higher still using the smaller numbers on transfers to
pirates in World Bank (2013). Hence, the results suggest a substantial welfare cost
from piracy.
2.3.4 Predation versus Taxation
We can use the analysis above to calculate t - the tax rate on shipping through Aden
that would yield the same revenue that is going to pirates. Of course there is no
reason to expect that such a tax and transfer system provides a realistic solution
to the piracy problem. Identifying those who should receive the transfer would be
impossible to identify. However, it does provide another way of conceptualizing the
costs involved.
Disregarding the effect on trade we get this tax rate from the following calculation:
t =
τ (∆) νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆])
νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆])
=
120 million USD
0.4726 ∗ 30.3 ∗ 646, 064, 000+ 0.4648 ∗ 20.67 ∗ 578, 000, 000
= 0.008.
This implies that a tax rate of just 0.8 percent on chartering would be needed to gen-
erate a transfer of comparable magnitude to that generated by piracy. Even if we
assume that a rent of 205 million USD was generated by piracy this would still imply
a tax rate of only 1.4 percent. This contrasts with our estimates of the increase in
shipping costs of between 8 and 12 percent. The predatory activity of the kind un-
47To get an intuition for the formula assume that the shipping cost is 100. The owner has additional
costs due to piracy of 20 and the charterer pays 10. The charter rate will go up by 10 due to piracy but
overall costs due to piracy is 30. And, indeed, 12ζ−1 =
1
2 23−1
= 3 in this case.
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dertaken by pirates is between 5 and 16 times more costly as a means of transferring
resources to pirates than taxation would be.
Somalia is now the focus of international attention although with limited progress.
In the context of potential donor interest, it is instructive to consider how many So-
mali’s could be hired for one year using the additional resources that we estimate
are expended by the shipping industry in response to the threat of piracy. Using
the numbers in panel B of Table 2.7, a conservative estimate of the costs of piracy to
the shipping industry is about 1.05 billion USD. We use wage data from the Somali
Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit (FSNAU) presented in Shortland (2011) to
calculate a yearly wage of about 870 USD.48 This means that the extra spending due
to piracy could finance one year of employment for more than 1.2 million laborers at
the going market rate in 2010. This does not mean that such a transfer scheme would
be realistic or that it would prevent piracy. But it illustrates the scale of losses to the
industry relative to the reality of the Somali economy.
2.3.5 Investing in Security
Given the increases in shipping costs that we have found, the question arises of why
piracy remains a threat. The question of how security is provided and the optimality
of arrangements in place raises a range of issues which go beyond the scope of the
paper. However, we briefly discuss some of the issues here and argue that, prima facie,
there is evidence that there is currently scope for coordinating security.
The obvious course open to ship owners to reduce piracy risk is to make indepen-
dent investments in defensive measures such as barbed wire, panic rooms and secu-
rity crews for their ships. We would expect this to be done according to a cost-benefit
calculation by each ship owner. Our estimates could be regarded as the expected hi-
jacking costs if no defensive measures were taken.49 In addition to ransom payments,
attempted hijacks generate costs if ships are damaged after the hijacking, especially
since pirates have to hold ships for long enough to establish their credibility. The
risk of being captured for several months also increases the cost of recruiting crew
members who demand a wage premium as compensation. Ransom negotiations for
crew and ship are like an inefficient war of attrition which increases the cost of doing
business and creates delay over and above the cost of the ransom.50
Given that no ship with security teams on board has been hijacked we consider
now the costs arising when investments in security are decentralized.51 From conver-
sations with security firms, we know that they charge about 3000 USD for a security
48In 2010 the highest daily wage paid in Somalia was about 100,000 Somali Shillings (SSh). Assuming
261 work days and an exchange rate of about 30,000 SSh/USD this implies a yearly wage of about 870
USD.
49In the interpretation of Bowles and Jayadev (2004) the welfare loss we capture is then a direct
consequence of the guard labor needed to defend economic inequality.
50For an analysis of a closely related ransom bargaining process see Ambrus et al. (2011) who analyze
ransom negotiations during a period of piracy in the Meditteranean sea from 1575-1739.
51We thank Daron Acemoglu for suggesting that we look at this and Marit Rehavi for suggestions on
data.
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crew of four per day.52 The guards typically board the vessel on key points before
entering the Indian Ocean. The boarding points are Sri Lanka, the Strait of Hormuz,
Madagascar and an anchored vessel in the Red Sea off Djibouti. We compute the
average time it takes for a vessel to travel between the boarding points in Sri Lanka,
the Strait of Hormuz, Madagascar and the Red Sea. Based on this we compute the
total cost of hiring security crews for traffic going through the Suez Canal. We arrive
at an estimate of 302 million USD and 486 million USD for 2010. In Table 2.7 we
calculated costs which lie between 640 million USD and 2.4 billion USD for traffic
through Aden. Taken at face value, it suggests a large loss due to uncoordinated
provision of security.
This inefficiency is best explained as due to externalities in protection decisions.
There are two plausible externalities at work which have opposite signs. To the
extent that being protected increases the chances that unprotected vessels are suscep-
tible to attacks, there is a negative externality from investing in protection.53 Alone,
this might lead to excessive investments. However, investments in protection may
reduce the overall level of piracy attacks by reducing pirate intensity. And this will
tend to lead to too little investment.54 Either way, this creates a role for coordinated
action.55 However, such coordination among a myriad of ship-owners will be difficult
to achieve and our evidence suggests that externalities leading to free-rider problems
may be important.
This apparent inefficiency due to uncoordinated protection notwithstanding, it
does appear as if defensive measures in Somalia have been increasingly successful -
the number of successful hijacks has declined by more than 70 percent between 2010
and 2012. But the fact that this may be due to higher investments in security implies
that the costs of piracy to the industry may not have declined commensurately. These
costs of protection continue to be incurred even when there are very few successful
52This cost is well in the interval of cost estimates for US security contracts in Iraq. The 2010 United
States Government Accountability Office report "Warfighter Support: A Cost Comparison of Using State
Department Employees versus Contractors for Security Services in Iraq", for example, gives a range of
these costs between 430 USD and 7600 USD for four persons per day.
53Bandiera (2003) makes a similar point. In addition, there is anecdotal evidence of an arms race in
which pirates are better and better equipped and ship owners move from minor ship modifications to
hiring security crews. For a general discussion of these issues see Meza and Gould (1992).
54To illustrate this, consider the following simple model. Suppose that there is continuum of ship
owners of size one indexed by n ∈ [0, 1] and that each can eliminate the threat of piracy at cost f . Let
the threat of any particular ship being attacked when nˆ vessels are protected be p (nˆ). The loss from
being attacked is −`. Now the equilibrium condition determining the fraction of vessels who choose
to protect is
p (nˆ) ` = f .
For this to be a stable interior solution, we require that p′ (nˆ) < 0. This says that (locally) having more
vessels protected, reduces the likelihood of being attacked. The surplus maximizing level of protection
maximizes
S (nˆ) = −nˆ f − (1− nˆ) p (nˆ) `
by choice of nˆ. And it is straightforward to see that at any stable interior decentralized outcome
S′ (nˆ) = − (1− nˆ) p′ (nˆ) ` > 0
i.e., there is too little investment in protection.
55See Besley and Ghatak (2010) for development of this argument in relation to property rights en-
forcement. See Grossman (2002) for a theoretical argument relating to predation.
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attacks. Indeed, the possibility of predation can impose welfare costs even where the
revenue from predation goes to zero.
There may also be a case for going beyond coordinated private security towards
collective provision. Whether this is optimal depends on the technology, coordi-
nation among providers and possible scale economies from having vessels that spe-
cialize in protection (such as a Navy) as a means of protecting ships. Successful
collective provision is likely to occur only if there is an agreed way to share costs. In
this regard, it is worthwhile noting that currently member countries of the EU, the
US, China, Russia, India, Saudia Arabia, Iran and Japan deploy maritime forces in
the area. They patrol an area of sea approximately equal to the size of western Eu-
rope.56 Difficulties in agreeing ways of sharing costs is not a new issue as revealed,
for example, in the correspondent report on Chinese piracy in The London and China
Telegraph from 4th February 1867 noted that
“Besides we are not the only Power with large interests at stake. French,
Americans, and Germans carry on an extensive trade [...] Why should we
then incur singly the expense of suppressing piracy if each provided a
couple of gunboats the force would suffice for the safety foreign shipping
which is all that devolves upon [..] why should the English tax payer
alone bear the expense?”
The current reliance of the international community on Naval patrols to combat
piracy could succeed in reducing pirate activity further. In the end, the most promis-
ing long-term solution would seem to be to restore a functional Somali state which
can deny pirates safe haven, thereby dealing with the problem at source.
2.4 Concluding Comments
Piracy is an important source of predation which creates economic disruption. In this
paper, we have used estimates of its effect on shipping prices to estimate the welfare
cost of Somali piracy.
While what we have studied here is only one specific kind of lawlessness, esti-
mates of the costs of predatory activity in any specific context are rare. We have
shown that the cost of piracy is large relative to the size of the transfer to pirates.
The analysis further underlines the difference between organized extraction by
the state in the form of taxation and disorganized predation. We estimate that the
latter is at least five times more costly. In the language of Olson (1993), pirates are
roving bandits while the state is a stationary bandit and hence is in a better place
to organize extraction at lower costs. But this requires some commitment power on
behalf of a stationary bandit. Absent such commitment in the context of piracy,
the shipping industry has started to invest in protection. The resulting reduction in
pirate activity, however, is just a change in the way that the costs of piracy manifest
56We discuss the additional costs that this might cause in the Appendix 2.A.5.
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themselves. Without a return to strong law and order in Somalia, it seems unlikely
that the underlying welfare costs will disappear any time soon.
There are a number of insights from our findings which extend beyond the spe-
cific context that we study. The results suggest that there can be a substantial cost of
predation even if the transfers that are generated are modest. There is a parallel here
with the welfare cost of crime more generally. For example, a high perceived risk of
burglary can encourage house holders to invest in private security which can lead
to significant costs even if, as a consequence, burglars earn low returns from their
activity. Thus, gauging the costs of predation and theft requires looking beyond the
extent of the crime that actually occurs.
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Table 2.1: Seasonality in Attacks in Somalia Region
month before May 2008 after May 2008
January 1.5 12.5
Februar 2.7 7.5
March 2.9 31.5
April 5.2 34.1
May 3.7 21.0
June 1.8 10.5
July 3.5 4.6
August 2.1 9.4
September 1.3 14.6
October 3.8 18.7
November 2.2 28.0
December 2.4 12.6
average 2.8 17.1
difference (after-before) 14.3
Note: Table shows the mean of attacks in the Somalia area in the
periods 2002-2007 and 2008-2009.
Table 2.2: Piracy Attacks and Shipping Costs - Simple Difference in Difference
(1) (2) (3)
charter rate per DWT on routes before May 2008 after May 2008 difference
that do not pass the piracy area 0.486 0.386 0.100
(0.00306) (0.00329) (0.00450)
that pass the piracy area 0.480 0.454 0.026
(0.00415) (0.00653) (0.00781)
difference 0.006 -0.068 0.074
(0.00516) (0.00731) (0.00894)
Notes: Charter rates are given in US dollars per deadweight tonnage (DWT).
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Table 2.3: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline Adding controls Post May 08 War Risk Wind-speed
attacks (Somalia) 8.204** 8.438** 3.862***
(3.558) (3.542) (1.057)
war risk area 12.332* 2.183
(6.924) (5.556)
calm winds * war risk area 18.254***
(4.407)
calm winds -0.036*
(0.021)
ballast bonus per DWT -0.001 -1.509*** -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.529) (0.001) (0.001)
ship age -0.614*** -0.754*** -0.613*** -0.611***
(0.098) (0.191) (0.098) (0.098)
handysize 0.622*** 0.637*** 0.627*** 0.639*** 0.638***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
handymax 0.400*** 0.403*** 0.372*** 0.404*** 0.404***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.031) (0.036) (0.036)
panamax 0.149*** 0.150*** 0.177*** 0.152*** 0.152***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
capesize -0.039 -0.051* -0.082 -0.050* -0.050*
(0.037) (0.029) (0.067) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 23679 23679 9530 23679 23679
R-squared .851 .856 .829 .856 .856
Notes: All regressions include dyad fixed effects, ship-size controls and time fixed effects. Robust standard
errors adjusted for two-way clustering on the origin and destination country for each voyage are in the paren-
theses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the log of the charter
rate in US dollars per dead-weight tonnage (DWT). All attack variables are interactions between a dummy that
indicates whether a ship will cross a pirate territory and the number of attacks in that territory. "Handysize" is
a dummy that indicates ships with DWT ≤ 35000. "Handymax" are ships with 35000 < DWT ≤ 55000. "Pana-
max" are ships with 55000 < DWT ≤ 80000. "Small capesize" are ships with 80000 < DWT ≤ 150000 (omitted).
"Capesize" are ships with DWT > 150000. “Ballast bonus” is a payment that compensates the ship owner for
travelling without cargo on return. “War risk area” is a dummy that indicates whether the area was defined as a
war risk area by the Maritime Insurer’s Joint War Committee. The coefficient on the attack variables and of the
war-risk and wind-interactions are multiplied by 100 for clearer exposition.
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Table 2.4: Robustness Checks - Modelling Expectations and Macroeconomic Controls
Expectations Macroeconomic Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EM EM (Seasonality) GDP Trade Trends Lehman Break
forecasted attacks (EM) 9.225* 8.747**
(5.539) (3.709)
attacks 8.449** 8.385** 5.833** 2.876**
(3.545) (3.268) (2.490) (1.330)
annual GDP growth origin region 0.024
(0.022)
annual GDP growth destination region -0.005
(0.015)
monthly trade on dyad 0.008
(0.005)
region time trend No No No No Yes No
post Lehman dyad fixed effect No No No No No Yes
Observations 23679 23679 23679 21469 23679 23282
R-squared .855 .856 .856 .85 .86 .845
Notes: All regressions include dyad fixed effects, ship-size controls and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for
two-way clustering on the origin and destination country for each voyage are in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the log of the daily charter rate per deadweight tonnage (DWT). All attack
variables are interactions between a dummy that indicates whether a ship will cross a pirate territory and the number of attacks
in that territory. Columns (1) and (2) use alternative models to forecast piracy attacks. We use a simple Markov chain model for
column (1) and a Markov chain model that accounts for seasonality in column (2). Ship controls are dummy variables classifying
the ship size in terms of DWT and contain the age of the ship and the size of the “Ballast bonus” for a particular voyage. Monthly
trade on dyad is the log of the value of monthly trade on a dyad as obtained from the Export time-series from the IMF direction
of trade database. For dyads where trade is zero, this is coded as a zero. The coefficient on the attack variables is multiplied by
100 for clearer exposition.
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Table 2.5: Robustness Checks - Assignment of Routes, Treatment Areas and Intensity
Assignment of Routes Treament Areas
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Rerouting 10% Rerouting 20% Only Aden Fixed Area Fixed Area Varying Area Varying Area
attacks (Somalia) 9.841*** 8.529*** 1.911 4.441
(3.135) (3.077) (4.479) (3.222)
attacks (Aden) 7.780*
(4.375)
share of route 29.012* 36.142*** 20.586* 40.363***
through piracy area * attacks (16.157) (13.557) (11.272) (10.797)
share of route 0.495 0.412
through piracy area (0.849) (0.816)
Observations 23679 23679 23679 23679 23679 23679 23679
R-squared .855 .855 .855 .856 .856 .856 .856
Notes: All regressions include dyad fixed effects, ship-size controls and time fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for two-way clustering on the
origin and destination country for each voyage are in the parentheses with stars indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the
log of the daily charter rate per deadweight tonnage (DWT). All attack variables are interactions between a dummy that indicates whether a ship will cross
a pirate territory and the number of attacks in that territory. Columns (6) and (7) present the results when we use time-varying piracy areas obtained from
the year-on-year convex hulls that are spanned by the geo coordinates of the attacks that have occurred up to each year. Columns (4) and (6) test whether
the share of a ships journey through maritime areas affected by piracy has an independent effect, while columns (5) and (7) present results when using the
continuous measure of the share of route through the piracy area interacted with attacks as a control. The coefficients on the attack variables and war risk
dummies are multiplied by 100 for clearer exposition.
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Table 2.6: Extended Results - Suez Canal Traffic
Suez Canal Traffic Ship Size
(1) (2) (3)
Basic Lehman Break from Chartering Contracts
attacks (Somalia) -12.015*** -2.296
(2.962) (1.553)
cargobreak -0.432***
(0.025)
attacks (Somalia) -293.468
(812.198)
linear trend Yes Yes .
route fixed effect . . Yes
month fixed effect . . Yes
Observations 108 108 12753
R-squared .638 .923 .482
Notes: Robust standard errors are reported. The stars indicate *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *
p < 0.1. The dependent variable is the log of cargo traffic in a particular month through
the Suez Canal. The variable "cargobreak" is an indicator that is equal to 1 after the
break in cargo trade volumes following the Lehman brothers collapse in November 2008,
"attacks" measures the number of attacks in the Somalia area in a given month. The
coefficient on the attack variable is multiplied by 100 for clearer exposition.
Table 2.7: The Welfare Cost of Piracy in 2010
Panel A: Aden (1) (2) (3)
L1 (in million USD) L2 (in million USD) L3 (in million USD)
low estimate 638 649 1495
high estimate 1017 1045 2302
Panel B: Aden and Indian Ocean (1) (2) (3)
L1 (in million USD) L2 (in million USD) L3 (in million USD)
low estimate 1093 1113 2464
high estimate 1700 1749 3757
Notes: Calculations are discussed in section 4 and the appendix F. Column (2) adjusts the welfare loss by taking
into account the change in trade. Column (3) adjusts the cost to take into account the share of costs borne by
charterers. Panel B uses data on trade to and from the Middle East to calculate the costs for the area including
the Indian Ocean.
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Table 2.8: Summary Statistics of Main Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
trade value (in Mio USD) 3831.42 8101.499 0 42034.211
log(trade value+1) 18.767 5.739 0 24.462
shipage (in years) 9.45 7.31 0 39
deadweight tonnage (dwt) 80092.19 39495.48 5169 300000
rate per day per dwt (in USD) 0.45 0.30 0.01 4.04
ballast bonus per dwt (in USD) 1.03 70.26 0 1.10E+04
distance (in km) 8014 6846 0 2.41E+04
number of attacks in Somalia 7.03 9.06 0 42
number of attacks in Gulf of Aden 4.116 5.493 0 22
average predicted wind speed in m/s (Somalia) 6.34 1.38 4.36 8.81
forecast number of attacks Somalia (Markov Chain) 7.73 5.22 2.79 14.20
forecast number of attacks Somalia (AR(2)) 14.59 13.75 1.98 57.26
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Table 2.9: Predictive Power of Expectation Models
Different Expectation Models Google Searches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Lagged Attacks AR(2) EM EM (seasonal) Somali Piracy Somali Piracy Gulf of Aden Gulf of Aden
forecasted attacks 0.717*** 0.710*** 0.719*** 0.909*** 0.621*** 0.652***
(0.099) (0.097) (0.107) (0.072) (0.166) (0.148)
Searches ”Somali 0.166*** 0.032
Piracy” (0.032) (0.043)
Searches ”Gulf of 0.046** 0.008
Aden” (0.018) (0.015)
Observations 98 98 98 98 83 83 83 83
R-squared .51 .511 .426 .807 .303 .489 .202 .488
Notes: Results from a regression of piracy in a month on various models of expectations. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses, with stars
indicating *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Note that the Google Search data is only available from 2004 onwards.
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Figure 2.5: Wind Speed in the Somalia Area
Figure 2.6: Wind Speed and Attacks in the Somalia Area
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Figure 2.7: Calculated Shipping Lanes and Treatment Areas Based on Convex Hulls
Note: The dark shaded area on the interior is the convex hull spanned by all attacks up to 2005, while
the bigger light shaded area is the convex hull spanned by all attacks up to 2010. The location of attacks
is indicated by a cross. The circles indicate the shipping lanes, the colouring of which is proportional to
the number of observation on each shipping lane according to the continuous colour scheme.
2.A Appendix
This Appendix discusses the data sources and generation of variables.
2.A.1 Data
Chartering Contracts
The data on shipping prices comes from the web-site of N. Cotzias Shipping Con-
sultants which provides monthly reports of the time charter market for the period
November 2002 until December 2010.57 The data is comprised of 33,529 individual
fixtures in the dry bulk cargo segment of the market.
It contains details on the vessel that was chartered, the chartering company,
the month in which the charter was fixed and the approximate date (day-range /
months), when the charter would commence. The details on the vessel give us the
current ship name, the year it was built and its deadweight tonnage. The pricing
information contains the daily rate in USD, along with a ballast bonus. From these
57In early 2011, Cotzias merged with Intermodial (www.intermodal.gr). As of 25th January 2012, the
Cotzias data was available on http://www.goo.gl/g5d0c.
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we construct the daily rate per deadweight ton and the ballast bonus per deadweight
ton. On average, about 9% of the charters in our sample include a ballast bonus.
The chartering information provides details about the location of the vessel origin
and the vessel destination, i.e. where it will be handed back to the ship owner. Due
to the nature of the chartering market, market participants have an active interest in
reporting the vessels delivery- and redelivery locations. However, this information
comes with varying levels of detail. In particular the redelivery location may either
be a port, a country, a maritime region or it may be missing. Further challenges
include that sometimes, the port name is spelled wrongly or abbreviations were used.
We harmonize the data to country-level pairs. The raw data contains 2,430 distinct
delivery- or redelivery locations. We proceeded in two steps:
1. Try an exact match based on a database of port names.58. This will give us, in
case of an exact match, a port and the country in which this port is located.
In case no exact match was found, we used the Google Search Engine to get
a spelling suggestion (in case there was a misspelling in the raw data) and try
it again with the corrected spelling. Through this, we are able to filter 570
locations, which account for roughly 2/3 of the observations.
2. For the remainder of the delivery- and redelivery locations, we proceed by
performing Google searches in a semi-automated way, double checking and
validating the results manually.
IMB Piracy Data
The IMB runs the piracy reporting centre which can be contacted 24 hours by vessels
under attack. The information received from the ship Masters is immediately relayed
to the local law enforcement agencies requesting assistance. In addition, the infor-
mation received from the ship Masters is broadcast to all vessels in the Ocean region
- thus highlighting the threat to a Master en route into the area of risk. The IMB
annual reports reproduce the piracy reports received by the piracy reporting centre.
They define a piracy attack as
An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent
intent to commit theft or any other crime with the apparent intent or
capability to use force in the furtherance of that act. (IMB, 2009)
Under this definition, pirate attacks include all actual or attempted attacks on
vessels while in port, anchored, berthed or underway. While there is some acknowl-
edged under-reporting, it is the most complete database on maritime piracy that is
available. We obtained the annual reports of piracy and robbery incidents from 1999-
2010. Each report provides a detailed listing of the piracy incidence, containing the
following information:
58This database contains the details and locations of 27,625 ports all over the world. They include all
major ports, but also smaller ports and docks. It can be accessed on http://www.goo.gl/s59UE
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• Date (usually to day)
• Name of Ship
• Flag of Ship (sometimes)
• Call sign of ship (not always)
• IMO number of ship (not always)
• Information on location of attack, various levels of detail but mostly a geo-code.
• A narrative of the attack
In total, data on 5,456 incidents is reported. We were not able to use all obser-
vations, as quite often for attacks that take place near some ports or just off some
islands, the report does not include a geo-coded location. We tried to make use of
as many observations as possible by manually geo-coding the missing observations.
Furthermore, in early years the data does not give information on whether the vessel
was underway or at anchor when it was attacked. This data was manually extracted
by analyzing the narrative of the attacks.
Using the maritime areas that we describe in the text, we arrive at a monthly
number of piracy attacks in that particular maritime area. This time series is then
used throughout the paper.
Wind and Seasonality of Attacks
The connection between wind speed and pirate risk is well-documented. For ex-
ample, the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), a U.S. navy think tank, publishes the
Piracy Analysis and Warning Weekly (PAWW) which uses weather data to predict
piracy risks in the Somalia area.
We obtained wind data from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA), which, among others, provides detailed satellite and observational
weather data for the world’s oceans. For our purposes we accessed the NOAA
Multiple-Satellite Blended Sea Winds database.59 This particular database has the
advantage that it is compiled from several satellites, which limits the number of cov-
erage gaps. Another advantage is, that it provides the data on a fine spatial grid of
0.5◦ and is available, without gaps from 1987 onwards.
From this database we extracted the monthly mean wind speed pertaining to
the geographical grid of our piracy regions. For each month, we have around 8,800
observations of the monthly mean wind speed per 0.5◦ cell corresponding to our grid.
We use this to compute the average wind speed in any month for both the Somalia
area.
59The data can be accessed via http://www.goo.gl/DM80l.
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Figure 2.5 shows the average monthly wind speed for the Somalia area (dotted
line) and the predicted wind speed (solid line). The predicted wind speed is calcu-
lated from a regression of wind speed on month dummies
E [windt] =12m=1 monthm (t) + et.
This regression has an R2 of 0.997. The strong seasonal pattern is also apparent in
figure A1 which clearly shows the summer monsoon seasons with increased wind
speeds and January and February with very calm winds.
Figure 2.9 shows the connection of the average wind speed prediction (lagged)
and mean piracy attacks from Table 2.1. It shows that attacks and lagged wind speed
are highly correlated. This is in line with UNOSAT (2010) where the lag reflects the
latency period for the pirate militias to redeploy their vessels from the main militia
bases along the Puntland coast.
Algorithm for Maritime Routes and Distances
We first determine start and end points for each journey. We use country start and
end points rather than specific ports. This is because there is some ambiguity in the
port information. This is more severe for some countries. For example, the United
States has access to more than one Ocean so that errors could be quite large.
Each country information is interpreted as a specific position. We assigned the
most frequently occurring port as our start and finish point for each country. We are
then able to automate the way treatment is assigned by computing maritime routes
between these points.
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
First, we transform a world map into a coarse 1◦ grid of the world. The coarseness
of the grid allows us to compute optimal routes for the 1,600 routes in a reasonable
amount of time on a standard desktop computer. The grid is thus a 360×180 ma-
trix, which we can think of as a graph. Each cell in the matrix represents a node
of the graph. We assume that vessels can travel into any of the 8 neighboring cells.
The transformation into a grid takes into account that moving along a diagonal corre-
sponds to a larger distance (i.e. higher costs) than moving along straight line vertices.
Second, we then assigned to each cell a cost of crossing using the map on which
the grid was defined. We normalize this cost of crossing to be 1 for sea- or oceans and
passing a very large number for landmass. We had to manually close the North-West
passage and, due to the coarseness of the grid, we had to open up the Suez canal, the
Malacca Straits and the Panama canal.
Third, the start- and end-locations, given as GPS coordinates, are then mapped
into a particular cell in this graph. We can use simple shortest-path algorithms to
compute an optimal path from any two points on the grid. The shortest-path imple-
mentation we used is a Dijkstra algorithm implemented in the R package Gdistance.60
60The R package is available from http://www.goo.gl/BCj6G. The procedure and the code used is
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The algorithm delivers three outputs: a shortest path as a sequence of GPS coor-
dinates, its distance and a cost measure. We use the actual path for the intention to
treat assignment that we describe in the text.
2.A.2 Predicting Pirate Attacks
This Appendix discusses table 2.9 which reports the predictive power of five different
ways to model equation (2.1). Our baseline specification, in effect, supposes that the
best estimate of piracy en route is the level of piracy attacks in the current month, i.e.
E [at+1] = at. The result is reported in column (1) of Table 2.9.
As an alternative, we also fitted an AR(2) process to the pattern of attacks in the
piracy region which we report in column (2) of Table 2.9. The R squared of this model
is only marginally higher than in the baseline model.
In section 2.2.4 we also discuss two Markov Chain models which have a more
intuitive appeal in the context of the distinct shift in pirate activity after May 2008.
The first model uses a Markov Chain to model just the shift from one mean number
of attacks to another. We report the fit to the actual attacks in column (3) of Table 2.9.
This model performs slightly worse than the baseline.
The second model distinguishes twelve different means, one for each month, in
each regime. As can be seen in column (4) this, season specific, Markov Chain model
produces an extremely good fit to the realized number of attacks.
Finally, we gathered data on google searches on "Somali piracy", a proxy for news
stories, which we use to predict attacks. Results are presented in column (5) of Table
2.9. This variable performs worse than any of the models using the attacks data
which suggests that news stories lag attacks instead of leading them. Column (6)
shows that news do not add additional predictive power beyond attacks. In columns
(7) and (8) we run the same analysis for the search term "Gulf of Aden".
Markov Chain Forecasts
Basics Assume that attacks in region r at time t are given by the following “switch-
ing” model:
at = µ` (1− δ (`t)) + µWδ (`t) + εt with εt ∼ N(0, σ2`t) (2.13)
where δ (S) = 0 and δ (W) = 1. Thus, µS is the mean number of attacks in the inactive
state and µW is the number of attacks when pirates are active. This allows for the
possibility that µS > 0. The transition matrix between states is given by:
`t−1 = W `t−1 = S
`t = W p 1− q
`t = S 1− p q
available from http://www.goo.gl/irRxgv.
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at date t, follows the process:
`t = 1− q + λ`t−1 + vt where λ = q + p− 1
where vt is an error term with a state-contingent distribution of
vt | (`t−1 = W) =
{
1− p with probability p
−p with probability 1− p
and
vt | (`t−1 = S) =
{
− (1− q) with probability q
q with probability 1− q.
The model has a vector of six region-specific parameters
θ ≡ {µW , µS,σ2W , σ2S , p, q}
which is a complete description of the parameters governing the process of piracy.
Most of our use of the model will turn around just four parameters from this vector:
µW , µS, p and q
The history of attacks is used to estimate the probability P (`t = W | Ht, θ) given
the attack history Ht and the parameter vector θ. (Details are provided below.) This
probability can then be used to form expectations about the level of future attacks,
i.e. at+1. It is easy to show that given equation (2.13) the estimate of attacks in the
next month is
E (at+1 : Ht) = µW (1− q) + µSq (2.14)
+ (µW − µS) λP (st = W | Ht, θ)
where λ ≡ p + q− 1. The first two terms in equation (2.14) are time-invariant func-
tions of the regional parameters θ. One can interpret them as the expected level of
attacks in times of inactivity, i.e. at P (st = W | Ht, θ) = 0. The second term shows
that the expected violence in the next period only depends on the estimated proba-
bility of conflict in t, the differences in attacks between active and inactive months
and the persistence, λ.
Estimation A good starting point for the calculation of the probability of being in
conflict, P (`t = W | Ht, θ), is Bayesian updating in period t. In period t, the extrapo-
lation of last period P (`t = W | Ht−1, θ) is updated with attacks in t according to the
standard formula:
P (`t = W | Ht, θ) = f (at | `t = W, Ht−1, θ) P (`t = W | Ht−1, θ)W
∑
j=S
f (at | `t = j, Ht−1, θ) P (`t = W | Ht−1, θ)
.
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The immediate insight from this formula is that the probability can only be calculated
with an estimate of θr because the conditional densities are given by
f (at | `t = j, Ht−1, θ) = 1√
2piσ2j
exp
(
−
(
at − µj
)2
2σ2j
)
and therefore depend on parameters in θ.
The probability P (`t = W | Ht, θ) can be calculated if the past estimate P (`t−1 = W | Ht−1, θ)
is known. To see that this dependency of P (`t = W | Ht, θ) on P (`t−1 = W | Ht−1, θ)
note that
P (`t = W | Ht, θ) =
1
∑
j=0
P (`t = W, `t−1 = j | Ht−1, θ) .
and
P (`t = W, `t−1 = j | Ht−1, θ) = P (`t = 1 | `t−1 = j) P (`t−1 = W | Ht−1, θ)
where P (`t = W | `t−1 = j) is nothing else than the estimated p and 1− q contained
in θ. Hence, one needs P (`t−1 = W | Ht−1, θ) to calculate P (`t = W | Ht, θ).
This reliance of P (`t = W | Ht, θ) on P (`t−1 = W | Ht−1, θ) implies that previous
probabilities of conflict have to be calculated first. The filter therefore takes a starting
value P (`0 = 1 | H0, θ) and calculates
P (`1 = 1 | H1, θ) , P (`2 = 1 | H2, θ) ...P (`T = 1 | HT, θ)
by iteratively updating the probability of conflict with the monthly attacks data at.
To some degree this is what the charter parties of a shipment through the Somalia
area would have done, too.
However, this simple filter relies on the availability of the vector θ. The prob-
lem is that θ cannot be calculated without knowing the states `1, `2...`T which are
unobserved. Hence, the estimation method needs to determine when regime shifts
occurred and at the same time estimate the parameters of the model. One way of
estimating the parameters of the violence process is the Expectation Maximization
(EM) Algorithm described in Hamilton (1990) which generates an estimate of θ by
iteration.
In each iteration the algorithm makes use of the "smoothed" probability of conflict
which is based on the entire attack time series data
P (`t = 1 | aT, aT−1, ..., a1, θ) .
Nothing in the process changes if we assume a distinct value of µjm that is a
function of the month in addition to the state. The EM algorithm simply fits 12 means
instead of 1 mean per state and calculates probabilities P (`t = 1 | aT, aT−1, ..., a1, θm)
as described above.
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2.A.3 Cost Factors
Damage to Vessels
Direct damage is typically due to attempts to board a vessel. This could be damage
due to small arms fire or rocket propelled grenades. Damages to the cargo are typi-
cally small, at least in bulk shipping which we focus on, while damage to the hull is
more common.61 As a consequence, the risk to hulls has now been unbundled from
the Hull and Machinery (H&M) insurance and put into special War Risk Insurance.
The War Risk Insurance is typically an annual police, but additional premiums are
charged if vessels travel through high risk areas. These premiums are passed on
to the charterers. In May 2008 the Joint War Committee, an advisory body set up
by the maritime underwriters based in London, declared the Gulf of Aden to be an
area of high risk for which these additional premiums apply. The high risk area has
since then expanded considerably and now covers the whole large rectangle in Figure
2.2.62 Cargo insurances do not typically charge additional premiums for specific sea
areas.63 Since hull damage is covered by insurance we expect such costs to be passed
on to ship charterers.
Loss of Hire and Delay
The distribution of costs coming from loss of hire depends on the individual char-
tering agreements. These determine to what extent a charterer has to pay the daily
chartering rate for the time that a ship is being held by pirates. According to an in-
dustry norm the charterer is responsible for the first 90 days following seizure.64 With
an estimated rolling average of 205 days under seizure at the end of 2010 this implies
a relatively even share of costs.65 The risk of not being operational after release (due
to damage to ship during captivity) is with the ship owner. This risk is substantial as
immobility of several months without maintenance is bound to incapacitate a ship.
Ransom Payments
Ransom payments and the costs of negotiators typically reach several million dollars
and are, in principle, shared between the owner of the vessel, a chartering party and
the owner of the cargo or special insurances that these parties purchased.66 However,
this applies only on journeys with cargo on board. In addition, the crew falls into
the ship owners obligations if brought off the ship.67 Both the ship owner’s H&M
insurance and the war risk insurance will cover part of this ransom. Kidnap and
61Hastings (2009) stresses that cargo is not stolen during captivity in the case of Somalia because the
infrastructure for transporting it off is lacking.
62For details see http://www.goo.gl/MOg7S.
63See Marsh’s Global Marine Practice available at http://www.goo.gl/vhXoJ.
64This norm is the "BIMCO Piracy Clause 2009". BIMCO is the largest international shipping associ-
ation representing ship-owners.
65For a summary see MARSH (2011).
66See http://www.goo.gl/jSO3f.
67For a discussion see MARSH (2011) and http://www.goo.gl/vhXoJ, accessed on 10.04.2012.
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Ransom (K&R) insurance policies, introduced in 2008, provide additional cover for
the payment of ransoms. It is unclear what proportion of ships are insured by these
policies.68 However, the fact that these are designed for shipowners is indicative that
these bear the main burden of ransom payments.
Even if ransoms are not paid, ship-owners need to pay a significant wage risk
bonus to crew when travelling through pirate territory. According to the Interna-
tional Maritime Employers’ Council (IMEC) seafarers are entitled to a compensation
amounting to 100% of the basic wage on each day a vessel stays in a high risk area.
Security
The maritime industry’s Best Practices manual lists a long list of changes to ship and
crew stretching from barbed wire, high pressure fire hoses and citadels to additional
security teams, that can help prevent a successful pirate attack/hijack.69 All these
expenses will be borne by the ship owner. The notion of an "arms race" between
better equipped pirates and ever more sophisticated defence mechanisms by ship
owners suggests that there might be costs on the side of ship owners that exceed the
expected sum of ransom payments. According to The Economist newspaper, some
40% of ships carried security crews by 2012.70 Conversations with industry experts
suggest that the price per security crew of four is fixed and does not generally vary
with the type of ship under consideration. The quoted price we work with in the
paper is 3000 USD per day for a crew of four.
Re-routing, Speeding-up
The cost of re-routing around the Cape of Good Hope, especially among very large
vessels, has been highlighted as a major element of the costs of piracy in early pub-
lications on the issue.71 In the public debate this notion was often supported by a
drastic decrease in Suez canal traffic in 2008. However, Suez canal traffic data can be
misleading in this regard as world bulk trade collapsed only a few months before the
increase in pirate activity. In addition, it should be kept in mind that large Capesize
Bulk Carriers were never able to cross the Suez canal and would go around the Cape
regardless of pirate activity. Indeed, more recent evidence using satellite imaging
suggests that re-routing around the Cape is likely to be a minor issue.72 Rerouting
costs are in principle fully recoverable from the charterer since contracts are written
for daily ship hire. A different issue are additional fuel costs which are borne by the
charterer under the time-charter.
68Though some industry experts claim that as of 2009, the proportion of ships covered by such policies
was less than 10 %, see http://www.goo.gl/Uh3zX.
69These are updated regularly. The version referred to here is BMP4 (2011) "Best Management Prac-
tices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy".
70Laws and guns, The Economist, April 14th 2012.
71See, for example, One Earth Future (2010) and Bendall (2011).
72See One Earth Future (2011).
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Additional Wage Costs
There are large welfare costs borne by the captured individuals in hijacking incidents.
With captivity lasting on average 11 months and a high level of physical violence the
hijacking risk looms large for individuals. In addition, according to the Ocean’s
Beyond Piracy think tank 3,863 seafarers were fired upon by pirates in 2012. It is
difficult to measure this human cost in monetary terms. Still, one way to capture
it is the wage compensation that seafarers receive when shipping through piracy
areas. After negotiations in the International Bargaining Forum (IBF) it was agreed
that workers should be entitled to a 100 percent basic wage bonus to compensate for
travels through war risk areas. As this cost is directly borne by the shipowner it will
also increase shipping rates in a competitive market.
The bottom line from this discussion is that looking at contract prices in shipping
should pick up a good deal of the increased costs imposed by piracy. However, we
would expect this to be a lower bound on the overall cost to the shipping industry
since some of the direct costs paid by charterers may not be captured. This issue is
taken into account in our welfare calculations.
2.A.4 Welfare Cost Calculations
Basic Estimate
The first column in Table 2.7 reports:
L1 (∆) = [∆− τ (∆)] νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) .
In this Appendix, we first present the calculations for column (1) in Panel (A) and
(B). We then discuss the calculations of column (2) and (3).
Total Cargo shipped through the Suez Canal is around 646, 064, 000 tons per
year.73 According to data from Stopford (2009) bulk ships travel at around 26km
per hour (14 knots) and the average distance that charters travel which pass through
the Gulf of Aden is 16, 400 km with a typical charter length of 26.3 days. To this we
add 4 days on charter for loading and unloading. This does not include waiting time
in Suez and neglects the possibility of re-routing.
Our estimates in Panel B in Table 2.7 add the costs imposed by piracy on maritime
traffic through the broader Somali area to this cost. In order to calculate this we use
the same estimates as before and estimate the number of tonnage travelling through
this area (but not the Gulf of Aden) we use COMTRADE data on commodity trade
between the Middle East and Africa/Asia (excluding India).74 The data suggests that
73See http://www.goo.gl/J3lGl.
74For this we define two groups of countries and calculate total tons of trade between the two groups.
A) Middle Eastern countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United
Arab Emirates; and B) Africa/Asia: Angola, Australia, Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong SAR,
Macao SAR, Dem. People’s Rep. of Korea, Fmr Dem. Rep. of Vietnam, Fmr Rep. of Vietnam, Indonesia,
Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, New Zealand, Philippines, Rep.
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about 578, 000, 000 tons were shipped through the area in 2010. Most of this is oil
exports from the Middle East. As before, we use our data to calculate the average
charter length (20.67 days) and the average charter rate (0.4646 USD/DWT days).
Low estimate:
Gulf of Aden:
0.082 ∗ 0.4726 ∗ 30.3 ∗ 646064000 = 758 million USD
−120 million USD
= 638 million USD
Gulf of Aden+Indian Ocean:
0.082 ∗ 0.4726 ∗ 30.3 ∗ 646064000 = 758 million USD
0.082 ∗ 0.4648 ∗ 20.67 ∗ 578000000 = 455 million USD
−120 million USD
= 1, 093 billion USD.
High estimate:
Our high estimate uses the estimate on the dummy on war area risk from Column
(4) Table 2.5 to derive the costs of piracy. That estimate suggests that piracy leads to
an increase of charter rates by 12.3%.
Gulf of Aden:
0.123 ∗ 0.4726 ∗ 30.3 ∗ 646064000 = 1, 137 million USD
−120 million USD
= 1017 million USD
Gulf of Aden+Indian Ocean: we use the same coefficient but apply it to the Indian
Ocean Trade Thus:
0.123 ∗ 0.4726 ∗ 30.3 ∗ 646064000 = 1, 137 million USD
0.123 ∗ 0.4648 ∗ 20.67 ∗ 578000000 = 683 million USD
−120 million USD
= 1, 700 billion USD.
Column (2) in Table 2.7 applies the additional factor derived in equation (2.11). De-
tails are in the following section.
of Korea, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, United Rep. of Tanzania, Viet Nam.
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Quantity Effects
Formula for L2 (∆) The general formula for the welfare loss can be written
V (ψ+ ν [c + t])−V (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) = Q (t)
' Q (∆) + Q′ (∆) [t− ∆] + 1
2
Q′′ (∆) [t− ∆]2 .
Note that
V (ψ+ ν [c + t]) = U
(
Xˆ (ψ+ ν [c + t])
)− Xˆ (ψ+ ν [c + t]) [ψ+ ν [c + t]] .
When we derive the partial derivative using
∂U
(
Xˆ (ψ+ ν [c + t])
)
∂Xˆ (ψ+ ν [c + t])
= ψ+ ν [c + t]
we find that
Q′ (t) = −vXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + t]) .
Now observe that:
Q (∆) = 0
Q′ (∆) = −νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆])
Q′′ (∆) = −ν2Xˆ′ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆])
We assume that the demand function has a constant price elasticity η so that we can
write
Xˆ (ψ+ ν [c + t]) = (ψ+ ν [c + t])−η .
and inserting all this we get an approximation of the welfare loss
Q (∆) + Q′ (∆) [t− ∆] + 1
2
Q′′ (∆) [t− ∆]2
= νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) [∆− t]− 1
2
ν2Xˆ′ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) [t− ∆]2
= νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) [∆− t]
[
1+
1
2
η
ν (∆− t)
ψ+ ν [c + t]
]
= νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) [∆− t]
[
1+
1
2
ηˆ
∆− t
c + ∆
]
≥ νXˆ (ψ+ ν [c + ∆]) [∆− τ (∆)]
[
1+
1
2
∆− τ (∆)
c + ∆
ηˆ
]
where we have replaced the trade elasticity with regard to price η (which we do not
have) with the trade elasticity with regard to transport costs, ηˆ (available from the
trade literature). Observe that the trade elasticity with respect to transport costs, ηˆ,
in terms of our model is
ηˆ =
∂ log X
∂ log φ
= η
φ
ψ+ φ
143
so that, using the definition of φ above, we get
η = ηˆ
ψ+ ν [c + ∆]
ν [c + ∆]
.
The last approximation uses the fact that τ (∆) ≤ t. So this gives a lower bound on
the welfare loss and depends on observables. Comparing this to equation (2.10) we
have that
L2 (∆) ' L1 (∆)
[
1+
1
2
∆− τ (∆)
c + ∆
ηˆ
]
.
Implementation In the low estimate the relative increase in transport costs due to
piracy is
∆
c + ∆
= 0.082
while in the high estimate it is
∆
c + ∆
= 0.123.
We use four different estimates for 1− τ(∆)∆ . The low Gulf of Aden estimate is
1− τ (∆)
∆
= 1− 120 million USD
758 million USD
= 0.84
the other estimates are calculated analogously.
There are several possible numbers we could use for ηˆ. Latest results from Feyrer
(2009) who uses the Suez Canal closure as a shock to distance and calculates the
effects on trade from distance costs suggests that an estimate between 0.2 and 0.5 for
ηˆ is realistic. The estimate found in a meta study in Disdier (2008) is 0.9. Given the
similarity of the Feyrer study we use the estimate of 0.5 in column 2. This leads to an
adjustment of
L2 (∆) = L1 (∆)×
[
1+
1
2
(
1− τ (∆)
∆
)
∆
c + ∆
ηˆ
]
= L1 (∆)× 1.017
for the low estimate in the Gulf of Aden. This is applied to the whole welfare loss
caused by price increases. For the low estimate in the Gulf of Aden this is
(758 million USD− 120 million USD)× 1.017 = 649 million USD.
Insurance Averaging
The general average insurance rules imply that the cost of piracy is borne by both
cargo owners as well as by the ship owners. It is the ship owners, who in turn pass
on this cost to the chartering parties in form of higher chartering rates. This is what
we estimate in our main specification. However due to the general average principle,
this effect is underestimated, since the ship owner’s insurer pays only a share of the
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piracy cost in cases in which the ship is laden. In this Appendix we describe at how
we arrive at the scaling factor ζ > 1 used in the welfare estimates shown in the main
text (Table 2.7).
The first step is to estimate the market value of the vessels in our dataset. Second,
we estimate the values of the cargo that these ships transport. The ratio of the values
is indicative for general average rules. In a third step, we estimate the share of ballast
journeys, in order to correct for the fact that, during these journeys, the ship owner
bears the entire cost of piracy.
From weekly market reports of the ship brokerage firm Intermodial75, we ob-
tained recorded sales of dry bulk vessels on the second hand market for 2010. In
total, there were 402 recorded transactions. For a subset of 379 of these transactions,
we know the age of the ship, the vessel’s deadweight tonnage and the value of the
transaction. Using these data on transactions, we can estimate the value of the ships
2010 in our dataset for the year. These estimates use two common controls in both
data-sets: the age of ship and its tonnage to carry out this matching. Clearly, there
are many more controls that correlate with the price that a vessel achieves on the
market. However, we abstract from these due to data limitations. Either way, our
estimated values are likely constitute a lower bound on a ship’s value due to the
standard adverse selection problem.
Using the 379 recorded sales, we estimate a regression of the form:
ShipPricel = β0 + β1Agel + β2DWTl + el
Using the estimated coefficients, we generate fitted values for our main sample for
the ships in 2010. The estimated values for vessels travelling through the Suez Canal
in our sample are as follows:
Quartile Value (USD)
Lower Quartile 26,791,260
Median 32,637,280
Upper Quartile 37,281,280
This compares well with industry-wide figures published by ship brokerage firms.
For 2010, Intermodal for example reports that a five year old Panamax vessel with
75,000 tons deadweight was estimated to be worth 39 Million USD. In our dataset,
the median ship on the Aden route is 7 years old, i.e. slightly older and with 73,726
tons deadweight slightly smaller. This makes us confident that the fitted ship values
are indeed reasonably realistic for 2010.
We estimate the value of the cargo carried by the dry bulk ships in our sample
using Suez Canal traffic statistics. These provide a very crude disaggregation into the
different types and quantities of goods carried through the Suez Canal. We try to link
this disaggregation with average commodity price data for the year 2010 obtained
75These reports can be accessed on http://www.goo.gl/RmUZU.
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from the IMF and the World Bank. Any matching to these average commodity values
is quite crude since the Suez authorities, for example, do not decompose such broad
categories as cereals, ores and metals, coal and coke or oil seeds.76 With this caveat,
we match to our data using four main commodity prices: coal, iron ore, soybean and
wheat. Using the traffic statistics on these four broad commodities, we compute the
value of the average ton of these commodities passing through the Suez canal.
Using this, we estimate the value of the average ton of dry bulk carried through
the Suez Canal. Using the median ship in our dataset, this allows us to estimate
the value of cargo. We compute lower- and upper-bound values for these estimates
using plain commodity prices for coal and wheat. This yields the following range of
estimates:
Cargo type Price (USD) per Ton Cargo Value (USD)
(Low value) Coal cargo 106.03 7,451,675.41
Average Suez dry bulk cargo 165.97 11,663,908.20
(High value) Wheat 223.67 15,719,087.90
Using these estimates, we can compute the ratio of the cargo to ship value. However,
using this share as a scaling factor ζ, without correcting for the share of ballast (i.e.
without cargo) journeys, we are likely to underestimate the general average share
paid by the ship owner. Using Suez canal traffic data, we find that, in 2010, 25.7% of
the dry bulk carrier transits were ballast journeys. Hence, the general average share
of the ship owner is:
ζ = (1− b)(1− cargo/ship) + b
where b is the share of the journey in ballast.
Using this, we arrive at the following general average shares for our median ship
value:
Cargo type Cargo-to-ship value ζ
Average Suez dry bulk cargo 0.35738 0.7346
The value of ζ from this table is used in the Table 2.7 to estimate the welfare loss.
This implies that L1 (∆) can underestimate the welfare cost by a factor of up to
2.13. Combined with our high estimate this would imply an increase in chartering
cost by 27%. However, for reasons laid out in section 2.1.3 this is likely to be an upper
76These four commodities make up at least 48.3 % of all commodities in the Suez traffic that can
broadly be classified as (dry) bulk cargo.
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bound. The low estimate for Aden, for example, can then be calculated as
758 million USD × 2.13
−120 million USD
= 1, 495 billion USD.
This is the figure reported in column (3), Table 2.7.
2.A.5 Cost of Military Operations
While somewhat sketchy, our estimates in Table 2.7 can be augmented to include the
costs of naval operations which try to limit pirate activities. The costs of Atalanta for
the European Union in 2009 was 11 million USD.77 To this we need to add the costs
of the EU member countries. The only available estimates indicate that additional
operational costs for the German military involvement (1 vessel, 300 personal) in
2010 was around 60 million USD.78 Since the overall size of the Atalanta mission is
between 4 and 7 vessels this indicates total costs of about 340 million USD for the
Atalanta mission.
In addition to Atalanta there are two more operations which are, at least partially,
occupied with preventing piracy attacks: NATO’s Ocean Shield and the Combined
Force 151. Causality from piracy to the presence of some of the military forces in the
Arabian sea is harder to establish. For example, the Combined Force 151 includes
two US aircraft carriers stationed there.
77See http://www.goo.gl/hrqPA, accessed on 10.04.2012.
78Deutscher Bundestag Drucksache 17/179. Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte
an der EU-geführten Operation Atalanta zur Bekämpfung der Piraterie vor der Küste Somalias.
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Chapter 3
Group Lending Without Joint
Liability
While joint liability lending by microfinance institutions (MFIs) continues to attract
attention as a key vehicle of lending to the poor, recently some MFIs have moved away
from explicit joint liability towards individual lending. The most prominent such
institutions are Grameen Bank of Bangladesh and BancoSol of Bolivia.1 However,
interestingly, Grameen and others have chosen to retain the regular group meetings
that traditionally went hand-in-hand with joint liability lending.
Now it should be pointed out that in the absence of good panel data on lending
methods it cannot be conclusively said that there has been a significant overall decline
in joint liability among MFIs worldwide just on the basis of various anecdotes about
a handful of high-profile MFIs. Indeed, existing evidence suggests that joint liability
continues to be widely used. For example, de Quidt et al. (2012) use a sample of
715 MFIs from the MIX Market (Microfinance Information Exchange) database for
2009, and estimate that 54% of loans are made under “solidarity group” lending as
opposed to “individual” lending.2
Nevertheless, these phenomena raise the question of the costs and benefits of us-
ing joint liability, and the choice between group loans with and without (explicit) joint
liability. Besley and Coate (1995) is one of the first papers to point out both benefits
and costs of joint liability: joint liability can increase repayment rates by inducing
borrowers to repay on behalf of their unsuccessful partners but there are also states
of the world where an individual borrower may default because of this burden, even
if she was willing to pay back her own loan. Using a limited enforcement or “ex-
1For a discussion of the reasons for the shift in Grameen Bank’s lending strategy, see Muhammad
Yunus’s article “Grameen Bank II: Lessons Learnt Over Quarter of A Century,” at http://www.grameen.
com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30&Itemid=0, accessed 18 December 2012.
2An earlier study Cull et al. (2009) puts this number at 51% using 2002/04 data involving 315 in-
stitutions. The year 2009 is one for which the largest cross-section of lending methodologies is avail-
able. Solidarity group loans defined by MIX as those for which “some aspect of loan consideration
depends on the group, including credit analysis, liability, guarantee, collateral, and loan size and con-
ditions.” Individual loans are “made to individuals, and any guarantee or collateral required comes
from that individual.” We excluded 154 “village banks” for which lending methodology is unclear. See
http://www.mixmarket.org/about/faqs/glossary.
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post moral hazard” framework introduced by Besley and Coate (1995) in the group
lending context, in this paper we study two issues raised by this apparent shift.
First, we analyze how by leveraging the borrowers social capital, individual lia-
bility lending (henceforth, IL) can mimic or even improve on the repayment perfor-
mance and borrower welfare of explicit joint liability (EJ). When this occurs, we term
it “implicit joint liability” (IJ). For this argument to work, there is no need for group
lending per se - borrowers can, in theory, sustain this without any explicit effort on
the part of the lender. Second, to understand better the logic of group lending, we in-
troduce a purely operational argument for its use under IL, namely, it simply reduce
the lender’s transactions costs, shifting the burden to the borrowers. This is valuable
because lower interest rates relax the borrowers’ repayment incentive constraints, in-
creasing repayment and welfare. We then show how this related to first issue: group
lending may contribute to the creation of social capital, and therefore, may induce
IJ.3
Next we carry out some simple simulation exercises using empirically estimated
parameters. The goal is to complement the theoretical analysis and to get a quan-
titative sense of the welfare effects as well as the relevant parameter thresholds that
determine which lending method is preferred. Our key findings are as follows. First,
in low social capital environments, EJ does quite well compared to IJ. For example,
when the standard deviation of project returns of 0.5, for social capital worth 10% of
the loan size, the welfare attainable under IJ is 32.4% lower compared to the welfare
under EJ. However, with social capital worth 50% of the loan size, the welfare attain-
able under EJ is 5% lower to the one attainable under IJ. Second, we find that the
interest rate, repayment rate and borrower welfare are all rather insensitive to social
capital under EJ, whereas in the case of IJ, they are all highly sensitive. This is what
we would expect, since the only sanction available under IJ is coming through social
capital. Third, when project returns are high variance, the welfare gains from higher
social capital are quite large under IJ, which is not the case under EJ. To illustrate
consider the case where project returns have a standard deviation of 0.5. If borrowers
share social capital worth 10% of the loan size, borrower welfare under IJ is 35.9%
lower than that of borrowers who share social capital worth 50% of the loan size.
Our analysis is motivated by two influential recent empirical studies. Giné and
Karlan (2011) found that removing the joint liability clause, but retaining the group
meetings, of a random subset of borrowing groups of Green Bank in the Philippines
had no meaningful effect on repayment rates. In our model, this outcome arises when
the newly individually liable groups have sufficient social capital to continue to assist
one another with repayments, as under EJ. Secondly, Feigenberg et al. (2011) ran-
domly varied the meeting frequency of individually liable borrowing groups of the
Village Welfare Society in India. They found that groups who met more frequently
3It could even be that without the group, borrowers would be less able to interact. Indeed, in some
conservative societies, social norms may prevent women from attending social gatherings (for instance
under the Purdah customs in some parts of India and the Middle East). Then externally mandated
borrowing groups can be a valuable vehicle for social interaction. See, for instance Sanyal (2009),
Anderson et al. (2002), Kabeer (2005).
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had subsequently higher repayment rates. In particular, they present evidence sug-
gesting that this is due to improved informal insurance among these groups due to
higher social capital. Both Giné and Karlan (2011) and Feigenberg et al. (2011) find
evidence for intra-group transfers to help a borrower repay her loan even without
explicit joint liability.4 We argue that more frequent group meetings give borrowers a
stronger incentive to build social capital, and that this is then leveraged to generate IJ.
Grameen Bank states that Grameen II is designed to “lean on solidarity groups: small
informal groups consisting of co-opted members coming from the same background
and trusting each other.”5 The emphasis on trust suggests that the group continues
to play an important role in Grameen’s lending methodology beyond simply moder-
ating the lender’s transaction costs.
The main conclusions of our analysis is that it is premature to write off EJ as a
valuable contractual tool and group lending without (explicit) joint liability may still
harness some of the benefits of joint liability via implicit joint liability. Thus far
we have one high quality randomized study of contractual form (Giné and Karlan
(2011)) in which EJ seems not to play an important role. However in our theoretical
analysis there are always parameter regions over which EJ is the most efficient of the
simple contracts we analyze. A recent randomized control trial by Attanasio et al.
(2011) finds stronger consumption and business creation impacts under EJ (albeit no
significant difference in repayment rates - note that in their context mandatory group
meetings are not used under either IL or EJ). Carpena et al. (2010) analyze an episode
in which a lender switched from IL to EJ and found a significant improvement in
repayment performance. For the same reasons, Banerjee (2012) stresses the need for
more empirical work in the vein of Giné and Karlan (2011) before concluding that EJ
is no longer relevant.
It is instructive to briefly look at the types of contracts currently used by MFIs.
As mentioned, from the MIX dataset, 54% of borrowers were borrowing under what
are classified as solidarity group loans. Although the solidarity group loans might
not correspond exactly to pure EJ, this is the best measure we have. Our concept of
IJ is most relevant to the “individual” category; the MIX Market notes that “loans
based on consideration of the sole borrower, but disbursed through and recollected
from group mechanisms, are still considered individual loans.” A notable example
is the Indian MFI Bandhan, which is one of the top MFIs in India, and is listed
as having 3.6m outstanding loans in 2011, all classified as “individual”. Bandhan
does not use joint liability but disburses the majority of its loans through borrowing
groups. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the method of disbursement of the
4In table IX of Giné and Karlan (2011) we see that conversion to individual liability caused a de-
crease, significant at 10%, in side-loans between borrowers, although no significant effect on borrowers
“voluntarily [helping others] repay loans”. Note that one challenge of interpreting these results in the
light of our analysis is that group composition changed in Giné and Karlan (2011)’s experiment, while
our model analyzes contract choice for a given level of social capital. Converted centers tended to take
in members that were less well-known by existing members, presumably because individual liability
made doing so less risky.
5See http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=33&Itemid=
107, accessed 28th September, 2012.
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full sample of loans classified as individual, but it seems likely that many institutions
are indeed using groups to disburse individual loans. This paper highlights how
this may improve welfare through two channels: first of all, borrowers with sufficient
social capital can mutually insure one another and secondly, attending costly group
meetings may give borrowers incentives to invest in social capital.
Much of the existing theoretical work has sought to show how explicit joint liabil-
ity improves repayment rates (see Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) for a review). In the
model of Besley and Coate (1995), joint liability gives borrowers an incentive to repay
on behalf of their partner when the partner is unable to repay her own loan. If bor-
rowers can threaten social sanctions against one another, this effect is strengthened
further. However, there are two problems with EJ. Firstly, since repaying on behalf
of a partner will be costly, incentive compatibility requires the lender to use large
sanctions and/or charge lower interest rates, relative to individual liability.6 Sec-
ondly, when a borrower is unsuccessful, sometimes EJ induces the successful partner
to bail them out, but sometimes it has a perverse effect, inducing them to default
completely, while under IL they would have repaid. Rai and Sjöström (2004) and
Bhole and Ogden (2010) approach these issues from a mechanism design perspective
- designing cross-reporting mechanisms or stochastic dynamic incentives that min-
imize the sanctions used by the lender. Baland et al. (2010) provide an alternative
explanation of the apparent trend away from what we call EJ towards IL, based on
loan size. They find that the largest loan offered under IL cannot be supported under
joint liability and that the benefits of the latter are increasing in borrower wealth. We
do not focus on this angle but briefly touch on the issue of loan size in section 3.1.
Allen (2012) shows how partial EJ, whereby borrowers are liable only for a fraction of
their partner’s repayment, can improve repayment performance by optimally trading
off risk-sharing with the perverse effect on strategic default. In contrast, we focus on
how simple group lending with no joint liability can achieve some of these effects, as
side-contracting by the borrowers can substitute for the lender’s enforcement mech-
anism.
Our model is also related to Rai and Sjöström (2010). In that paper, borrowers
are assumed to have sufficient social capital to support incentive-compatible loan
guarantees through a side-contract between borrowers, provided they have sufficient
information to enforce such side contracts. The role of groups is to provide publicly
observable repayment so as to enable efficient side-contracting. In contrast, in our
setting, repayment behavior is common knowledge among the borrowers, and it is
the amount of social capital that is key. Groups play a role that depends on meeting
costs introduced in the next two sections. Secondly, in our model, borrowers are
better off when they guarantee one another as their probability of contract renewal is
higher. In Rai and Sjöström (2010) this is not the case as the lender is simply assumed
to use a punishment that simply imposes a utility cost on the borrowers in case of
6This issue is the focus of the analysis in Rai and Sjöström (2010). Because of this, de Quidt et al.
(2012) show that with a for-profit monopolist lender borrowers are better off under EJ than IL lending,
because the lender must typically charge lower interest rates under EJ.
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default. In fact, the optimal contract delivers the same borrower welfare whether they
guarantee one another or not.
Other than the above mentioned papers, our paper is also broadly related to the
theoretical literature in microfinance that have emerged in the light of the Grameen
Bank of Bangladesh abandoning explicit joint liability and switching to the Grameen
II model, focusing on aspects other than joint liability, such as sequential lending
(e.g., Chowdhury (2005)), frequent repayment (Jain and Mansuri (2003), Fischer and
Ghatak (2010)), exploring more general mechanisms than joint liability (e.g., Laffont
and Rey (2003)), and exploring market and general equilibrium (Ahlin and Jiang
(2008); ? and de Quidt et al. (2012)).
The paper is structured as follows: in section 3.1 we present the basic model where
in principle lending may take place with or without group meetings. We introduce
our concept of implicit joint liability and show when it will occur and be welfare
improving. Section 3.2 formalizes a key transaction cost in group and individual
lending - the time spent attending repayment meetings. Section 3.3 then shows how
meeting costs can give borrowers incentives to invest in social capital, and shows
when this is welfare improving. Section 3.4 presents results of a simulation of the
core model, while section 3.5 summarises the results and concludes.
3.1 Model
We model a lending environment characterized by costly state verification and lim-
ited liability. Borrowers are risk neutral, have zero outside option, no capital and
limited liability. They have access to a stochastic production technology that requires
1 unit of capital per period with expected output R¯, and therefore must borrow 1
per period to invest (we assume no savings for simplicity). There are three possi-
ble output realizations, R ∈ {Rh, Rm, 0}, Rh ≥ Rm > 0 which occur with positive
probabilities ph, pm and 1− ph − pm respectively. We define the following:
p ≡ ph + pm
4 ≡ ph − pm
R¯ ≡ phRh + pmRm.
We will refer to p as the probability of “success”, and R¯ as expected output.
We assume that output is not observable to the lender and hence the only relevant
state variable from his perspective is whether or not a loan is repaid. Since output
is non-contractible, the lender uses dynamic repayment incentives, as in Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990). We assume that if a borrower’s loan contract is terminated fol-
lowing a default, she can never borrow again. Under individual liability (IL), a bor-
rower’s contract is renewed if she repays and terminated otherwise. Under explicit
joint liability (EJ), both contracts are renewed if and only if both loans are repaid.
Now we introduce the notion of social capital used in the paper. We assume that
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pairs of individuals in the village share some pair-specific social capital worth S in
discounted lifetime utility, that either can credibly threaten to destroy. In other words,
a friendship yields lifetime utility S to each person. If the social capital is destroyed
it is lost forever. We assume that each individual has a very large number of friends,
each worth S. Thus each friendship that breaks up represents a loss of size S.7
We assume a single lender with opportunity cost of funds equal to ρ > 1. In the
first period, the lender enters the community, observes S and commits to a contract
to all potential borrowers. The contract specifies a gross interest rate, r and EJ or IL.
We assume the lender to be a non-profit who offers the borrower welfare maximizing
contract, subject to a zero-profit constraint.8
In this section we ignore the role of groups altogether - being in a group or not
has no effect on the information or cost structure faced by borrowers and lenders. Al-
though borrower output is unobservable to the lender, we assume it is observable to
other borrowers. As a result, they are able to write informal side contracts to guaran-
tee one another’s repayments, conditional on the output realizations. For simplicity,
in the theoretical analysis we assume such arrangements are formed between pairs
of borrowers.9
EJ borrowers will naturally side contract with their partner, with whom they are
already bound by the EJ clause. Specifically, we assume that once the loan contract
has been fixed, pairs of borrowers can agree a “repayment rule” which specifies each
member’s repayment in each possible state Y ∈ {Rh, Rm, 0} × {Rh, Rm, 0}. Then in
each period, they observe the state and make their repayments in a simultaneous-
move “repayment game”. Deviations from the agreed repayment rule are punished
by a social sanction: destruction of S. The repayment rule, social sanction and liability
structure of the borrowing contract thus determine the payoffs of the repayment game
and beliefs about the other borrower’s strategy. To summarize, once the lender has
entered and committed to the contract, the timings each period are:
1. Borrowers form pairs, and agree on a repayment rule.
2. Loans are disbursed, borrowers observe the state and simultaneously make re-
payments (the repayment game).
3. Conditional on repayments, contracts are renewed or terminated and social
7One way to conceptualize S is as the net present value of lifetime payoffs in a repeated “social
game” played alongside the borrowing relationship, similar to the multi-market contact literature, such
as Spagnolo (1999), who models agents interacting simultaneously in a social and business context,
using one to support cooperation in the other. As an illustration, suppose the borrowers play the
following “coordination” stage-game each period: if both play A, both receive s. If one plays A and
the other, B, both receive −1. If both play B, both receive 0. Clearly, both (A, A) and (B, B) are Nash
equilibria in the stage-game. If players expect to play (A, A) forever, their expected payoff is S ≡ s1−δ .
However, switching to (B, B) forever as a social sanction is always a credible threat, and can be used to
support the repayment rule.
8We abstract from other organizational issues related to non-profits, see e.g. Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001).
9This could be for example because there are two types of investment project available and returns
within a project type are perfectly correlated, such that side-contracting with another borrower who has
the same project type yields no benefit. In the simulations we extend the analysis to larger groups.
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sanctions carried out.
4. If an IL borrower’s partner was terminated but she repaid, she rematches with
a new partner.
We restrict attention to repayment rules that are stationary (depending only on the
state) and symmetric (do not depend on the identity of the borrower). This enables
us to focus on the stationary value function of a representative borrower. Stationarity
also rules out repayment rules that depend on repayment histories, such as reciprocal
arrangements. In addition, we assume that the borrowers choose the repayment rule
to maximize joint welfare. Welfare maximization implies that social sanctions are
never used on the equilibrium path, since joint surplus would be increased by an
alternative repayment rule that did not punish this specific deviation.
Given repayment probability pi, the lender’s profits are:
Π = pir− ρ
and therefore the zero-profit interest rate is:
rˆ ≡ ρ
pi
. (3.1)
By symmetry, each borrower i pays pir = ρ per period in expectation.
There are two interesting cases that arise endogenously and determine the feasi-
bility of borrowers guaranteeing one another’s loans. In Case A Rm ≥ 2r and hence
a successful borrower can always afford to repay both loans. In Case B we have
Rh ≥ 2r > Rm ≥ r, thus it is not feasible for a borrower with output Rm to repay both
loans. Case B will turn out to be the more interesting case for our analysis, since in
this case there is a cost to using joint liability lending. Specifically there are states of
the world (when one borrower has zero output and the other has Rm) in which under
joint liability both borrowers will default, since it is not feasible to repay both loans
and they will therefore be punished whether or not the successful partner repays her
loan. Meanwhile under individual liability, the successful partner is able to repay her
loan and will not be punished if she does so.
Consider Case A. If borrowers agree to guarantee one another’s loans, they will
repay in every state except (0, 0), so the repayment probability is pi = 1− (1− p)2 =
p(2− p), in which case rˆ = ρp(2−p) . Therefore Case A applies if Rm ≥ 2ρp(2−p) , i.e. when
the successful partner can afford to repay both loans even if her income is only Rm.
If this condition does not hold, then it will not be feasible for the successful borrower
to help her partner in this state of the world, and therefore Case B applies.
Definition 1 Case A applies when Rm ≥ 2ρp(2−p) . Case B applies when Rm < 2ρp(2−p) .
Suppose that borrowers only repay when both are successful, i.e. when both have
at least Rm, which occurs with probability p2. If this is the equilibrium repayment
rate, then rˆ = ρp2 . We make a simple parameter assumption that ensures that this will
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be the highest possible equilibrium interest rate (lowest possible repayment rate), by
ensuring that even with income Rm, borrowers can afford to repay
ρ
p2 .
Assumption 1 Rm ≥ ρp2 .
We also assume that Rh is sufficiently large that a borrower with Rh could afford
to repay both loans even at interest rate rˆ = ρp2 . Since this is the highest possible equi-
librium interest rate, this implies that Rh is always sufficiently large for a borrower to
repay both loans.
Assumption 2 Rh ≥ 2 ρp2 .
To summarize, together these assumptions guarantee that Rm ≥ r and Rh ≥ 2r on
the equilibrium path.
We can now write down the value function V for the representative borrower,
which represents the utility from access to credit. Suppose that borrower i’s loan is
repaid with some probability pi. Since the repayment rule is assumed to maximize
joint welfare, it follows that borrowers’s loans are only repaid when repayment leads
to the loan contracts being renewed, and therefore the representative borrower’s con-
tract is also renewed with probability pi. Since the lender charges zero profit interest
rate rˆ = ρpi , the borrower repays pirˆ = ρ in expectation. Hence, her welfare is:
V = R¯− ρ+ δpiV
=
R¯− ρ
1− δpi . (3.2)
For any borrower to be willing to repay her loan, it must be that the value of
access to future loans exceeds the interest rate, or δV ≥ r. If this condition does not
hold, all borrowers will default immediately. We refer to this condition as Incentive
Condition 1 (IC1), and it must hold under any equilibrium contract.
Provided IC1 is satisfied, borrower welfare is maximized by achieving the highest
repayment rate possible. To see this, suppose the lender charges some interest rate r.
Then V = R¯−pir1−δpi . It can be verified that this is increasing in pi if and only if IC1 holds.
Therefore, in the subsequent discussion the ranking of welfare will be equivalent to
the ranking in terms of the repayment probability.
Using (3.2) and rˆ = ρpi we can derive the equilibrium IC1 explicitly:
ρ ≤ δpiR¯. (IC1)
By Assumption 1, the lowest possible equilibrium repayment probability pi is
equal to p2. For the theoretical analysis we make the following parameter assumption
that ensures IC1 is satisfied in equilibrium:
Assumption 3 δp2R¯ > ρ.
Now that the model is set up we analyze the choice of contract type.
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3.1.1 Individual Liability
Suppose first of all that the borrower does not reach a repayment guarantee arrange-
ment with a partner. Since IC1 is satisfied, the borrower will repay her own loan
whenever she is successful, so her repayment probability is p. Her utility V is then
equal to R¯−ρ1−δp .
Now we consider when pairs of IL borrowers will agree a repayment guarantee
arrangement. If this occurs, we term it implicit joint liability (IJ).
Since IC1 holds, the borrowers want to agree a repayment rule that maximizes
their repayment probability. There are many possible such rules that can achieve the
same repayment rate, so for simplicity we focus on the most intuitive one, whereby
borrowers agree to repay their own loan whenever they are successful, and also repay
their unsuccessful partner’s loan if possible.10
We already know that repayment of the borrower’s own loan is incentive compat-
ible by IC1. For it to be incentive compatible for her to repay on behalf of her partner
as well, it must be that social sanction outweighs the cost of the extra repayment, i.e.
r ≤ δS. This gives us a constraint which we term IJ Incentive Constraint 2, or IJ IC2.
For equilibrium interest rate rˆ = ρ
pi I J
IJ IC2 reduces to:
ρ ≤ δpi I JS. (IJ IC2)
There is a threshold value of S, SˆI J , such that IJ IC2 holds for S ≥ SˆI J :
SˆI Jk ≡
ρ
δpi I Jk
, k ∈ {A, B},
where k denotes the relevant case. When S ≥ SˆI J , it is feasible and incentive compat-
ible for borrowers to guarantee one another’s loans, and therefore they will do so as
this increases the repayment probability and thus joint welfare. Therefore IJ applies
for S ≥ SˆI J .
Next we work out the equilibrium repayment probabilities and interest rates in
cases A and B respectively. Assume S ≥ SˆI J . In Case A, a successful borrower
can always afford to repay both loans, so both loans are repaid with probability
pi I JA ≡ 1− (1− p)2 = p(2− p). In Case B, both loans are repaid whenever both are
successful, and in states (Rh, 0), (0, Rh). In state (Rm, 0), borrower 1 cannot afford to
repay borrower 2’s loan, so she repays her own loan, while borrower 2 defaults and
is replaced in the next period with a new partner. Therefore pi I JB ≡ p2 + 2ph(1− p) +
pm(1− p) = p + ph(1− p). Notice that both pi I JA and pi I JB are greater than p.
The lender observes whether Case A or Case B applies, and the value of S in the
community, and offers an individual liability contract at the appropriate zero profit
interest rate. Equilibrium borrower welfare under individual liability is equal to:
10An example of an alternative, less intuitive rule that can sometimes achieve the same repayment
rate but cannot do better is where borrowers agree to repay their partner’s loan, and then repay their
own as well if they can afford to do so.
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V ILk (S) =

R¯−ρ
1−δp S < Sˆ
I J
k
R¯−ρ
1−δpi I Jk
S ≥ SˆI Jk
, k ∈ {A, B}.
It is straightforward to see that as S switches from less than SˆI Jk to greater than or
equal to it, V ILk (S) goes up as pi
I J
k > p.
3.1.2 Explicit Joint Liability
Now we analyze EJ contracts. Recall that under EJ, a pair of borrowers are offered a
contract such that unless both loans are repaid, both partners lose access to credit in
the future. The advantage of this contractual form is that it gives additional incentives
to the borrowers to guarantee one another’s loans. However, the disadvantage is that
when borrower i is successful and j is unsuccessful, there may be states in which
borrower i would repay were she under individual liability, but she will default under
joint liability because she is either unwilling or unable to repay both loans.
The borrowers will agree a repayment rule, just as under IJ. Since this will be
chosen to maximize joint welfare, it will only ever involve either both loans being
repaid or both defaulting, due to the joint liability clause that gives no incentive to
repay only one loan. Subject to this, because IC1 holds, joint welfare is maximized by
ensuring both loans are repaid as frequently as possible.
IC1 implies that when both borrowers are successful, they will both be willing
to repay their own loans. We therefore need to consider i’s incentive to repay both
loans when j is unsuccessful. Borrower i will be willing to make this loan guarantee
payment provided the threat of termination of her contract, plus the social sanction
for failing to do so, exceeds the cost of repaying two loans. Formally, this requires
2r ≤ δ(VEJ + S). We refer to this condition as EJ IC2. Rearranging, and substituting
for rˆ = ρ
piEJ
, we obtain:
ρ ≤ δpi
EJ [R¯ + (1− δpiEJ)S]
2− δpiEJ . (EJ IC2)
We can derive a threshold, SˆEJ , such that EJ IC2 is satisfied for S ≥ SˆEJ :
SˆEJk ≡ max
{
0,
ρ
δpiEJk
− δpi
EJ
k R¯− ρ
δpiEJk (1− δpiEJk )
}
, k ∈ {A, B}
where as before, k denotes the relevant Case.
Note that SˆEJ can be equal to zero. This corresponds to the basic case in Besley and
Coate (1995) where borrowers can be induced to guarantee one another even without
any social capital. This relies on the lender’s use of joint liability to give borrowers
incentives to help one another, and is not possible under individual liability.
Provided S ≥ SˆEJ , borrowers are willing to guarantee one another’s repayments.
The repayment rule will then specify that i repays on j’s behalf whenever i can afford
to and j is unsuccessful. If S < SˆEJ , borrowers will not guarantee one another. They
will therefore only repay when both are successful.
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We now derive the equilibrium repayment probability under each Case. Firstly, if
S < SˆEJ , borrowers repay only when both are successful, so piEJ = p2 in either Case.
Now suppose S ≥ SˆEJ . In Case A, both loans can be repaid whenever at least one
borrower earns at least Rm. Thus the repayment probability is pi
EJ
A = p(2− p). In
Case B, Rm is not sufficient to repay both loans. Therefore both loans are repaid in all
states except (0, 0), (Rm, 0), (0, Rm). In these three states both borrowers default. The
repayment probability is therefore piEJB = p
2 + 2ph(1− p) = p +4(1− p).
Borrower welfare is:
VEJk (S) =

R¯−ρ
1−δp2 S < Sˆ
EJ
k
R¯−ρ
1−δpiEJk
S ≥ SˆEJk
, k ∈ {A, B}.
Note that SˆEJA ≤ SˆEJB . This is because the interest rate is lower in Case A, and V
is higher (due to the higher renewal probability), so the threat of termination is more
potent.
Now that we have derived the equilibrium contracts assuming either IL or EJ, we
turn to analyzing the lender’s choice of contractual form in equilibrium, which will
depend crucially on the borrowers’ ability to guarantee one another’s loans.
Let us define V(S) ≡ max{VEJ(S), V IL(S)} as the maximum borrower welfare
from access to credit. Observe that the repayment probability and borrower welfare
from access to credit, V(S), are stepwise increasing in S.
3.1.3 Comparing contracts
In this section we compare borrower welfare under each contractual form. We have
seen that EJ has the advantage that it may be able to induce borrowers to guarantee
one another even when they have no social capital. However, in Case B it has a
perverse effect: in some states of the world borrowers will default when they would
have repaid under IL.
This is most acute when pm > ph. Then pi
EJ
B = p +4(ph − pm) < p. Therefore in
Case B, EJ actually performs worse than IL for all levels of social capital - the perverse
effect dominates. Thus for Case B, EJ would never be offered.
We have already derived thresholds for S, SˆI J and SˆEJ , above which borrowers
will guarantee one another’s loans under individual and joint liability respectively.
The lender’s choice of contract will depend on the borrowers ability to do so, so first
we derive a lemma that orders these thresholds in Case A and Case B.
Lemma 1
1. SˆI JA > Sˆ
EJ
A .
2. Suppose ph ≥ pm. Then SˆI JB > SˆEJB .
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Proof. See appendix.
Lemma 1 shows that supporting a loan guarantee arrangement requires more
social capital under IL than under EJ. The reason for this is that the lender’s sanction
under EJ is a substitute for social capital in providing incentives to borrowers to
guarantee one another.11
The lender is a non-profit who offers the borrower welfare-maximizing contract.
Therefore he offers IL if VEJ(S) ≤ V IL(S) and EJ otherwise. This will depend on the
Case (A or B), the sign of 4, and S. We summarize the key result of this section as:
Proposition 1 The contracts offered in equilibrium are as follows:
Case A: IL is offered at rˆ = ρp for S < Sˆ
EJ
A , otherwise EJ is offered at r =
ρ
piEJA
.
Case B, 4 > 0: IL is offered at rˆ = ρp for S < SˆEJA , EJ is offered at rˆ = ρpiEJB for S ∈
[SˆEJB , Sˆ
I J
B ), IL is offered at rˆ =
ρ
pi I JB
for S ≥ SˆI JB .
Case B, 4 ≤ 0: IL is offered at rˆ = ρp for S < SˆI JB , IL is offered at rˆ = ρpi I JB otherwise.
Whenever EJ is offered borrowers guarantee one another’s repayments. Whenever IL is
offered and S ≥ SˆI J borrowers guarantee one another’s repayments.
Proof. See appendix.
The result is summarized in Table 3.1, which gives the equilibrium contract and
repayment probability pi in alternate rows. Borrower welfare is not shown, but is
easily computed as V = pR−ρ1−δpi , is strictly increasing in pi.
Case A Case B, 4 > 0 Case B, 4 ≤ 0
S < SˆEJ
IL (no IJ) IL (no IJ)
p p IL (no IJ)
S ∈ [SˆEJ , SˆI J) EJ EJ pp(2− p) p +4(1− p)
S ≥ SˆI J EJ IL (with IJ) IL (with IJ)p(2− p) p + ph(1− p) p + ph(1− p)
Table 3.1: Equilibrium contracts and repayment probabilities
This table shows that there are clear trade-offs in the contractual choice. In Case
A, IJ has no advantage over EJ because in both cases borrowers repay both loans
whenever successful. Therefore IL is offered for low S, and EJ for high S. In Case B
when4 ≤ 0, we have already remarked that EJ is always dominated by IL. Therefore
basic IL is offered for low S, and when S is high enough, borrowers will begin to
11A slight complication arises in the proof because in Case B the repayment probability is higher and
therefore the interest payment is lower under IJ. As a result, the size of the guarantee payment that
must be incentive compatible is actually smaller under IJ, but the net effect is still that borrowers are
more willing to guarantee one another under EJ.
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guarantee one another, leading to an increase in the repayment rate and a fall in the
equilibrium interest rate.
The most interesting case is Case B for 4 > 0. Here there is a clear progression
as S increases. For low S, borrowers cannot guarantee one another under either
contract, so basic IL is offered. For intermediate S, EJ can sustain a loan guarantee
arrangement but IL cannot, so EJ is offered. Finally for high S, borrowers are able to
guarantee one another under IL as well. Since this avoids the perverse effect of EJ,
the lender switches back to IL lending.
3.1.4 A remark on loan size
For simplicity, our core model assumes loans of a fixed size. However we can allow
for variable loan size as a simple extension. To keep things simple, we assume that
borrowers require a loan of size L. The relation between loan size and output is
linear, that is, with a loan of size L, output is LRh with probability ph, LRm with
probability pm, and 0 otherwise. Therefore we can simply scale R¯ and r by L, so
borrower welfare is now equal to LV. However, borrowers’ social capital is derived
from relationships external to the production function and therefore is assumed not
to depend on L. Thus for a given amount of social capital S, borrowers are less
willing to guarantee one another’s loans as the loan size increases.12 Thus we have
the following observation:
Observation 1 SˆEJ(L) and SˆI J(L) are increasing in loan size, L. For a given S borrowers
are less likely to guarantee one another’s repayments as loan sizes increase. The repayment
probability is thus decreasing in L.
Note that the region L(SˆI J − SˆEJ) is increasing in L. In particular, as L increases,
the region [0, SˆEJ) expands. Over this region, borrowers are receiving “basic” IL, and
not guaranteeing one another. Thus this result suggests a simple intuition for the
stylized fact that IL loans tend to be larger. When loan sizes are small, the borrowers’
social capital can be tapped to smooth out occasional small imbalances in income.
As loan sizes and incomes increase, this becomes less feasible. As borrowers become
unwilling to guarantee one another’s loans, EJ becomes unattractive as it induces the
borrowers to default unless both are successful.13
3.1.5 Discussion
Borrowers form partnerships that optimally leverage their social capital to maximize
their joint repayment probability. Thus when social capital is sufficiently high to
generate implicit joint liability, IL lending can dominate EJ: borrower i no longer
12Formally, the IJ IC2 is Lr ≤ δS and the EJ IC2 is Lr ≤ δ(LV + S). Both are tighter as L increases.
Replacing R¯ with LR¯, we observe that SˆEJ(L) = LSˆEJ and SˆI J(L) = LSˆI J .
13Baland et al. (2010) obtain a result that gives the same negative correlation between the use of IL
and loan size. Our above result is different in a nuanced way. In their model the poorest borrowers need
the largest loan. Hence, their model generates a positive correlation between loan size and poverty.
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defaults in state (Rm, 0). This does not however mean there is no role for EJ. In
particular, for intermediate levels of social capital, EJ can dominate IL - social capital
is high enough for repayment guarantees under EJ but not under IL. We analyze
borrower welfare under EJ and IL/IJ quantitatively in the simulations.
The results of Giné and Karlan (2011) are consistent with our Case A. Here, IL
and EJ lending can achieve the same repayment probability, provided S is sufficiently
high. This does not imply that those same borrowers would repay as frequently if
they were not able to side-contract. Giné and Karlan (2011) additionally find that
borrowers with weak social ties are more likely to default after switching to IL lend-
ing - this is consistent with these borrowers having SˆEJ ≤ S < SˆI J , so they are unable
to support implicit joint liability.
So far, we have ignored the use of groups for disbursal and repayment of loans.
However, it is frequently argued (see e.g. Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch
(2010)) that group meetings generate costs that differ from those under individual
repayment. In the next section we show that this may induce the lender to prefer one
or the other. We then proceed to show that by interacting with the benefits from social
capital, group meetings may induce the creation of social capital. This is consistent
with the results of a field experiment by Feigenberg et al. (2011).
3.2 Meeting Costs
In this section we lay out a simple model of loan repayment meeting costs. This
immediately suggests a motivation for the use of groups. Holding group repayment
meetings shifts the burden of meeting costs from the lender to the borrowers. This
enables the lender to reduce the interest rate, which in turn makes it easier for bor-
rowers to guarantee one another. Then in the next section we explore how the use of
groups might create social capital, and thus generate implicit joint liability.
Since we want to focus on the interplay between meeting costs and social capital
under individual liability, we assume that Case B applies and 4 ≤ 0. Therefore we
can ignore EJ and drop the A, B notation.
A common justification for the use of group meetings by lenders is that it mini-
mizes transaction costs. Meeting with several borrowers simultaneously is less time-
consuming than meeting with each individually. However, group meetings might be
costly for the borrowers, as they take longer and are less convenient than individual
meetings. We term IL lending to groups ILG and IL lending to individuals ILI.
We assume that loan repayment meetings have two components, each of which
takes a fixed amount of time. For simplicity, we assume that the value of time is the
same for borrowers and loan officers14 Also, for simplicity, we assume that the cost of
borrower time is non-monetary so that borrowers are able to attend the meeting even
if they have no income. However, more time spent in meetings by the loan officer
increases monetary lending costs, for example because more staff must be hired.
14This may not be too unrealistic. For example, the large Indian MFI, Bandhan, deliberately hires
loan officers from the communities that they lend to.
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Each meeting incurs a fixed and variable cost. The fixed cost includes travel to the
meeting location (which we assume to be the same for borrower and loan officer for
simplicity), setting up the meeting, any discussions or advice sessions that take place
at the meeting, reminding borrowers of the MFI’s policies, and so on. This costs each
borrower and the loan officer an amount of time worth γ f irrespective of the number
of borrowers in the group. Secondly there is a variable cost that depends on the
number of borrowers at the meeting. This time cost is worth γv per borrower in the
meeting. This covers tasks that must be carried out once for each borrower: collecting
and recording repayments and attendance, reporting back on productive activities,
rounding up missing borrowers, and so on. As with the fixed cost, each borrower
and the loan officer incurs the variable cost. We assume that for group loans, each
borrower also has to incur the cost having to sit through the one-to-one discussion
between the loan officer and the other borrower, i.e., in a two group setting, the total
variable cost per borrower is 2γv whereas under individual lending, it is γv.
Therefore, in a meeting with one borrower, the total cost incurred by the loan
officer is γ f + γv, and the total cost incurred by the borrower is the same, bringing
the aggregate total time cost of the meeting to 2γ f + 2γv. In a meeting with two
borrowers the loan officer incurs a cost of γ f + 2γv, and similarly for the borrowers.
Thus the aggregate cost in this case is 3γ f + 6γv. The lender’s cost of lending per loan
under ILI is ρ+ γ f + γv. Under ILG it is ρ+
γ f
2 + γv. Therefore the corresponding
zero-profit interest rates are rˆILI ≡ ρ+γ f+γvpi and rˆILG ≡
ρ+
γ f
2 +γv
pi .
Accounting for these costs, per-period expected utility for borrowers under ILI is
R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv). Under ILG, the per-period utility is R¯− ρ− 32 (γ f + 2γv).15
Of course, the first thing to check is whether one lending method is less costly
than the other in the absence of any loan guarantee arrangement between borrowers.
This is covered by the following observation:
Observation 2 Suppose S = 0. The lender uses ILG if and only if γv <
γ f
2 .
16
The intuition is straightforward. When γ fγv is large, i.e., fixed costs are important
relative variable costs (e.g., when a large part of repayment meetings is repetitious) it
is economical to hold group meetings. However, the more time is spent on individual
concerns, the more costly it is to the borrowers to have to attend repayment meetings
in groups because they have to sit through all the bilateral exchanges between another
borrower and the loan officer. Microfinance loans are typically highly standardized
and so γ fγv will be relatively large, which is consistent with the common usage of
group lending methods in microfinance.
Now consider borrowers’ incentives to guarantee one another’s loans. First we
observe that for a given γv,γ f , half of the aggregate meeting cost per borrower is
15We need to adapt Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 to reflect the additional costs. We assume Rm ≥
ρ+ 12 (γ f+2γv)
p2 , Rh ≥ 2
ρ+ 12 (γ f+2γv)
p2 , δp
2R¯−max
{
(1+ δp2)(γ f + γv),
(
1
2 + δp
2
)
(γ f + 2γv)
}
≥ ρ.
16Proof: S = 0 implies IJ is not possible so pi = p under ILI and ILG. The result then follows from
comparison of per-period borrower welfare.
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borne by the lender under ILI, while only a third is borne by the lender under ILG.
The lender passes on all costs through the interest rate, so inspecting the value func-
tions suggests that it is innocuous upon whom the cost of meetings falls. In fact this
is not the case. Consider once again IJ IC2: r ≤ δS. The only benefit a borrower
receives from bailing out her partner is the avoidance of a social sanction, while the
cost depends on the interest payment she must make. Therefore a lending arrange-
ment in which the lender bears a greater share of the costs, and thus must charge
a higher interest rate, tightens IJ IC2. This gives us the next proposition, which is
straightforward:
Proposition 2 Borrowers are more likely to engage in IJ under group lending than individual
lending: SˆI JG < SˆI J I .17
The implication of this result is that there is a trade-off between minimizing total
meeting costs, and minimizing those costs borne by the lender. It may actually not
be optimal to minimize total costs as shown by the following corollary, the proof of
which is straightforward and given in the appendix. This arises from the fact that in
an environment where the borrowers’ participation constraints are not binding, the
lender does not put weight on the disutility costs of meetings (individual or group)
to the borrowers.
Corollary 1 Suppose S ∈ [SˆI JG, SˆI J I). Borrower welfare under ILG may be higher than
under ILI, even if γv >
γ f
2 .
We have now set the stage to analyze the interaction between meeting costs and
social capital.
3.3 Social capital creation
In this section we show how group lending can actually generate social capital that
is then used to sustain IJ. This analysis is motivated by the findings of Feigenberg
et al. (2011). In their experiment, borrowers who were randomly assigned to higher
frequency repayment meetings went on to achieve higher repayment rates. The au-
thors attribute this to social capital being created by frequent meetings, social capital
which can then support mutual insurance.
We show two main results. Firstly, group lending may create social capital where
individual lending does not. The reason is simply that forcing the borrowers to spend
time together in group meetings gives them an added incentive to invest in getting
to know one another, as this makes the time spent in group meetings less costly. The
knock-on effect is then that individual liability in groups may outperform individual
liability with individual meetings because the groups are creating social capital that
is then being used to support IJ.
17Proof: Borrowers are willing to guarantee their partner’s repayments provided r ≤ δS. Plugging in
for the interest rates under ILG and ILI, we obtain SˆI JG = ρ+
1
2 (γ f+2γv)
δpi I J
<
ρ+γ f+γv
δpi I J
= SˆI J I .
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Secondly, we turn to a comparative static more closely related to the Feigenberg
et al. (2011) finding. Our simple framework does not easily allow us to model varying
meeting frequency, so instead we study the effect on social capital creation of increas-
ing the meeting costs (γ f or γv). We find that an increase in the amount of time spent
in group meetings can induce borrowers to switch to creating social capital, and can
in fact be welfare-increasing.
Suppose that initially borrowers do not have any social capital, because creating
social capital is too costly. For example, borrowers must invest time and effort in
getting to know and understand one another, extend trust that might not be recip-
rocated, and so forth. Assume that social capital can take two values only, 0 and
S > 0 and for a pair to generate social capital worth S in utility terms, each must
make a discrete non-monetary investment that costs them η. To make the analysis
interesting, we assume that in the absence of microfinance, they prefer not to do so,
namely, η > S.
Once we introduce group lending, social capital generates an indirect benefit, by
enabling the formation of a guarantee arrangement. This may or may not be sufficient
to induce them to make the investment - that would depend on how η − S compares
with the insurance gains from
.18
Suppose the lender offers ILI and S is sufficiently large to sustain IJ. If the bor-
rowers prefer to invest in social capital, each time their partner defaults they must
invest in social capital with their new partner. We obtain the following result:
Lemma 2 Borrowers will not invest in social capital under ILI if:
η − S > G1. (3.3)
where
G1 ≡
ph(1− p)
[
δ
(
R¯− ρ
pi I J
)− 1+δpi I J
pi I J
(γ f + γv)
]
(1− δp)(1− δ(p +4(1− p))) .
The proof is given in the appendix. The greater the welfare gain from insurance,
the higher is G1 so the more likely the borrowers will invest in social capital. If (3.3)
holds, the only equilibrium under ILI is one in which the borrowers do not invest in
social capital, and therefore are not able to guarantee one another’s loans.
Now assume that under ILG, the per-meeting cost to borrowers is decreasing in
S. Attending group meetings is a chore unless the other group members are friends,
in which case it can be a social occasion. By forcing the borrowers to meet together,
the lender might give them an incentive to create social capital, benefiting them.
For simplicity, we assume that the cost to the borrowers of the time spent in group
meetings is (1− λ(S))(γ f + 2γv). In particular, λ(0) = 0 and λ(S) = λ > 0. The
larger is λ, the smaller the disutility of group meetings, and when λ > 1, borrowers
18Note that each time a borrower’s partner defaults and is replaced, she must invest in social capital
with the new partner in order to continue with IJ.
164
actually derive positive utility from group meetings that is increasing in the length of
the meeting. We can now check when social capital will be created in groups.
Lemma 3 Borrowers invest in social capital under ILG if:
η − S ≤ G2. (3.4)
where
G2 ≡
ph(1− p)
[
δ
(
R¯− ρ
pi I J
)− 1+2δpi I J2pi I J (γ f + 2γv)]+ λ(1− δp)(γ f + 2γv)
(1− δp)(1− δ(p +4(1− p))) .
The proof is given in the appendix. The greater the welfare gain from insurance,
the higher is G2, but in addition, G2 is increasing in λ, which represents the reduction
in the cost of attending group meetings when the borrowers have social capital. The
larger is G2, the more likely borrowers are to invest in social capital.
Lemmas 2 and 3 suggest that there may exist an interval, (G1, G2] for η − S over
which groups create social capital but individual borrowers do not. The condition
for this to be the case is derived in the next proposition, which follows from straight-
forward comparison of (3.3) and (3.4):
Proposition 3 If the following condition holds:
λ >
ph(1− p)(δpi I Jγv − γ f2 )
4pi I J(1− δp)(γ f + 2γv) (3.5)
then there exists a non-empty interval for η − S over which both (3.3) and (3.4) are satisfied.
If η − S lies in this interval, groups create social capital, and individual lending does not.
This is a key result, as it shows that when creating social capital sufficiently offsets
the cost to borrowers of attending group meetings, borrowing groups may create
social capital and guarantee one another’s loans, while individual borrowers may
not do so. We can see that the threshold for λ in (3.5) is negative if γ f2 > γv > δpi
I Jγv
and so the condition (3.5) is always satisfied if group lending has a cost advantage
to the lender. What can be checked is, even if this is not the case, and δpi I Jγv −
γ f
2 > 0 the critical threshold for λ is always strictly less than 1 and therefore, there
always exists a λ high enough (but strictly less than 1) such that the condition (3.5)
would hold. However it does not yet establish that the use of groups is necessarily
welfare-improving. In other words, observing that groups are bonding and creating
social capital does not tell the observer that group lending is the welfare-maximizing
lending methodology. All it tells us is that investment is preferred to no investment
under ILG, and no investment is preferred to investment under ILI. The welfare
ranking of these two will depend on the meeting costs, η and S. The following
proposition addresses the welfare question.
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Proposition 4 Suppose condition (3.5) is satisfied and η − S ∈ (G1, G2]. Borrower welfare
under ILG is higher than that under ILI if:
η − S ≤ G3 (3.6)
where
G3 ≡
δph(1− p) (R¯− ρ) + 2(1− δpi I J)(γ f + γv)− 12 (1− δp)(γ f + 2γv)(3− 2λ)
(1− δp)(1− δ(p +4(1− p))) .
The proof is given in the appendix. G3 is higher the larger is the meeting cost
under ILI relative to under ILG. It is also increasing in λ, representing the reduction
in the cost of attending group meetings when the borrowers have social capital. Note
that (3.6) is always satisfied for sufficiently large λ.
The expressions G1, G2 and G3 are somewhat unwieldy. The following proposition
establishes a sufficient condition under which G1 < G2 < G3, i.e. there is guaranteed
to exist an interval for η− S over which groups invest in social capital and individuals
do not, and over which borrower welfare is higher under group than individual
lending:
Proposition 5 Suppose total meeting costs per borrower are weakly lower under ILG than
ILI, i.e. γv ≤ γ f2 . Then G1 < G2 < G3, i.e.:
1. There always exists an interval for η − S over which groups create social capital and
individuals do not.
2. Borrower welfare is weakly higher under ILG than ILI for all values of η − S.
The proof is given in the appendix. The condition γv ≤ γ f2 implies that ILG has a
(weak) cost advantage over ILI, as was discussed in Observation 2. In addition, when
G1 < η − S ≤ G2, groups invest in social capital while individuals do not, and this
gives ILG a further advantage.
3.3.1 Meeting frequency and social capital creation
Now we take this basic framework and carry out one particular comparative-static
exercise, motivated by the findings of Feigenberg et al. (2011). They find that groups
that were randomly assigned to meet more frequently have better long-run repay-
ment performance, which they attribute to higher social capital and informal insur-
ance within the group. It is not possible to model repayment frequency in our simple
setup, but nevertheless our model is able to capture some of this intuition.
We model an increase in meeting frequency as an increase in meeting costs, rep-
resented by an increase in either γ f or γv. The more time spent in group meetings,
the greater the benefit from social interaction within those meetings, captured by λ.
Intuitively, it may not be too costly to attend meetings once a month with a stranger,
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but the more frequent those meetings are, the greater the incentive the borrowers
have to build social capital.
However, more frequent meetings require more of the loan officer’s time as well,
leading to higher lending costs and a higher interest rate. This reduces the borrowers’
incentive to invest in S, since the higher meeting costs reduce the value of maintaining
access to credit.
The net effect on borrowers willingness to invest in S is positive if λ is sufficiently
large, as shown by the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Increases in γ f or γv make borrowers under group lending more willing to
invest in social capital if and only if the following condition holds:
λ >
ph(1− p)(1+ 2δpi I J)
2pi I J(1− δp) . (3.7)
The proof is immediate from inspection of (3.4). This proposition implies an
interesting corollary: an increase in meeting costs can actually be welfare-improving,
by inducing borrowers to invest in social capital and thus engage in implicit joint
liability.
Corollary 2 Suppose (3.7) holds. Then there exists a threshold at which increases in the
costs γ f or γv cause group borrowers to switch to creating social capital, and this is welfare-
improving.
The proof is given in the appendix. The reason for this result is that in the neigh-
borhood of (3.4) binding, the no-investment equilibrium is inefficient. A marginal
increase in the meeting cost can be enough to give the borrowers sufficient incentive
to switch to the investment equilibrium, generating a strict welfare increase.
It is worth explaining here why it is that there may not be an investment equilib-
rium even when utility is strictly higher under the investment than the no-investment
equilibrium. In fact the reasoning is straightforward: the welfare cost of switching
from investment to no-investment may be high. This is because of two things: the
repayment rate is lower in the no-investment equilibrium, and the interest rate is
higher. However, a borrower considering whether to deviate under the investment
equilibrium does not consider the effect on the interest rate, since this only changes in
equilibrium. Hence the cost of deviating from a hypothetical investment equilibrium
is lower than the cost of switching from investment to no-investment.
Proposition 3 derives a condition on λ under which groups are better able to cre-
ate social capital than individual borrowers. Proposition 6 simply focuses on group
lending and asks when higher meeting costs actually lead to more social capital cre-
ation. As meeting costs increase, two things occur. Firstly, the lender must charge a
higher interest rate, which reduces borrower welfare and tightens IJ IC2. Secondly,
the cost to borrowers of being in a group with a stranger increase: by creating social
capital the cost to borrowers of time spent in meetings decreases by λ(γ f + 2γv). If
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λ is sufficiently large, the second effect dominates and higher meeting costs increase
the borrowers’ incentive to invest in S.
Feigenberg et al. (2011) show that the improvement in repayment performance
associated with higher meeting frequency approximately offset the increase in the
lender’s cost. This implies that among contracts with group meetings the total sur-
plus was increasing in meeting frequency in their experiment. In our model, all
surplus accrues to the borrower, so condition (3.7) is necessary for there to exist a
region over which total surplus is increasing in the meeting frequency.
If the lender holds the interest rate fixed, as in Feigenberg et al. (2011), borrowers
will be more willing to create social capital for a given increase in the meeting fre-
quency (the extra cost is not passed on through a higher interest rate). However, a
parallel condition must then hold for the increase in repayment frequency to offset
the lender’s costs.
3.4 Simulation
In this section, we simulate a simple extension of the model calibrated to empiri-
cally estimated parameters. This enables us to illustrate the costs and benefits of
explicit joint liability and explore under which environments it will be dominated by
individual liability lending that induces implicit joint liability.
We find that in low social capital environments, EJ does quite well compared to IJ.
For example, when the standard deviation of project returns of 0.5, for social capital
worth 10% of the loan size, the welfare attainable under IJ is 32.4% lower compared
to the welfare under EJ. However, with social capital worth 50% of the loan size, the
welfare attainable under EJ is 5% lower to the one attainable under IJ. We find that
for social capital worth around 25% of the loan size, EJ and IJ perform approximately
equally well in terms of borrower welfare. For lower values of S, EJ dominates, and
for higher values of S, IJ dominates. This analysis thus gives us insights into the
extent of the perverse effect of JL. With high S under IJ, the borrowers now have
enough social capital to help one another when they can afford to do so, but are not
penalized in states of the world where only some of the group can repay. We also
find that the interest rate, repayment rate and borrower welfare are highly insensitive
to social capital under EJ, whereas IJ is highly sensitive to social capital, since the
only sanction available is coming through the social capital. For example, when the
standard deviation of project returns is 0.5, the EJ net interest rate is 11.3%, while
the IJ net interest rate ranges between 10.4% and 21.4% for levels of S valued at 10%
to 50% of the loan size respectively. The difference in the interest rate translates
correspondingly into borrower welfare. If borrowers share social capital worth 10%
of the loan size, the attainable IJ welfare is V I J = 2.29, which is 35.9% lower compared
to the IJ welfare of V I J = 3.57 attained by borrowers who share social capital worth
50% of the loan size. We also find that these welfare and interest rate differentials
between low and high levels of social capital S are increasing in the variance of project
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returns.
From theory we know the basic trade off between EJ, Il and IJ and how that
changes with social capital. What this analysis adds is to give a quantitative magni-
tude to the relevant thresholds and also suggests some policy implications. In low
social capital environments, despite its well known costs (Besley and Coate (1995))
EJ is an effective device to induce repayment incentives and moreover, if the extent
of social capital is not known ex ante it is a robust instrument. It also suggests a high
payoff from encouraging investing in social capital given the welfare implications of
higher S on borrower welfare in IJ.
3.4.1 Approach
We approach the simulations in a very similar way to de Quidt et al. (2012). Firstly,
while it is theoretically convenient to model groups of size two, these require empiri-
cally implausibly high returns to investment for the borrowers to be able to repay on
one another’s behalf, so instead we extend the model to groups of size 5, the group
size originally used by Grameen Bank and others. For simplicity, we carry over our
concept of social capital unaltered to the larger groups. Previously a borrower who
did not help her partner when the repayment rule stipulated she should was sanc-
tioned by her partner. Now we simply assume she is sanctioned by the whole group,
losing social capital worth S.
We express all units in multiples of the loan size and a loan term of 12 months.
For example, if S = 0.15 this means the borrowers have social capital worth 15%
of the loan size. We obtain our parameter values from the estimates in de Quidt
et al. (2012). R¯, the expected return to borrowers’ investments, is set to 1.6, i.e. a 60%
annual return, based on De Mel et al. (2008)’s preferred estimates of the rate of return
to capital among microenterprises in Sri Lanka. The lender’s cost of capital, ρ, is set
to 1.098, which was estimated using lender cost data from the MixMarket database
of financial information from MFIs around the world. Lastly, we set δ equal to 0.864.
This is the midpoint between the value implied by the return on US treasury bills
and a lower bound implied by the model in de Quidt et al. (2012).
The two key ingredients that drive the trade-off between explicit and implicit
joint liability are the level of social capital and the shape of the borrowers’ return
distribution function. We do not have data on social capital, so instead we estimate
the equilibrium interest rate, repayment rate and welfare for a range of values for S.
This enables us to say, for example, how much social capital is required for implicit
and joint liability to perform as well or better than explicit joint liability.
It is more difficult to explore how the shape of the returns distribution affects the
trade-off between EJ and IJ. In the theoretical analysis it was convenient to illustrate
the key intuition using a simple categorical distribution with three output values and
associated discrete probabilities. With larger groups, this distribution function is less
useful. It no longer gives a simple and intuitive set of states of the world in which
EJ does and does not perform well (with a group of size n, there are 3n possible
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states of the world). More problematic is that the distribution has four parameters
(pm, Rm, ph, Rh), only one of which can be tied down by our calibrated value of R¯. As
a result, it is very difficult to perform meaningful comparative statics - there are too
many degrees of freedom.19
Therefore, for the main simulations we use the most obvious two-parameter dis-
tribution function, the Normal distribution.20 Fixing the mean at R¯, we can vary the
shape of the distribution by changing the standard deviation. The range for σ was
chosen to obtain the highest and lowest possible repayment rates at which the lender
is able to break even. For the benchmark simulations, we assume the borrowers’ re-
turns are uncorrelated, but we also allow for positive and negative correlations in an
extension.
To simulate the model, for each contract we work out a welfare-maximizing re-
payment rule for the borrowing group, i.e. one that maximizes the repayment rate,
subject to the borrowers’ incentive constraints. Solving analytically for the equilib-
rium repayment probability (which then gives us the interest rate and borrower wel-
fare) is complex, so instead we simulate a large number of hypothetical borrowing
groups and use these to compute the equilibrium repayment probability. We describe
the simulation approach in detail in appendix 3.B.
3.4.2 Results
The main results for uncorrelated borrower incomes are presented in Figure 3.1. The
standard deviation σ of individual borrower returns is varied on the horizontal axis
of each figure.
For the distribution and parameter values used, it turns out that individual liabil-
ity is in fact marginally loss-making for all σ, so we just present results for implicit
joint liability and explicit joint liability for values S ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5}.
The figures show that increasing the variance of returns is bad for repayment
and thus welfare under both contracts. This is unsurprising: higher variance income
processes are more difficult to insure (the required transfers between members tend
to be larger), so states in which members cannot or will not help one another out
become more common. Increasing S partially mitigates this effect since it increases
the size of incentive-compatible transfers between borrowers.
Our simulated repayment rates vary between around 85% to close to 100% as
the variance of borrower income decreases. These high repayment rates follow from
the fact that the calibrated mean return R¯ is higher than the lender’s cost of funds,
ρ, so perfect repayment is attainable for sufficiently low variance. However, these
values are fairly typical for microfinance repayment rates. For example, in de Quidt
et al. (2012) we conservatively estimate a repayment rate in the MIX Market dataset
19We perform one exercise in the appendix, where we vary ph − pm while holding p, Rh, Rm constant.
The confound here is that the mean return also varies as we vary ph and pm.
20One complication arises, namely the possibility of negative income realizations. For simplicity, we
allow these to occur, but we assume that only borrowers with positive incomes can assist others with
repayment.
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Figure 3.1: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns. Explicit joint lia-
bility results are in the left column and implicit joint liability in the right column.
Each figure plots the relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and borrower wel-
fare) for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The standard deviation of the
individual borrower’s income is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
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of around 0.92. Using the simulated repayment rate, we can obtain the zero-profit
interest rate and borrower welfare. The net interest rate varies between 10% and
30% per year (again, these are not unreasonable values for the microfinance context),
while borrower welfare varies between around 1.8 and 3.7 multiples of the loan size.
One of the most striking lessons we learn from the graphs is that the interest
rate, repayment rate and borrower welfare are highly insensitive to social capital
under explicit joint liability. The reason is that social capital is only shifting the
borrowers from default to repayment in states of the world where they can afford
to help one another and where the joint liability penalty is not already sufficient.
The probability that such a state occurs is lower, the bigger the sample of borrowers.
Meanwhile, implicit joint liability is highly sensitive to social capital, since the only
sanction available is coming through the social capital. For example, at σ = 0.5, the
IJ repayment rate is 91% for S = 0.1, 98% for S = 0.25, and close to 100% for S = 0.5,
while the EJ repayment rate is fixed at 98% throughout.21
In order to more easily compare EJ and IJ, in Figure 3.2 we overlay the welfare
curves for EJ and IJ. The simulation exercise emphasizes much of the core intuition
from the model. When S is low, explicit joint liability tends to dominate since the
joint liability clause gives the borrowers an additional incentive to help one another.
When S is high, implicit joint liability dominates, due to the perverse effect of JL - the
borrowers now have enough social capital to help one another when they can afford
to do so, but are not penalized in states of the world where only some of the group
can repay.
To give a numerical example of the magnitudes of the welfare gains from EJ and
IJ as a function of S, consider the case of a standard deviation of project returns of 0.5.
Here for social capital worth 10% of the loan size for example, the welfare attainable
under IJ, V I J = 2.29 is 32.4% lower compared to the welfare under EJ VEJ = 3.39.
This highlights the clear welfare gains that are possible under EJ in environments
with low S. These gains disappear however for higher levels of S. With social capital
worth 50% of the loan size, the welfare attainable under EJ VEJ = 3.39 is in fact 5 %
lower to the one attainable under EJ V I J = 3.56. The higher levels of social capital
make it incentive compatible to help each other out, when they are able to, while not
being punished when not the whole group is able to repay.
The graph also highlights that the EJ and IJ contracts are almost completely over-
lapping for intermediate values of S = 0.3 of the loan size, suggesting that in environ-
ments with intermediate levels of social capital both contracts can perform equally
well.
While these results illustrate the problems with strict EJ,22 we also interpret them
as showing why EJ should not be prematurely dismissed as an important contractual
21Note that in de Quidt et al. (2012) we find that the interest rate and borrower welfare are sensitive
to social capital when the lender is a monopolist, since higher social capital relaxes IC2, and therefore
enables the lender to increase the interest rate. The non-profit lender, as modeled in this paper, does
not do this.
22Problems that have also received attention in Besley and Coate (1995), Rai and Sjöström (2004),
Bhole and Ogden (2010), Rai and Sjöström (2010) and Allen (2012).
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Figure 3.2: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns. Explicit joint lia-
bility results are in red and implicit joint liability in blue. The figure plots borrower
welfare for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The standard deviation of
the individual borrower’s income is varied on the horizontal axis.
tool (as also recently argued by Banerjee (2012)). Many of the candidates for alter-
native mechanisms discussed in the literature are complex and potentially difficult
to implement, so we have focused on two extremely simple mechanisms that we feel
are empirically relevant. What we find is that implicit joint liability can perform very
well, provided borrowers have enough social capital: borrowers have to be willing to
impose sanctions on one another worth at least 25% of their loan size. Meanwhile EJ
functions well in our simulations even for low levels of social capital. This illustrates
how important the lending environment, and in particular borrowers’ social ties are
for determining the preferred contract in our framework.
3.4.3 Correlated returns
As an extension, we now present simulation results when borrowers’ returns are
correlated. A number of recent papers have analyzed how correlated returns affect
repayment behavior under joint liability lending.23. As a simple extension, we con-
sider how our EJ and IJ borrowers are affected by introducing positively or negatively
correlated returns into the model. We simulate the borrowing group’s per-period in-
come vector [Y1, ..., Yn] as a multivariate Normal distribution. We fix the standard
deviation at 0.5, the midpoint of the range considered in the previous section, and
vary the pairwise correlation between group members from −0.25 to 0.45.24 We
graph the results in Figure 3.4.25
23For example, Laffont (2003), Ahlin and Townsend (2007) and Allen (2012)
24For correlation smaller than −0.25 we essentially have 100% repayment everywhere, and for greater
than 0.45 there is typically no lending equilibrium.
25Note that the graphs are less smooth than those in Figure 3.1. This is because for the benchmark
simulations we are able to reuse the same underlying random draws for each set of output realizations,
simply by rescaling as the standard deviation changes. This is not possible when considering variously
correlated returns, so we need to generate a new sample of borrower output realizations for each value
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The main conclusion from this analysis is that for a given level of social capital, EJ
is sufficiently more sensitive to the strength of correlation between borrower incomes.
EJ requires all loans to be repaid. When borrower incomes are only weakly correlated,
there will typically only be a small number of failures in a group, which are relatively
easy for the other members to assist with. With a strongly positive correlation this is
no longer the case, it becomes more common to have large numbers of failures. In
this environment IJ is an advantage because the borrowers are not penalized when
their partners default. This becomes evident when comparing the gradient of the IJ
curves relative to the EJ curves as the correlation increases.
Figure 3.3: Simulation results for correlated borrower returns. Explicit joint liability
results are in red and implicit joint liability in blue. The figure plots borrower welfare
for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The correlation between pairs of
borrower’s returns is varied on the horizontal axis.
3.5 Conclusion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that there has been a move away from explicit joint
liability towards individual liability by some prominent institutions. Most of these
institutions have retained the use of groups to facilitate credit disbursal. The key
question now is whether groups do more than just facilitate the lender’s operations.
The interest in this question has been strengthened by two recent field experiments
by Giné and Karlan (2011) and Feigenberg et al. (2011).
The first of these, Giné and Karlan (2011), found that removing the joint liability
clause, but retaining the group meetings, of a random subset of borrowing groups of
Green Bank in the Philippines had no meaningful effect on repayment rates, although
borrowers with weak social ties to other borrowers were more likely to drop out.
In this paper we have shown that this outcome may result when the newly in-
of the correlation coefficient, and this naturally introduces some extra noise.
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Figure 3.4: Simulation results for uncorrelated borrower returns. Explicit joint liabil-
ity results are in the left column and implicit joint liability in the right column. Each
figure plots the relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and borrower welfare)
for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The correlation between pairs of
borrower’s returns is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
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dividually liable groups have sufficient social capital to continue to guarantee one
another’s repayments, as under EJ, which we call implicit joint liability (IJ). We show
that this may even lead to higher repayment rates and borrower welfare. However
this first result does not depend upon the use of groups, provided borrowers are able
to side contract on loan repayments outside of repayment meetings.
We next show that when individual and group repayment meetings are costly,
mutual insurance or IJ are easier to sustain under group lending, because IJ depends
crucially on the interest rate, which in turn depends on the share of total meeting
costs borne by the lender. Group meeting reduces the lender’s share of meeting
costs, enhancing the advantages of IJ.
The second experimental paper highlighting the role of groups is Feigenberg et al.
(2011). They find that varying meeting frequency for a subset of individually li-
able borrowing groups seemed to have persistent positive effects on repayment rates.
They suggest that this is due to improved informal insurance among these groups
due to higher social capital.
We analyze situations under which microcredit might induce borrowers to create
social capital, which in turn enables them to sustain IJ. We derive conditions under
which group lending is more likely than individual lending to create social capital,
and show when this is indeed welfare increasing. Finally, relating to one of the
key findings of Feigenberg et al. (2011), we derive conditions under which more
frequent meetings, modeled here as an increase in the amount of time borrowers and
loan officers must spend in loan repayment meetings, increases borrowers’ incentive
to invest in social capital. This provides a theoretical foundation for Feigenberg
et al. (2011)’s observation. We also carry out a simulation exercises to assess the
quantitative magnitudes of the effects of alternative forms of lending, as well as some
of the relevant thresholds of social capital.
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3.A Mathematical appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Comparing the expressions for SˆEJA and Sˆ
I J
A , it is immediate that Sˆ
EJ
A < Sˆ
I J
A
since piEJA = pi
I J
A and δpi
EJ
A R¯− ρ > 0 by Assumption 3.
Now consider Case B. It is obvious that if SˆEJ = 0, SˆI J > SˆEJ , since SˆI J > 0.
Suppose therefore that SˆEJ > 0. It is straightforward to check that Assumptions 1, 2
and 3 imply that δp ≥ 12 . Given this, and ph ≥ pm, it follows that pi I J ≥ p ≥ 12 and
piEJ ≥ p ≥ 12 . Also using the fact that piEJB can be written as p2 + 2ph(1− p). We have:
SˆI J − SˆEJ = δpi
EJ
B R¯− ρ
δpiEJB (1− δpiEJB )
+
ρ
δpi I JB
− ρ
δpiEJB
=
pi I JB (δpi
EJ
B R¯− ρ)− pm(1− p)(1− δpiEJB )ρ
δpi I JB pi
EJ
B (1− δpiEJB )
≥ (δpi
EJ
B R¯− ρ)− pm(1− p)ρ
2δpi I JB pi
EJ
B (1− δpiEJB )
=
δp2R¯− ρ+ ph(1− p)(2δR¯− ρ) + (ph − pm)(1− p)ρ
2δpi I JB pi
EJ
B (1− δpiEJB )
> 0
which follows from 2δR¯− ρ > 0 by Assumption 3.
Proof of Proposition 1
To compare IL and EJ, we consider first Case A, then Case B with ph > pm, and lastly
Case B with ph ≤ pm.
In Case A, borrower repayment guarantees under IL offer no advantage over EJ, so
provided S ≥ SˆEJA , EJ is the borrower welfare-maximizing contract (with indifference
for S ≥ SˆI J). For S < SˆEJA , borrower will not mutually guarantee under EJ and also
default unless their partner is successful, so IL is preferred to EJ:
VEJA (S)−V ILA (S) =

− δp(1−p)(R¯−ρ)
(1−δp)(1−δp2) S < Sˆ
EJ
A
δp(1−p)(R¯−ρ)
(1−δp)(1−δp(2−p)) S ∈ [SˆEJA , SˆI JA )
0 S ≥ SˆI JA
In Case B, with ph > pm, EJ dominates IL when borrowers guarantee one an-
other under EJ but not under IL, for S ∈ [SˆEJB , SˆI JB ), so EJ is preferred in this region.
However, once IJ is possible, for S ≥ SˆI JB , it dominates EJ. This is because borrower 1
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repays her own loan in state (Rm, 0), while she would default under EJ. We have:
VEJB (S)−V ILB (S) =

− δp(1−p)(R¯−ρ)
(1−δp)(1−δp2) S < Sˆ
EJ
B
δ4(1−p)(R¯−ρ)
(1−δp)(1−δ(p+4(1−p))) S ∈ [SˆEJB , SˆI JB )
− δpm(1−p)(R¯−ρ)
(1−δ(p+ph(1−p)))(1−δ(p+4(1−p))) S ≥ Sˆ
I J
B
Lastly, in Case B with ph ≤ pm, EJ is always dominated by IL. This is because
under EJ the highest possible repayment probability is p+4(1− p), which is weakly
smaller than p, the lowest possible repayment probability under IL. Therefore we do
not need to know the ordering of SˆEJB and Sˆ
I J
B for this case - EJ will never be used.
Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose total meeting costs are higher under ILG: 32 (γ f + 2γv) > 2(γ f + γv) or
2γv > γ f . Suppose also that S ∈ [SˆI JG, SˆI J I). Then group lending sustains IJ but
individual lending does not. Welfare is higher under group lending if:
R¯− ρ− 32 (γ f + 2γv)
1− δ(p + ph(1− p)) >
R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv)
1− δp
Taking the limit as γ f → 2γv, it is clear that this condition holds strictly, while
SˆI JG > SˆI J I continues to hold, thus the corollary follows for a non-trivial interval of
costs by a standard open set argument.
Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that ∂
2V
∂r∂pi < 0. Therefore, the benefit of increasing pi is higher when interest
rates are low.
We want to find conditions under which ILI borrowers will not invest in social
capital in equilibrium. To show this, we hypothesize a (low interest rate) equilibrium
in which ILI borrowers do invest, and show that there exists a profitable deviation.
Then, we know that in a (high interest rate) equilibrium in which borrowers do not
invest, they will not wish to deviate to investing; this follows from ∂
2V
∂r∂pi < 0 as noted
above.
Consider then a hypothetical equilibrium in which the borrowers do invest in
social capital and repay with probability pi I J ≡ p + ph(1 − p). They are charged
rˆ = ρ+γ f+γv
pi I J
.
At the beginning of the first period, the borrower and her partner pay cost η and
create social capital. Then, each period with probability p+4(1− p), both loans are
repaid and both contracts renewed. With probability pm(1− p), only borrower i’s
loan is repaid. As a result, at the beginning of the next period, she must again pay
cost η to create social capital with her new partner.26
26Since no social capital is destroyed on the equilibrium path, the S created with the original partner
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Consider an ILI borrower in the first period, or one whose partner has just de-
faulted. We know that IC1 is satisfied, since by repaying her loan she can guarantee
herself at least δ(R¯− (γ f + γv))− ρ+γ f+γvpi I J if she agrees with the new partner to sim-
ply take a loan and default immediately. This expression is positive by the modified
Assumption 3 in footnote 15. Then we note that if it is an equilibrium for the bor-
rower to invest in social capital, it must be that she does even better than this, and
therefore IC1 must hold.
As we are considering an equilibrium in which she invests in social capital, we
use an “IJI” superscript to denote the fact that IJ is taking place. If she invests in
social capital with the new partner, she earns utility U, defined as follows:
U I J I1 = S− η +W I J I1
where
W I J I1 =
(
R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv)
)
+ δ(p +4(1− p))W I J I1 + δpm(1− p)U I J I1 .
The first term in W is the per-period utility under ILI. The second term represents
the continuation payoff when both borrowers repay and have their contracts renewed.
This occurs with probability p +4(1− p). In this case she earns W I J I1 next period.
The third term represents the continuation payoff if she repays but her partner de-
faults, which occurs with probability pm(1− p). In this case she matches with a new
partner and therefore earns U I J I1 next period.
Substituting for W, we can write U as:
U I J I1 = S− η +
(
R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv)
)
+ δpm(1− p)(S− η)
1− δpi I J
=
(
R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv)
)
+ (1− δ(p +4(1− p)))(S− η)
1− δpi I J .
Now we check for a one-shot deviation. In this context, a deviation is to defer invest-
ing in social capital by one period, i.e. to undergo one period without social capital
(and therefore with repayment probability p), then invest in social capital next period.
She prefers to deviate if:
U I J I1 <
(
R¯− pρ+ γ f + γv
pi I J
− (γ f + γv)
)
+ δpU I J I1 . (3.8)
The first term on the right hand side represents the per-period utility of a borrower
under ILI without social capital, paying an interest rate of rˆ = ρ+γ f+γv
pi I J
(intuitively,
since the lender does not know she has deviated, the interest rate is not adjusted).
With probability p her loan is repaid, and in the next period she invests in S, thus
receiving continuation value U I J I1 . Substituting for U
I J I
1 and rearranging yields con-
dition (3.3).
is not lost but cannot be leveraged in the credit contract.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Hypothesize an equilibrium in which borrowers invest in social capital. We know that
IC1 is satisfied, since by repaying her loan she can guarantee herself at least δ(R¯−
(γ f + 2γv)) − ρ+
1
2 (γ f+2γv)
pi I J
if she agrees with the new partner to simply take a loan
and default immediately. This expression is positive by the modified Assumption 3
in footnote 15.
We need to check that no borrower prefers to deviate by deferring their investment
by one period, exactly as in Lemma 2. We define the value functions analogously to
those in the proof of Lemma 2:
U I JG1 = S− η +W I JG1
W I JG1 =
(
R¯− ρ− 1
2
(γ f + 2γv)(3− 2λ)
)
+ δ(p +4(1− p))W I JG1 + δpm(1− p)U I JG1 .
Where the possession of social capital reduces the borrowers’ cost of group meetings
by λ(γ f + 2γv). The appropriate substitutions yield:
U I JG1 =
R¯− ρ− 12 (γ f + 2γv)(3− 2λ) + (1− δ(p +4(1− p)))(S− η)
1− δpi I J .
There will be no deviation if U I JG1 ≥
(
R¯− p ρ+ 12 (γ f+2γv)
pi I J
− (γ f + 2γv)
)
+ δpU I JG1 .
Simplifying yields condition (3.4).
Proof of Proposition 4
Total borrower welfare under ILI (where borrowers do not invest in social capital) is:
V ILI = R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv) + δpV ILI
=
R¯− ρ− 2(γ f + γv)
1− δp
and when groups are used (and the borrowers do invest in social capital) it is:
U I JG1 =
R¯− ρ− 12 (γ f + 2γv)(3− 2λ) + (1− δ(p +4(1− p)))(S− η)
1− δpi I J .
as was derived in the proof of Lemma 3. The result then follows from comparison of
these value functions.
Proof of Proposition 5
First, observe that if γv ≤ γ f2 , condition (3.5) is satisfied for all λ ≥ 0, hence G1 < G2.
From the proof of Lemma 3, η − S ≤ G2 if and only if U I JG1 ≥
R¯−p ρ+
1
2 (γ f +2γv)
piI J
−(γ f+2γv)
1−δp .
Call the RHS of this condition B. From the proof of Proposition 4, η − S < G3 if and
only if U I JG1 > V
ILI . Finally, note that B − V ILI = ph(1−p)(ρ+γ f )+p
( γ f
2 −γv
)
pi(1−δp) , which is
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strictly positive if γv <
γ f
2 . Thus, η − S ≤ G2 implies η − S < G3, or G2 < G3.
Claim 1 follows immediately from G1 < G2 < G3. Claim 2, that borrower welfare
is always higher under ILG, can be broken into three parts. Firstly, if η − S ≤ G1,
both groups and individuals invest in social capital. Then, the cost advantage of
ILG (γv ≤ γ f2 ) implies that welfare is higher under ILG. Secondly, if η − S > G2,
neither groups nor individuals invest in S, and again the cost advantage leads to ILG
dominating. Lastly, if G1 < η − S ≤ G2, groups invest and individuals do not, and
thus ILG dominates by Proposition 4.
Proof of Corollary 2
Suppose condition (3.4) binds, such that a small decrease in γ f causes borrowers to
stop investing in social capital. We want to show that this leads to a discontinuous
decrease in welfare.
Before the change, welfare is:
U I JG1 =
R¯− ρ− 12 (γ f + 2γv)(3− 2λ) + (1− δ(p +4(1− p)))(S− η)
1− δpi I J .
after the change (in the limit as the increase in γ f approaches zero), it is:
V ILG =
R¯− ρ− 32 (γ f + 2γv)
1− δp
since the borrowers can no longer sustain IJ, so the new equilibrium is one in which
they repay with probability p and the interest rate is ρ+
1
2 (γ f+2γv)
p . From condition (3.4)
binding we know that:
η − S =
ph(1− p)
[
δ
(
R¯− ρ
pi I J
)− 1+2δpi I J2pi I J (γ f + 2γv)]+ λ(1− δp)(γ f + 2γv)
(1− δp)(1− δ(p +4(1− p))) . (3.9)
For U I JG1 to be strictly larger than V
ILG we require:
R¯− ρ− 12 (γ f + 2γv)(3− 2λ) + (1− δ(p +4(1− p)))(S− η)
1− δpi I J >
R¯− ρ− 32 (γ f + 2γv)
1− δp
which reduces to
δph(1− p)
(
R¯− ρ− 32 (γ f + 2γv)
)
+ λ(1− δp)(γ f + 2γv)
(1− δp)(1− δ(p +4(1− p))) > η − S.
Substituting for η − S from (3.9) and simplifying, we obtain:
2δρ(1− pi I J) + (1− δpi I J)(γ f + 2γv) > 0
which is satisfied.
More generally, this demonstrates that the no-investment equilibrium is inefficient
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in the neighborhood of η− S = G2. A marginal increase in the meeting cost that gives
the borrowers greater incentive to invest in social capital can lead to a strict increase
in borrower welfare.
3.B Simulation approach
This Appendix outlines the algorithm used to simulate the core model. The sim-
ulation was implemented in R. The intuition of the simulation procedure is very
straightforward. We use a random sample of N groups with n members each. A
group merely constitutes a vector of income realizations. These incomes are drawn
from some distribution function F. We assume that F is a Normal distribution with
µ = R¯ = 1.6, however we allow the standard deviation σ to vary.
Given these income realizations, we compute the repayment rate that would arise
under each contract for a given interest rate r. This process gives us a repayment
probability function pi(r) under either contract.
Given this repayment probability function, we can then compute the break-even
repayment rate and thus the break-even interest rate under each contract, along with
borrower welfare. This then allows us to make comparisons between the two con-
tractual forms.
We now describe in detail how the group-level repayment rate is computed, as
this is different under each contract type due to the different incentive constraints.
We denote an income realization of a group i with n borrowers is represented by
an n-vector, Yi = (y1, ..., yn), where yj is group member j’s income draw.
We want to find a repayment rule analogous to the one outlined in the theory that
allows for larger groups and the continuous output distribution. The most obvious
way to do this is to construct for each Yi a “group bailout fund” that can be used
for transfers between group members to assist with repayments. Since the incentive
constraints differ between EJ and IJ, the construction of the group fund also differs
and is described below.
Group Lending without Joint Liability
The relevant incentive constraint under group lending without joint liability implies
that the maximum amount a group member j is willing to contribute to the group
fund is cij = max(yij, δS). All the transfers are put into a common pool Cj. This pool is
then used to ensure the maximum possible number of repayments. The borrowers are
sorted in ascending order of the amount of transfer they require to repay their own
loan. and transfers made from the fund until it is exhausted.27. If m group members
27This in fact implies that in some cases the worse off borrowers will be bailing out the better off
borrowers. In particular, it may be that an unlucky borrower gives her whole income to a partner to
repay their loan, but defaults on her own loan. This is because the worse off borrowers require a larger
transfer, which is thus less likely to be incentive compatible. This mechanism achieves the maximum
possible repayment rate and therefore maximizes ex-ante expected utility.
This does not imply that a borrower with yj > r would ever default (i.e. be forced to choose between
losing δV and δS. The reason is that all borrowers "above" her in the bail out chain also have y > r, so
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repay, then we obtain a group level repayment rate pii = mn . As this procedure
is repeated for a sample of N groups, we can then estimate the overall repayment
probability as the simple average.
The procedure in pseudo-code:
Group Lending without JL
1. Generate a N × n matrix of income realizations from F.
2. For each possible value of the interest rate r:
(a) For each Yi: compute the maximum level of contributions that each group
member is willing to make to the common pool as cij = max(yij, δS). This
pot amounts to Cij = ∑n cij
(b) Compute the redistributions required by members to ensure repayment as
tij = max(0, r− yij − cij).
(c) Order the required transfer in ascending order and redistribute the pot Cij
until it is exhausted.
(d) Compute the group level repayment rate pii(r).
3. Given all the pii, compute pi(r) = ∑i
pii
N .
Group Lending with Joint Liability
The simulation of this contract is more involved, since the relevant incentive con-
straint is cij ≤ δ(V + S). This implies that in order to construct the repayment rate pi,
a number for the continuation value V is needed. V however, is itself a function of pi.
The method proceeds as follows, for each possible value of r. First, we construct
a set of possible candidates for pi(r), denoted p˜i 28, we calculate the associated V(p˜i).
Given these candidate V˜’s, the group fund Cij is computed as follows. Each member
is willing to contribute at most cij = max(yij, δ(V˜ + S)) toward repayment of the
group’s loan obligations. Explicit joint liability implies that the group will only repay
when Cj = ∑n cij ≥ nr. Thus a group’s repayment rate is pii = I [Cj ≥ nr] ∈ {0, 1}.
Taking the average we obtain the simulated repayment rate given pˆi(V(p˜i)). In other
words, taking as given a value for V(p˜i), the implied repayment rate pˆi is computed.
Then, the true pi (and thus the true V) is found by solving for the fixed point pi =
pˆi(V(pˆi)). By iterating over r, we obtain the schedule pi(r) and the associated V(pi(r)).
The procedure in pseudo code:
are making net positive contributions to the fund, which therefore has a positive "balance" when her
turn comes
28These candidate pi’s exploit the monotonicity of the pi(r) schedule. The upper bound is given by
the previous iteration for a higher r, while the lower bound is globally defined as ρ
(δR¯)
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Group Lending with JL
1. Generate a N × n matrix of income realizations from F.
2. For each interest rate r:
(a) Construct a set of candidates for p˜i(r).
(b) For each p˜i(r):
• For each Yi: compute the maximum level of contributions that each
group member is willing to make to the common pool as cij = max(yij, δ(S+
V(p˜i))). This pot amounts to Cij = ∑n cij
• The group defaults if Cj = ∑n cij < nr
• Compute the group level repayment rate pˆii(p˜i).
3. Given all the pˆii(V( p˜)), compute pˆi(V(p˜i)) as the average and find the fixed
point pi such that pi = pˆi(V(pi)).
3.C Simulation Results for Piecewise Returns
As discussed in the main text, there is no straightforward approach to simulate the
model with the piecewise returns distribution. The problem is one of too many
degrees of freedom. A sensible approach would be to vary the difference between
the parameters ph and pm, as we saw in the main draft that for ph < pm, group
lending with joint liability performs particularly bad. We can vary this difference,
but still hold the sum ph + pm = p¯ fixed, where p¯ = 0.921, as in de Quidt et al.
(2012).29
We still have three parameters to tie down. Namely Rm, Rh and the mean return.
There is no straightforward approach to tie down either of these parameters when
varying the difference between ph and pm. This appendix will show the results from
one pragmatic way. First, we tie down Rm = ρ/p2. This condition is motivated by
assumption 1 for the two player model. It implies that the medium return is high
enough to repay a individual liability loan. Given this and the value of R¯ = 1.6, we
compute Rh imposing the constraint that ph = pm. This thus gives us the value for
Rh, when the difference between ph and pm is zero. Given these fixed values, we
then simply vary the difference between ph and pm, holding everything else constant.
This exercise thus maps somewhat into the table of the two-player model, where the
model suggest that there is only an IL equilibrium for low S and only IJ equilibria
for sufficiently high S. There is no EJ equilibrium in this case however. For ∆ > 0,
the simple model would predict EJ lending for some range of parameter values. In
the two-player model thus, the ∆ is key. For groups with larger size, we would not
expect this simple result to go through as now there are a lot more states of the
29Please refer to this paper for details on how this value was estimated using cross-sectional data
from the MIX Market database
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world. However, when plotting the simulation results as a function of the difference
between ph and pm in figure 3.5, we do see that EJ performs better the larger ph − pm.
However, this may simply be due to the fact that for higher ph relative to pm, the
mean return in this case is changing as well.
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Figure 3.5: Simulation results for piecewise borrower returns distribution. Curves
for explicit joint liability are drawn in red, and implicit joint liability in blue. Each
figure plots the relevant object (repayment rate, interest rate and borrower welfare)
for three levels of social capital, S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5. The difference between ph and pm of
individual borrower returns is varied on the horizontal axis of each figure.
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